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ABSTRACT
Jain, Pawan. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2013. Three Essays on
Financial Markets. Co-Major Professors: Pankaj K. Jain, Ph.D. and Thomas H. McInish,
Ph.D.
This dissertation is composed of three essays. The first essay investigates the
information content of the limit order book (LOB) on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE), a purely order-driven market, for predicting future stock price volatility. We find
that the LOB supply schedule consistently and significantly predicts the future price
volatility. But this predictive power of LOB declines during the extreme market wide
movements. We also find that buy orders are more informative over future price volatility
than sell orders but sell (buy) orders becomes more informative during the extreme
market wide down (up) movement days. Finally, we document that predictive power of
LOB is short lived and markets are efficient over the longer time horizon.
The second essay examines the effect of high frequency trading on market
quality, systemic risk and trading strategies. In 2010 the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the
largest exchange headquartered outside the US, introduced a new trading platform,
Arrowhead, which reduced latency by 99.97% and increased co-located high-frequency
trading from zero to 36% of volume. Arrowhead improved market liquidity and reduced
volatility, but it also amplified systematic risks factors like quotes to trade ratio, orderflow autocorrelation and cross correlation, and tail risks. Arrowhead also affected trading
strategies by increasing trade price predictability and the use of fleeting orders. Cost of
immediacy serves as a channel through which reduced latency affects market quality,
systematic risks, and trading outcome.
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The third essay analyzes the links between corporate finance policies and
investment clienteles by comparing the cross-sectional variation in the dividend payout
policies of companies across 32 countries. Beyond the impact of firm-specific accounting
and financial variables, this study investigates how the country level variations:
shareholder demand due to demographic variations and consumption needs, agency
problems manifested in the extent of minority shareholder protection and business
disclosures, and market quality in terms of transparency and liquidity; affect dividend
payout policies. We find that firms have generous dividend payout policies when diverse
shareholder demands are strong, extents of business disclosures and legal protections are
weak, and the market qualities are poor. The empirical evidence supports the presence of
strong dividend clienteles in a global setting.
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PREFACE
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is under review at the Review of financial Studies
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is under review at the Pacific Basin Finance Journal
Chapter 3 of this dissertation has been has been accepted for publication at the Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation comprises three essays on financial markets. The first two
chapters focus on trading and technology and the third chapter on dividends spans
investments and corporate finance.
In the first essay I investigate the information content of the limit order book
(LOB) on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), a purely order-driven market, for
predicting future stock price volatility. I also analyze how this relationship evolves during
extreme market conditions. Using the minute-by-minute stock market data and
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models, I find strong
evidence that the LOB supply schedule consistently and significantly predicts the future
price volatility. But this predictive power of LOB declines during the extreme market
wide movements. I also find that buy orders are more informative over future price
volatility than sell orders, but sell (buy) orders becomes more informative during the
extreme market wide down (up) movement days. Finally, I document that the predictive
power of LOB is short lived and markets are efficient over the longer time horizon.
These results are helpful in understanding market efficiency and traders’ order
submission strategies on the fast growing market of SHSE.
In the second essay I analyze how the reduction in latency on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange as a result of the introduction of the Arrowhead trading platform in 2010
affected market quality, systematic trading risk, and trading strategies. Using data from
the Nikkei Economic Electronic Database Systems (NEEDS) dataset and generalized
least squares regression model, I find that Arrowhead improved market quality and the
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price discovery by increasing trading volume, LOB liquidity, and the number of trades
and by reducing intraday return volatility. I extend the literature in newer directions by
showing that Arrowhead amplified systematic trading risks by increasing order flow
autocorrelations and cross correlations, and the quotes-to-trade ratio. Furthermore,
Arrowhead increased the exposure to these systemic risks even more during tail risk
events, indicating that low latency markets could benefit from safety features such as kill
switches, circuit breakers, and rigorous software testing. The results further document
that Arrowhead has significantly changed the trading outcomes by increasing the price
placement predictability and the frequency of fleeting order executions. The effects of
Arrowhead are more pronounced for the large-cap stocks. Finally, I show that COI serves
a channel through which Arrowhead affect market quality, systematic risk, and trading
strategies.
In the third essay I present a global test of the dividend clientele theory. I compare
the cross-sectional variation in the dividend payout policies of companies across 32
countries. Beyond the impact of firm-specific accounting and financial variables, this
chapter investigates how the country level variations, such as shareholder demand due to
demographic variations and consumption needs, agency problems manifested in the
extent of minority shareholder protection and business disclosures, and market quality in
terms of transparency and liquidity; affect dividend payout policies. The results support
the presence of strong dividend clienteles. I find that firms headquartered in countries
with a lower proportion of senior citizens, generous universal health care, higher investor
overconfidence, lower proportion of foreign investors, lower agency costs, a liquid and
transparent market, and higher taxes have clients for firms with lower dividend payouts.
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Chapter 2
Predicting Future Price Volatility:
Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Limit Order Market
1. Introduction
The growth in electronic execution systems worldwide has been explosive, and
new stock markets are almost exclusively electronic. An electronic limit order book
(LOB) which allows traders to post bids and offers on the system provides information
about aggregate liquidity supply and trading interests. The dynamics of LOB has been
studied for many different markets.1 One of the limitations of the earlier studies is that
they analyze only the top of the LOB information, which does not present the complete
picture, especially for electronic LOB with greater transparency2.
Measures which incorporate information beyond the top of the LOB present a
more comprehensive assessment of current LOB liquidity because buy and sell orders can
cluster away from the best bid and ask prices (Rosu, 2009).3 Cao, Hansch and Wang
(2009) find that the depth of limit orders behind the top of the book quotes significantly
contribute to price discovery on the Australian Stock Exchange. Following Biais, Hillion
and Spatt (1995), Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) formally define the LOB Slope as a

1

Notable studies include Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Harris and
Hasbrouck (1996) and Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness (1999) on the U.S. Market.
2

Many markets now display top 5 quotes or more, for e.g. Shanghai Stock Exchange continuously
displays the top 5 quotes and associated depth and Tokyo Stock Exchange displays top 7 quotes and
associated depth to public.
3

Goettler, Parlour, Rajan’s (2005) model proves that midpoint of the quoted prices in a LOB is
not a good proxy for the true value. Aitken, Almeida, Harris and McInish (2007) show that traders display
liquidity simultaneously at multiple prices and hence top of the book does not provide a comprehensive
description of LOB liquidity. Rosu (2009) models this behavior of LOB.
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comprehensive LOB liquidity measure and analyze the information content of LOB in
explaining the price volatility on Oslo Stock Exchange.4 However, most of these studies
analyze the hybrid markets and the absence of any market intermediary on SHSE may
significantly change the LOB dynamics.
We extend this literature by investigating the comprehensive LOB measures in
explaining the volatility in an emerging, purely order driven and highly volatile market of
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). There are no market makers on SHSE and hence,
orders placed on LOB do not reflect the price stabilizing activities of a market
intermediary. Additionally, the trading on SHSE is dominated by the individual investors
and short-selling is prohibited during our sample period, which minimizes the order
slicing and price correction activities of the sophisticated informed investors.5 These
unique features of SHSE provide us with a cleaner set of LOB data to provide additional
evidence on the predictability of individual investors trading interests captured in LOB
for the future price volatility.
Investigating the relation between the liquidity and future price volatility can
provide insights about how information is incorporated into prices. Volatility is a major
determinant of options prices (Foucault, 1999, Hasbrouck and Saar, 2002), and plays an
important role in execution strategies and investment decisions (Fleming Kirby, and
Ostdiek, 2003). Placing a limit buy (sell) order can be viewed as writing a free out-ofmoney put (call) option (Copeland and Galai, 1983). The option-like feature of the limit
4

LOB Slope measures the change in quantity supplied in LOB per unit change in prices. A higher
number for the LOB slope measure is associated with overall better liquidity of the LOB.
5

Foucault, Sraer, Thesmar (2011) report that trading activity of retail investors (behave as noise
traders) has a positive effect on the volatility of stock.
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orders amplifies the influence of liquidity provisions on volatility. Foucault, Moinas, and
Theissen (2007) suggest that a thin LOB leads to higher realized volatility.
We test several hypotheses on the relationship between LOB liquidity measures
and volatility for stocks traded on SHSE. First, we characterize the shape of the LOB by
computing various composite measures of liquidity based on the first 5 steps of bid and
ask prices and the corresponding bid volume and ask volume, which more accurately
captures the LOB liquidity. By using these advanced LOB measures in addition to the
tradition measures, such as bid-ask spreads, depth, and trading volume, we conduct a
horse race to test which of the liquidity measure has the higher predictive power about
future price volatility. Next, we compare the predictive power of buy and sell orders to
test if the two types of orders have different information content about the future price
volatility. Finally we analyze the predictive power of LOB during the extreme market
conditions and over increased time horizon.
We find that higher LOB slope leads to lower future return volatility. A higher
LOB slope indicates a highly liquid market that can easily accommodate large buy or sell
volumes, without affecting prices significantly. This in turn results in a low future return
volatility. We also find that during the extreme market movements the informativeness
of LOB slope over future price volatility declines, consistent with the notion that during
the periods of high volatility, market participants protect themselves by withdrawing
depth and in certain cases, moving away from the LOB (Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2004).
Next we show that LOB slope on bid side is significantly more informative in
explaining future return volatility than the LOB slope of ask side which supports the
findings in Keim and Madhavan (1996). We also show that during extreme market-wide
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up (down) movement days, the informativeness of bid- (ask-) side LOB is higher as
traders, on average, may herd together during extreme market-wide movements by
buying during a market rise or selling during a market decline (Dennis and Strickland,
2002; Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood, 2004).
Finally, we document that LOB’s informativeness for return volatility is shortlived and LOB’s predictive power declines significantly when we consider the longer
time intervals of 5 minutes or 30 minutes.
Overall, our results are helpful in understanding the market efficiency and the
trader’s order submission strategy on the fully electronic, purely order driven and fastest
growing market of SHSE. Historically, Chinese markets have been more volatile than
other major stock markets (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Return volatility across major world stock markets
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Due to the growing importance of Chinese economy and unique characteristics of
Chinese financial markets, knowledge of volatility evolution for the stocks listed on
SHSE can provide interesting insights to investors who hope to have a better
understanding of this important emerging market.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Liquidity-Volatility relation
Traditionally, limit orders are viewed as non-aggressive orders that supply
liquidity to the market while market orders are viewed as aggressive orders that demand
liquidity (Glosten, 1994; Seppi, 1997). Therefore, the information content of the LOB is
linked to the question of whether informed traders use the limit orders. Consistent with
Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Kaniel and Liu (2006) provide a theoretical model based
on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that supports the use of limit orders by informed traders
when the information is long lived. Using an experimental design, Bloomfield, O’Hara,
and Saar (2005) find that in an electronic market, informed traders submit more limit
orders than market orders.
Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) present a theoretical model for a limit
order market where traders differ in terms of their private information about future
volatility. According to their model, the LOB is a conduit for volatility information
because of the option-like features of limit orders. As prices of option depend on
volatility, limit order traders should incorporate volatility information in their limit order
submissions. Therefore, the LOB should contain private volatility information.
Empirical findings regarding the informativeness of the LOB for future volatility,
are presented in Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) and Pascual and Veredas (2006). Ahn, Bae,
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and Chan (2001) find a negative relation between the market depth and future short term
price volatility for the 33 component stocks in the Hang Seng index of the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong. Pascual and Veredas (2006) support these findings. Naes and
Skjeltorp (2006) capture the LOB liquidity by measuring the LOB slope and find a
negative relationship between the liquidity and future return volatility for the large and
medium cap stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). OSE is the only regulated
market in Norway and is very focused on energy sector companies that comprise over
50% of its market capitalization6. Also, on OSE, trading is dominated by institutional
investors with some intermediation by the market makers (Bessembinder, Hao, and
Lemmon, 2011). We extend the current literature by analyzing the LOB on a pure order
driven market with no market makers and with trading dominated by retail investors.7 We
test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis I. Steeper LOB Slope leads to lower future price volatility.
2.2. Informativeness of buy orders versus sell orders
Burdett and O'Hara (1987) observe that large buyers are more likely to be
motivated by information than large sellers. Similarly, Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and
White (2000) also provide evidence that aggressive buy orders on the Toronto Stock
Exchange are more informative than aggressive sell orders. Keim and Madhavan (1996)
suggest that the reasons for this asymmetric price response is that institutional purchases
create new long positions and are more likely to be based on private information whereas

6

http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng

7

Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) document that market design and operations are very
different for SHSE than any European or the US markets.
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institutional sells can be based on reasons other than information (for e.g. liquidity based
reasons). Chan and Lakonishok (1993) give a similar argument. Institutional investor’
sell orders do not necessarily convey negative information as the sell decision is based on
the limited alternatives among the existing portfolio to sell a stock. In contrast, the buy
decisions are based on virtually all the stocks trading in the market and hence, are more
likely based on positive firm-specific news. Based on these findings, we argue that the
information advantage of buyers over sellers are not only limited to the institutional
investors or market orders, but also extends to the retail investors and less aggressive
limit orders. Also since, short selling is prohibited on SHSE, informed investors cannot
participate in correcting the temporary mispricing by shorting, which will result in fewer
proportions of informed investors selling than buying. Hence, the sell orders are expected
be less informative than buy orders on SHSE. Therefore, we test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis II. The limit orders on the bid side are more informative about future return
volatility than the limit orders on the ask side.
2.3. Predictive power of LOB during extreme market movement
Limit order traders are considered as passive traders who supply liquidity to the
market and hence they are faced with many risks such as the pickoff risk (risk that they
trade with someone possessing superior information), and the risk associated with price
uncertainty. During periods when these risks are heightened, limit order traders may
strategically choose to reduce liquidity supply, either by shifting depth away from the
quotes or reducing the depth provided at a given price. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004)
show that during periods with heightened uncertainty, the value of the free option
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associated with supplying liquidity via an electronic LOB becomes so high that market
participants protect themselves by withdrawing depth and in certain cases, moving away
from the LOB. Hence, information content of LOB should change during the extreme
market movement days.
Lipson and Puckett (2007) find that, on average, institutions trade in the opposite
direction of large market moves. They find that institutions provide some measure of
price stability by trading against the market. Hence, the supply schedule in the LOB
should reflect the information of the informed, which should increase the informativeness
of the LOB about future price volatility.
This contradicts the findings in Dennis and Strickland (2002) that show traders,
on average, herd together during extreme market-wide movements by buying during a
market rise and selling during a market decline to a degree that drives prices beyond
fundamental values. Hence, the LOB should become less informative over future price
volatility during extreme market movement periods. Using the newer comprehensive
LOB measures that present a more complete assessment of current LOB liquidity, we
provide additional empirical evidence on this debate by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis III. Informativeness of LOB over future price volatility decreases during the
extreme market movements.
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) show that the market conditions
affect institutional trading and investors have to pay a higher premium for liquidity when
they trade on the same side of the market. This finding suggests that the liquidity
available on ask- (bid-) side is lower during the market wide up (down) movement days.
Hence, a sell (buy) trade depleting the already lower liquidity supply on the bid- (ask-)
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side should result in higher volatility during the market wide down (up) movement days.
We test this prediction by analyzing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis IV. Informativeness of LOB on the ask- (bid-) side over future price
volatility increases during the extreme market down (up) movements.
Most of the studies analyzing the extreme market conditions have focused on the
developed markets and trading activity of institutional traders. The analyses in these
studies have also been limited to the top of the LOB information. Hence, a
comprehensive analysis of the LOB during the extreme market movements for stocks
listed on the emerging market of SHSE should provide interesting insights as SHSE has
been more volatile than other major world stock markets (Figure 1). Also, trading on
SHSE is dominated by individual investors who are not sophisticated enough to quickly
adapt their trading strategies to changing volatility.
3. The data
Our sample includes one year of LOB data from January 1, 2009 through
December 31, 2009 for all the companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange. We obtain
these data from the Beijing Gildata RESSET data tech company ltd (RESSET) database,
which comprises of every order and trade for the firms listed on the SHSE. The dataset
also includes data from the pre-trading and post-trading periods; those observations are
removed for the final sample. We eliminate obvious data errors such as trades with zero
prices or zero volume, limit orders with bid greater than ask, and limit orders with zero
limit price.8 We estimate the LOB liquidity measures using all the quotes and quote sizes
on both sides of the market at the end of every one-minute interval. Our liquidity
8

Data cleaning results in deletion of less than 0.5% of the data.
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measures capture the supply of liquidity offered by the traders at and away from the best
bid and best ask, throughout the five steps on both the ask and the bid side of the market.
Since we measure LOB liquidity at the end of each minute of trading, our liquidity
measures, in some sense, are measures of residual liquidity at any given instant, in our
case, end of each minute. Trades matched and executed within each minute are not part
of the LOB. In order to account for the effect of liquidity demanding market orders we
include average trade size (ATS) and number of trades (NTRD) per minute of trading as
control variables.
3.1. Institutional Background
SHSE is a purely order-driven market without any designated market makers. It
runs an electronic automated trading system and opens from Monday to Friday with three
daily sessions: 0915–0925 for call auction, 0930–1130 and 1300–1500 for continuous
trading double auction. Both limit orders and market orders are allowed on SHSE. Orders
are valid for one day and are stored in the LOB, of which the best five bid and ask prices
and the corresponding depths of the book are revealed continuously to public investors.
The tick size (minimum price variation unit) is 0.01 RMB while the minimum trading
unit is 100 shares (one lot). In the pre-trading call auction, submitted orders are batched
for execution, resulting in an equilibrium opening price that maximizes the total trading
volume. In the subsequent trading sessions, submitted buy and sell limit orders are
matched continuously based on the price and time priority rules. While the matched
orders result in a trade, the unmatched orders remain in the order queues in the LOB,
waiting for future executions for the rest of the trading day.
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Trading on SHSE is dominated by individual investors: 99.5% of the 68.8 million
domestic investor accounts in 2006 were held by individual investors (Ng and Wu, 2007).
Short selling is absolutely prohibited on SHSE during the sample period. Also, to dampen
extreme price movements and to provide a cool-off period in the events of overreaction,
SHSE currently sets the daily price limit at 10% (Chan, Menkveld and Yang, 2007; Ng
and Wu, 2007).9
4. Measures of liquidity
Liquidity is difficult to define and even more difficult to estimate. Kyle (1985, p.
1316) notes that ‘‘liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, in part because it
encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets, these include tightness,
depth, and resiliency’’. Empirical liquidity definitions span from direct trading costs
(tightness), measured by the bid–ask spread (quoted or effective), to indirect trading costs
(depth and resiliency), measured by price impact. Traditionally liquidity, measured from
the top of the LOB quotes and trades, include spreads and depth. But these traditional
measures based on top of the book information do not provide a complete analysis of
LOB liquidity because buy and sell orders can cluster away from the best bid and ask
prices (Rosu, 2009). Hence, in addition to these traditional measures we also investigate
couple of newer comprehensive measures of liquidity that are more relevant in the
context of a pure limit order markets: LOB Slope and Cost to Trade (CTT). LOB Slope is
a measure of resiliency of the full LOB and COI measures tightness and depth of the
LOB.

9

Burdekin and Siklos (2012) provide a very good description of the history of SHSE.
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4.1. LOB slope
The LOB Slope, developed by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), describes how the
quantity supplied in the LOB changes with price. A higher value of LOB Slope suggests
that larger quantities can be traded with very little price impact. Hence, a steeper LOB
Slope represents liquid markets. Following Naes and Skjeltorp (2006), we measure the
LOB slope for firm i at time t, as follows:

where

i,t and

i,t represent

the slope of the bid and ask side,

respectively. The LOB slope for the bid side for firm i at time t, is given as:

∑
{

}

Similarly, the LOB slope for the ask side can be given as:

{

∑

}

where NB and NA are the total number of bid and ask orders, respectively. τ denotes tick
levels, with τ = 0 representing the best bid-ask mid-point and τ > 0 representing the
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subsequent ask (bid) quote with positive share volume. p0 is the best bid-ask mid-point
and

and

is the natural logarithm of accumulated total share volume at the price

level

and

, respectively. In other words,

(

) is the natural logarithm of

cumulative share volume supplied (demanded) at

or lower (higher). At the end

of each minute, we use the five best bid and ask quotes together with the share volume at
these quotes for the calculation of the LOB slope.10
4.2. The cost-to-trade (CTT): an enhanced depth measure
Another measure of the liquidity provided in the LOB is based on how well high
volume orders are handled. A deep LOB can absorb a sudden surge in the demand of
liquidity with minimal price impact. Market buy (sell) orders are first executed against
the limit sell (buy) orders at the best ask (bid) and subsequently walk down (climb up) the
book for execution of the remaining volume at inferior prices. Similarly, when multiple
orders arrive successively, the orders arriving later may have to walk down or climb up
the book. The further that market order walks up or down the book, the larger is the
difference between the execution price and the mid-quote, and, therefore, the more costly
the trading process will be for the market order traders (Irvine, Benston, and Kandel,
2000).
To calculate our measure of CTT, we follow Kang and Yeo (2008). For each
stock, we estimate the impact of a sudden surge in the demand for liquidity separately on
the buy and the sell sides, equivalent to 1% of average daily trading volume. Let T be the

10

We divide the slope measure by 100 to scale the parameter estimates in the regressions in the
next sections.
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total number of shares to be bought or sold. We denote the jth best bid (ask) price as PjBuy
(PjSell) and the jth best bid (ask) size as QjBuy (QjSell). We define two indicator variables,
IkBuy and IkSell, which refer to number of shares bought or sold respectively at each price
point, k.
∑

(

∑

)

∑

∑

{
∑

(

∑

)

∑

∑

{

Then, we compute the (round-trip) cost-to-trade for stock i as the proportion of
the trading cost calculated above to the fair value of the trade, which is estimated by
multiplying the total number of shares to be traded with the best bid offer mid-quote price
level:

∑

(

)
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table1 provides summary statistics for all the 823 stocks listed on SHSE. We
average the variables across one minute intervals for each stock and then across stocks.
We present the means for the whole sample and also for large cap, mid cap and small cap
stocks classified on the basis of market capitalization. The mean volatility for the stocks
traded on SHSE is 0.18% per minute of trading. The small cap stocks are more volatile
than the large and midcap stocks. The trading price, the daily volume and the market
capitalization decreases with firm size. The mean LOB slope for all the sample stocks is
32.77. The LOB slope is gentler for Chinese stocks than the Norwegian stocks (see Naes
and Skeltorp, 2006). Hence, SHSE is less liquid than Norwegian stock market. One of the
reasons could be that SHSE is a purely order driven market with dominant retail trading
and hence, there is larger variability in order volume for a given change in price.

Accumulated % Volume
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60
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20
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0
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2
Bid Side<------ Tick ----->Ask Side

Figure 2. Limit Order Book of a typical stock on SHSE
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics
We present the summary statistics for all the firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange
for the period from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. For each firm, at the end of
each minute of trading, we calculate the VOLATILITY, which is the conditional variance of
from the return equation (5), TRADE PRICE is the average trading price for the sample
stocks, VOLUME is the average trading volume, MARKET CAP is the average market
capitalization of the stock, the slope for the five best bids (BIDSLOPE) and five best asks
(ASKSLOPE), using equations (1) and (2), in turn. SLOPE is the average of BIDSLOPE
and ASKSLOPE. CTT measures the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear above the
intrinsic value due to a sudden surge in the demand of liquidity of the 1% of the daily
average trading volume, CTTBUY is the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to buy
1% of the daily average trading volume, CTTSELL is the cost that liquidity demanders
have to bear to sell 1% of the daily average trading volume. We also calculate the
following variables for each firm: SPREAD is the mean percentage spread over each
minute of trading. DEPTH is the sum of the depth at the best bid and best ask at the end of
each minute of trading. NTRD is the number of transactions for each stock per minute of
trading, and ATS is the average trade size during each minute. We present the mean values
for each variable across firms for all firms together, and for large, mid, and small firms,
classified by market capitalization.

All firms
(n = 823)
0.18%

Large
(n = 275)
0.14%

Market capitalization
Medium
Small
(n = 274)
(n = 274)
0.17%
0.22%

VOLATILITY (per
minute)
TRADE PRICE
11.47
15.52
10.48
(Rmb)
VOLUME (daily
67,934
119,797
51,122
average)
MARKET CAP
11,671
31,940
2,116
(millions of Rmb)
Comprehensive LOB Liquidity Measures (minute by minute)
SLOPE
32.77
42.72
BIDSLOPE
32.88
42.86
ASKSLOPE
32.66
42.58
CTT
0.0121
0.0095
CTTBUY
0.0119
0.0090
CTTSELL
0.0122
0.0097
Traditional Liquidity Measures (minute by minute)
SPREAD
0.16
0.13
DEPTH
34,631
59,637
NTRD
6.83
8.30
ATS
7,909
12,183
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8.39
32,695
883

30.67
30.78
30.55
0.0117
0.0113
0.0119

24.89
24.91
24.87
0.0151
0.0149
0.0153

0.16
24,488
6.78
6,431

0.19
19,621
5.40
5,098

Figure 2 plots the LOB for a typical stock listed on SHSE and we observe that a
large proportion of order volume is placed away from the quote midpoint which results in
gentler LOB slope. We support the theoretical predictions of Rosu (2009) that limit
orders cluster away from the best quotes. Hence, in order to accurately measure the
liquidity provisions of the LOB on SHSE one needs to consider the liquidity supply
beyond the top of the book. The mean LOB slope for large cap stocks of 42.72 is almost
twice the mean LOB slope for the small cap stocks. Thus, the LOB slope is steeper for
large cap stocks than for medium cap and the small cap stocks. We also observe that the
bid side slope is steeper than ask side slope.
The table also reports that the mean for CTT liquidity measure is 0.0121, i.e., the
round-trip cost of market-orders is 1.21% higher than the round-trip cost of limit orders.
The CTT is higher for small cap stock as compared to large- and mid-cap stocks. For
large cap stocks, CTT is 0.95% more for aggressive trading using market orders than for
passive trading using limit orders.
The bid-ask spread is lower for large cap stocks and increases with the firm size,
while the depth at the best quote is the highest for large cap stocks and declines with the
firm size. Large caps stocks trade 8.3 times every minute while mid cap stocks trade 6.78
times each minute and small cap stocks trade 5.40 times each minute. A similar pattern
appears for average trade size.
Table 2 presents the correlations between return volatility and measures of
liquidity and between the various measures of liquidity. The LOB slope is significantly
negatively related to return volatility which supports our Hypothesis I. Hence, the steeper
the LOB slope the lower is the return volatility. We also find that average trade size is
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significantly positively related to the return volatility, which supports Gallant, Rossi, and
Tauchen (1992) findings. We also observe that LOB slope is significantly negatively
related to CTT and spreads and significantly positively related to number of trades and
depth at best quotes. However, a low magnitude of correlation coefficient between LOB
Slope and other liquidity measures suggests that LOB Slope contains significantly
different information about LOB liquidity than the other traditional liquidity measures. In
the later sections we analyze these relationships in more details using the GARCH
models.

Table 2.
Correlation coefficients for key variables
We report the Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients among the various
measures of liquidity and volatility. VOLATILITY is the conditional minute by minute
variance of from the return equation (5). The various measures of minute by minute
liquidity are the average of slope for the five best bids and five best asks (SLOPE), the
cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to trade 1% of the daily average trading
volume (CTT), mean spread (SPREAD), Depth is the average volume at the best bid and
best ask (DEPTH), NTRD is the number of transactions for each stock per minute of
trading, and ATS is the average trade size during each minute of trading.
VOLATILITY SLOPE
VOLATILITY
1.00
SLOPE
-0.15*
1.00
ATS
0.16*
0.01
NTRD
0.07
0.18*

ATS

NTRD

1.00
0.20*

1.00

CTT

CTT

0.06

-0.26*

0.08

-0.07

1.00

SPREAD

0.05

-0.22*

0.01

-0.10

0.36*

DEPTH

0.04

0.17*

0.17*

* Significant at 5%
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0.15*

-0.10

SPREAD DEPTH

1.00
-0.03

1.00

5.2. GARCH vs. Auto-Regressive model for volatility
We use two different model specifications to analyze the relationship between
liquidity and future return volatility. First, we consider the following two stage autoregressive model (Schwert, 1989) to analyze the relation between future price volatility
and liquidity:

∑

where,

∑

is the return on a stock for minute t+1, and

(5)

is a day-of-the-week dummy

for day k. To avoid measurement errors due to the bid-ask bounce, we calculate returns
from the average of bid-ask prices (mid-quote) at the end of each minute. The 12 lagged
return regressors are included to account for short-term movements in conditional
expected returns. The residual, εt+1, is our estimate of the unexpected return for a stock at
time t+1. The absolute value of this measure constitutes our measure of volatility. In the
second stage we run the following regression model to analyze the relationship between
liquidity and future return volatility:

|

∑

|

LIQUIDITYi,t is one (or combination) of the following liquidity measures: Spread, Depth,
Average trade size, Number of trades, LOB slope, and Cost-to-trade, for a stock at time t,
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Mt+1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise,

is the

residual from the return equation (5).11
But, as pointed out by Schwert (1989) and Pagan and Ullah (1988), the above
model specification has error in variable problem along with other econometric issues.12
So, to take care of this econometric problem, we use the following GARCH(1,2)
specification:

∑

∑
(7)

is the return on a stock for minute t+1,

is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,

is the conditional variance of residual from the return equation,

,

is

one (or combination) of the following liquidity measures: Spread, Depth, Average trade
size, Number of trades, LOB slope, and CTT, for each stock at time t,
variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, and

is a dummy

is the residual from the

return equation. The selection of GARCH(1,2) model is based on AIC and SIC criterions
that balance the tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency in model constructions.
GARCH(1,2) has the lowest AIC and SIC values.

11

Our results are robust even after controlling for intra-day seasonality.

12

Pagan and Ullah (1988) find that two stage estimations using equations (5) and (6) lead to
inconsistent estimates as the true volatility is observed with errors. Bollerslev and Domowitz (1991) notes
that the two stage OLS model do not account for volatility clustering observed in the data.
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We conduct the analysis using both the above mentioned model specifications.
Since, the results from the two models are qualitatively similar, we present only the
results from GARCH(1,2) analyses in the next sections.
5.3. Volatility and Traditional Liquidity Measures
Supporters of the specialist system often argue that immediacy of execution is
critical for a well-functioning capital market and that a designated market maker is
necessary for guaranteeing continuous immediacy at a reasonable cost. One of the most
frequently examined measures of liquidity is the quoted bid-ask spread. The difference
between the quotes represents the round trip cost of immediately reversing a trade
position. As SHSE has no designated market maker who can provide the last moment
liquidity to maintain a relatively narrow bid-ask spread, spread is determined by the
aggregate liquidity supplying limit orders. Hence, it is of particular interest to understand
the variation in bid-ask spread in the purely order driven SHSE. We also test the
informativeness of the top of the LOB depth for future volatility.
Several trade based measures have also been widely used in the literature on the
relationship between liquidity and volatility. Grundy and McNichols (1989) suggest that
informed traders prefer to trade large amounts at any given price. Hence, trade size is
likely to be positively related to the quality of information possessed and will, therefore,
be correlated with price volatility (Chan and Fong, 2000). On the other hand, other
theoretical models indicate that an informed trader may camouflage his trading activity
by splitting one large trade into several small trades (Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer,
1988). Thus, trade size will not necessarily convey private information. Jones, Kaul, and
Lipson (1994) empirically investigate the volume-volatility relation for a sample of
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Nasdaq stocks and find that number of trades virtually fully explains the volatilityvolume relation. Stocks listed on SHSE provide an ideal platform to revisit this debate.
Trading on SHSE is dominated by individual investors who are not sophisticated enough
to slice the larger orders for better execution.
To investigate the liquidity–volatility relationship in the Chinese equity market,
we start by including the conventional measures only to estimate the following
GARCH(1,2) models:

∑

∑

(8)
(9)

(10)

is the return on a stock for minute t+1,
is the conditional variance of

is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,

from the return equation, SPREADt is the

proportionate spread, DEPTHt is the average volume at the best bid and best ask, ATSt is
the average trade size, and NTRDt is the number of transactions for each stock for period
t. Mt+1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise,

is the

residual from the return equation. The regressions are estimated for each stock and then
the parameter estimates are averaged across stocks.
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Table 3, Panel A summarizes the results from the estimation of the GARCH(1,2)
models given by return equation in conjunction with equations 8, 9 and 10, respectively,
using the high frequency, minute by minute data for all stocks in our sample. The
average coefficient of spread is positive at 0.13 in the standalone model (1), 0.20 in
model (2) and 0.11 in the full regression model (3). Thus, a higher spread is followed by
higher future volatility. The coefficient on Spread is statistically significant for 39% of
the sample stocks and of those, 95% of the coefficients are positive. The percentage of
firms with significant coefficient for Spread declines to 32% in model (3) which includes
all the liquidity measures. Average trade size (ATS) turns out to be the best predictor of
future price volatility among all the traditional liquidity measures considered in our
study. ATS significantly positively predicts future price volatility for 84% of the sample
firms included in our study.
We re-estimate the full regression model for the three different size portfolios and
the results are summarized in Table 3, Panel B. In general, the results from estimating
separate regression models for each size portfolio are qualitatively similar to the results
from those for the whole sample. The predictive power of spreads is the highest for small
cap and declines with increase in firm size. Average trade size significantly and
consistently predicts future price volatility across different size based portfolios.
Overall, our results indicate a negative relationship between liquidity and the
future price volatility. The higher the spread, the lower is the future price volatility.
Hence, our results support the findings of Booth and Gurun (2008), Kalimipalli and
Warga (2002) and Hasbrouck (1999). We also find that the average trade size, and not the
number of trades, is the dominant determinant of the volume–volatility relationship
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Table 3.
Traditional liquidity measures and future volatility
We estimate the following GARCH model:
∑

∑

is the return on a stock for minute t+1, is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,
is
the conditional minute by minute variance of
from the return equation, SPREAD is the
mean proportionate spread, DEPTH is the average volume at the best bid and best ask, ATS is
the average trade size, NTRD is the number of trades for each minute of trading, M is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, and is the residual from the return
equation. Columns with heading %sig (%correct sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that
are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the correct sign). The
remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all individual
security regression equations. The table reports the results from running the regression
equation over the whole sample and the three portfolios based on market capitalization.
Panel A: Traditional measures of liquidity and future volatility
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Estimate
% sig
Estimate
% sig
(%sign)
(%sign)
SPREAD
0.13
39% (95%)
0.20
34% (100%)
DEPTH
-0.44
51% (97%)
NTRD
ATS
Adj. R2
0.10
0.13

Model 3
Estimate
% sig
(%sign)
0.11
32% (100%)
-0.12
47% (98%)
0.05
10% (100%)
0.11
84% (98%)
0.15

Panel B: Traditional measures of liquidity and future volatility for the three size based
portfolios
Large Cap

Medium Cap

Small Cap

Variables Estimate

% sig (%sign) Estimate

% sig (%sign)

Estimate

SPREAD
DEPTH
NTRD
ATS
Adj. R2

25% (100%)
46% (96%)
7% (100%)
80% (96%)

31% (100%)
46% (98%)
9% (100%)
82% (99%)

0.14
-0.14
0.10
0.15
0.15

0.06
-0.09
0.01
0.08
0.14

0.10
-0.12
0.04
0.11
0.15
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% sig (%sign)
38% (100%)
47% (99%)
15% (100%)
86% (98%)

which contradicts the findings of Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994). Majority of traders on
SHSE are individual investors who are not sophisticated enough to slice their larger order
into several smaller orders to reduce the price impact. Hence an individual
unsophisticated investor prefers to trade large amounts at any given price. Our findings
are consistent with the theoretical predictions by Grundy and McNichols (1989).
5.4. Volatility and comprehensive LOB liquidity
Traditional measures analyzed in the previous section are based on the top of the
LOB information or trading data. But these traditional liquidity measures do not provide
a complete analysis of LOB liquidity because buy and sell orders can cluster away from
the best bid and ask prices (Rosu, 2009). We examine the informativeness of the more
advanced comprehensive LOB liquidity measures over future return volatility, by
estimating the following GARCH(1,2) models:

∑

∑

(11)
(12)
(13)

(14)

is the conditional variance of

from the return equation, SLOPEt is our measure

of LOB slope for each stock at time t, CTTt measures the cost that liquidity demanders
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have to bear to trade 1% of the daily average trading volume for each stock at time t. The
remaining variables are as defined previously. The GARCH models are estimated for
each stock and then the parameter estimates are averaged across stocks.
Results are summarized in Table 4. The coefficients for LOB slope for both, the
model (1) and model (3), are negative and significant for about 96% of the sample stocks
but when we include all the liquidity measures in model 4, the proportion of firms with
significant coefficient for LOB slope drops to 82%. The average Variance Inflation
Factors for all the variables are less than 5 hence, we do not have any multicollinearity
issues when including all the relevant liquidity measures together in one GARCH
model.13 Overall, our results suggest that LOB slope significantly negatively predicts the
future price volatility. These results are consistent with our Hypothesis I.
CTT is a weaker predictor of the future price volatility. CTT significantly
positively predicts the future price volatility for 56% of the sample firms in model (2) and
52% of the sample firms in model (3). However, CTT has little marginal explanatory
power when volatility is conditioned on all relevant liquidity measures in model (4). We
re-estimate the last regression model (Model 4) for the three different size portfolios. The
results from these estimations are presented in the panel B of Table 4. In general, the
results from estimating separate regression models for each size portfolio are similar to
the results from estimating one regression for the whole sample. Overall, we find that
LOB slope and ATS consistently and significantly predicts the future price volatility even
after controlling for the other measures of liquidity. ATS is based on trading data which

13

For each independent variable, VIF is calculated as: VIF i = 1/(1more details)
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) (see Greene (2000) for

might not be frequently updated for all the stocks across all trading days. However, LOB
slope is based on quotes data that are readily available via the LOB and can prove to be
extremely useful liquidity measure especially for low trading days or less liquid stocks
and for predicting instantaneous price volatility. These findings are useful for algorithmic
or high speed traders who have faster access to the market data and can use our findings
to analyze the information content of quotes which are much more quickly updated.
5.5. The predictive power of buy-side versus sell-side liquidity
Next, we test the predictions of Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000), who
suggest that the buy orders are more informative than the sell orders. We estimate the
following GARCH(1,2) model:

∑

∑

(15)

BUY LIQUIDITY and SELL LIQUIDITY are measured by the slope for the five best bids
(BIDSLOPE) and five best asks (ASKSLOPE) for Table 5, Panel A and CTTBUY, which
is the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to buy 1% of the daily average trading
volume, and CTTSELL, which is the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to sell 1%
of the daily average trading volume for Panel B. The remaining variables are as defined
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Table 4.
LOB liquidity–future volatility relationship
We estimate of the following GARCH model:
∑

∑

is the return on a stock for minute t+1,
is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,
is the
conditional minute by minute variance of
from the return equation, SLOPE is the average of slope
for the five best bids and five best asks, CTT is the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to trade 1%
of the daily average trading volume, SPREAD is the mean spread, DEPTH is the average volume at the
best bid and best ask, NTRD is the number of transactions for each stock for each minute of trading, ATS
is the average trade size for each minute of trading, M is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays
and 0 otherwise, and is the residual from the return equation. Columns with heading %sig (%correct
sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that
have the correct sign). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged
across all individual security regression equations. The table reports the results from running the
regression equation over the whole sample and the three portfolios based on market capitalization.
Panel A: Comprehensive measures of liquidity and future volatility
Variables

Model 1
Estimate

SLOPE

-0.50

% sig
(%correct
sign)
96%(99%)

CTT

Model 2
Estimate

0.25

Model 3

% sig
(%correct
sign)

Estimate

56%
(100%)

Model 4

-0.30

% sig
(%correct
sign)
95% (99%)

0.09

52% (100%)

Estimate

% sig
(%correct sign)

-0.03

82% (97%)

0.02

2% (100%)

NTRD

0.01

3% (95%)

ATS

0.07

84% (99%)

SPREAD

0.01

5% (100%)

-0.02
0.16

47% (99%)

DEPTH
Adj. R2

0.15

0.13

0.15

Panel B: Comprehensive measures of liquidity and future volatility for three size based portfolios
Large Cap
Variables

Estimate

SLOPE
CTT
NTRD
ATS
SPREAD
DEPTH
Adj. R2

-0.02
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.02
-0.02
0.16

% sig
(%correct sign)
76% (94%)
4% (100%)
1% (67%)
85% (100%)
6% (100%)
46% (99%)

Medium Cap
Estimate
-0.04
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.01
-0.01
0.16
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% sig
(%correct sign)
81% (97%)
1% (100%)
1% (100%)
84% (98%)
5% (100%)
46% (99%)

Small Cap
Estimate
-0.04
0.01
0.03
0.08
0.01
-0.02
0.15

% sig
(%correct sign)
84% (98%)
1% (100%)
5% (100%)
83% (98%)
3% (100%)
47% (100%)

previously.14 The GARCH model is estimated for each stock and then the parameter
estimates are averaged across stocks.
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 5. Columns 2 and 3
present the results for the informativeness of LOB slope on the bid side, next 2 columns
summarize the results for the informativeness of LOB slope on the ask side, and the last 2
columns present the comparative statistics between the informativeness of buy orders
versus that of the sell orders for future price volatility. We find that both, the bid slope
and ask slope, significantly negatively predict the future price volatility. The results
further indicate that bid side slope has higher predictive power over future return
volatility than the ask side slope for 41% of the sample firms. We also find that the
difference between the information content of bid- and ask- slopes for future return
volatility is highest for the small firms. Our interpretation of this finding is that the small
firms are less liquid and a buy order should be based on strong stock specific private
signals while the sell decisions for these small stocks might be based on available market
liquidity. Panel B summarizes the results from similar analysis conducted using the CTT
liquidity measures. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented above.
These results provide supportive evidence for our Hypothesis II. Buy orders are more
informative about future price volatility than sell orders.
5.6. Predictive power of LOB during extreme market movement
Dennis and Strickland (2002) find that the traders may herd together during
extreme market-wide movements by buying during a market rise or selling during a

14

Two other quote based control variables, Spread and Depth are not included in this model as
they are not directional (buy vs. sell)
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market decline to a degree that drives prices beyond fundamental values. Hence, the LOB
should become less informative over future price volatility during extreme market
movement periods.
On the contrary, Lipson and Puckett (2007) find that during the periods of market
turmoil, rather than herding together, trading aggressively, and destabilizing prices in
order to participate in a broad market movement, institutions are providing some measure
of price stability by trading against the market. In this case the LOB should reflect the
private information of these informed investors and hence, become more informative
about future price volatility.
We extend this literature by testing the predictions for an emerging market,
SHSE. Specifically, we want to test if the informativeness of LOB over future price
volatility changes during the extreme market movement days. In addition, we test the
informativeness of either sides of the LOB (bid and ask) for volatility during the extreme
market-wide up and down movement days.
We initially follow Dennis and Strickland (2002) and define extreme market
movements as a 2% or more increase or decrease in the returns for the Shanghai 180
market index (SSE180). We also examine 1.5%, 2.5%, 3%, 3.5% and 4% cutoff samples.
Table 6 presents the results for cutoffs of 1.5% and 3% for market movements.15
Table 6, Panel A presents the summary information for the days during the
sample period when the SSE 180 market index return showed large movements. We find
that SHSE becomes less liquid during the extreme market conditions as reflected by

15

Our results are robust to alternate cutoffs for defining large movement in market index (2.5%,
3.5% and 4%) in untabulated results.
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Table 5.
Predictive power of Buy orders Vs. Sell orders
We report the results from the estimation of the following GARCH model:
∑

∑

is the return on a stock for minute t+1, is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,
is the
conditional minute by minute variance of
from the return equation, BUY LIQUIDITY and
SELL LIQUIDITY are measured by the slope for the five best bids (BIDSLOPE) and five best asks
(ASKSLOPE) for Panel A and CTTBUY, which is the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to
buy 1% of the daily average trading volume, and CTTSELL is the cost that liquidity demanders
have to bear to sell 1% of the daily average trading volume for Panel B. NTRD is the number of
transactions for each stock for each minute of trading, ATS is the average trade size for each
minute of trading, M is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, and is
the residual from the return equation. Columns with heading %sig (%correct sign) report the
percentage of t-statistics that are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the
correct sign). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged
across all individual security regression equations. The table reports the results from running the
regression equation over the whole sample and the three portfolios based on market capitalization.
Panel A: Predictive power of buy vs. sell liquidity based on LOB slope
Bid
Ask
| βbid|-| βask|
Estimate
% sig
Estimate
% sig
Estimate
% sig
(Bid) (%correct sign) (Ask) (%correct sign) (difference) (%correct sign)
All Firms
-2.97
84% (96%)
-2.38
81% (93%)
0.60
41% (100%)
Large Cap
-2.42
81% (92%)
-2.15
79% (88%)
0.27
40% (100%)
Mid Cap
-2.83
81% (97%)
-2.27
81% (92%)
0.56
38% (100%)
Small Cap
-3.66
89% (98%)
-2.73
84% (98%)
0.96
45% (100%)
Panel B: Predictive power of buy vs. sell liquidity based on CTT
Bid
Ask
| βbid|-| βask|
Estimate
% sig
Estimate
% sig
Estimate
% sig
(buy) (%correct sign) (sell) (%correct sign) (difference) (%correct sign)
All Firms
1.01
62% (100%)
0.25
57% (100%)
0.78
51% (100%)
Large Cap
1.01
61% (100%)
0.23
59% (100%)
0.81
51% (100%)
Mid Cap
1.06
59% (100%)
0.30
52% (100%)
0.77
44% (100%)
Small Cap
0.96
67% (100%)
0.23
61% (100%)
0.76
57% (100%)
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Adj R2
0.14
0.13
0.15
0.13

Adj R2
0.14
0.15
0.15
0.13

increased CTT (from 0.012 to 0.016) and gentler LOB slope (32.77 vs. 32.33). We also
find that bid- (ask-) side is more liquid as compared to the ask- (bid-) side during the
extreme market wide up (down) movement days. This evidence supports the herding
argument of Dennis and Strickland (2002) that there is more buying during a market rise
and selling during a market decline.
Panel B summarize the regression results of informativeness of LOB for future
price volatility during extreme market-wide movements. We use the GARCH(1,2)
models similar to the equations 14 and 15, for the sub sample of time period identified as
the extreme market movement days. We find that the proportions of firms with
significant coefficients for Slope declines from 82% for the full sample summarized in
Table 4, Panel A to 70% (55%) for days when market moves by 1.5% or more (3% or
more). This result suggests that during the extreme market movements the
informativeness of LOB Slope for future price volatility declines and the decline in
informativeness of LOB Slope increases with the degree of market movement. These
results are consistent with Dennis and Strickland (2002) predictions and support our
Hypothesis III.
Table 6, Panel B also report the results for informativeness of bid- and ask- sides
of LOB for future return volatility during extreme market wide up and down movement
days. We use the GARCH(1,2) model similar to the equations 15. We find that 48%
(73%) of the sample firms have significantly larger coefficients for ASKSLOPE
(BIDSLOPE) when market moves down (up) by more than 3%. Hence, buy orders are
more informative during a market rise while sell orders are more informative during a
market decline. These results provide supportive evidence for Hypothesis IV.
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Table 6.
Predictive power of LOB over future volatility during extreme market movement days
Panel A presents summary information for days during the January 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2009 sample period where the SSE 180 market index daily return showed
large movements. We present the results for cutoffs of 1.5% and 3% for daily market
movements (RETURN). The table presents the number of large market movement days
for each cutoff level, also presents means for various comprehensive LOB liquidity
measures for each cutoff level. Panel B presents cross-sectional regression results for the
following 2 GARCH models:
∑

∑

Model 1:

Model 2:

is the return on a stock for minute t+1, is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,
is the conditional minute by minute variance of
from the return equation,
SLOPE is the average of slope for the five best bids and five best asks, CTT is the cost
that liquidity demanders have to bear to trade 1% of the daily average trading volume,
SPREAD is the mean spread, DEPTH is the average volume at the best bid and best ask,
NTRD is the number of transactions for each stock for each minute of trading, ATS is the
average trade size for each minute of trading, M is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for
Mondays and 0 otherwise, and is the residual from the return equation. BIDSLOPE is
the LOB slope for the five best bids and ASKSLOPE is the LOB slope for the five best
asks. Columns with heading %sig (%correct sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that
are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the correct sign). The
remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all
individual security regression equations.
Panel A: Summary information for days when SSE 180 index return showed large
movements
Number of
SLOPE
BID
ASK
Days
SLOPE
SLOPE
Full Sample
234
32.77
32.88
32.66

0.012

Return> |1.5%|

104

32.54

32.75

32.51

0.015

Return> |3%|

54

32.33

32.52

32.35

0.016

Return< -1.5%

71

32.42

32.31

32.72

0.016

Return< -3%

34

32.18

32.09

32.28

0.017

Return> 1.5%
Return> 3%

33
20

32.67
32.49

32.89
32.84

32.25
32.06

0.014
0.015
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Table 6-Continued
Panel B: Multiple regression analysis results
Model 1
Slope
Extreme
Returns

Estimate

Return>
|1.5%|
Return> |3%|

-0.03

Return<
-1.5%
Return<
-3%
Return>
1.5%
Return> 3%

-0.02

-0.01

-0.01
-0.03
-0.01

Model 2
Bid Slope

| βbid|-| βask|

Ask Slope

% sig Estimate
% sig Estimate
% sig Estimate % sig
(%correct
(%correct
(%correct
(%correct
sign)
sign)
sign)
sign)
70%
(99%)
55%
(96%)
57%
(95%)
36%
(94%)
74%
(99%)
53%
(93%)

-2.93

68%
(91%)
57%
(86%)
78%
(87%)
74%
(94%)

-2.35
-3.31
-2.39

-3.03
-2.56
-3.04
-2.03

70%
(95%)
60%
(86%)
74%
(88%)
59%
(92%)

-0.08
-0.27
0.31
0.42

6. Robustness check
We perform additional robustness tests for the results presented in the above
section. We reexamine the results by considering the SSE 180 index constituent stocks
only. The index constituents include firms with higher percentage of market coverage and
industrial representativeness. We find qualitatively similar results as the ones presented in
the previous sections. LOB slope is the dominant comprehensive liquidity measure that
consistently and significantly predicts the future return volatility.
We have presented the results for minute by minute analysis of the LOB. We also
conduct a quote by quote analysis and analysis based on 5 minutes and 10 minutes
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12%
(96%)
48%
(97%)
53%
(100%)
73%
(100%)

snapshots of LOB. The results for the full sample are summarized in Table 7. We find
that the predictive power of LOB slope declines significantly with the increase in time
horizon. Hence, the predictability of the LOB is short lived and markets are more
efficient over the longer time horizon.

Table 7.
A LOB liquidity–future volatility relationship across different time horizons
We report the results from the estimation of the following GARCH model:
∑

∑

is the return on a stock for minute t+1, is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k,
is
the conditional variance of
from the return equation based on minute-by-minute analysis
for columns 2 and 3; 5 minutes analysis for columns 4 and 5, and 10 minutes analysis for
columns 6 and 7, SLOPE is the average of slope for the five best bids and five best asks, CTT is
the cost that liquidity demanders have to bear to trade 1% of the daily average trading volume,
SPREAD is the mean spread, DEPTH is the average volume at the best bid and best ask, NTRD
is the number of transactions for each stock, ATS is the average trade size, M is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, and is the residual from the return
equation. Columns with heading %sig (%correct sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that
are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the correct sign). The remaining
columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all individual security
regression equations.
Variables

SLOPE
CTT
NTRD
ATS
SPREAD
DEPTH
Adj. R2

1 min
Estimate
% sig
(%correct
sign)
-0.03
82% (97%)
0.02
2% (100%)
0.01
3% (95%)
0.07
84% (99%)
0.01
5% (100%)
-0.02
47% (99%)
0.16

5 min
Estimate
% sig
(%correct
sign)
-0.04
43% (98%)
0.02
3% (100%)
0.02
2% (100%)
0.08
81% (99%)
0.01
4% (91%)
-0.02
25% (98%)
0.15
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10 min
Estimate
% sig
(%correct
sign)
-0.01
11% (100%)
0.01
1% (100%)
0.01
1% (100%)
0.04
51% (100%)
0.01
5% (100%)
-0.01
10% (100%)
0.13

Finally, we account for the effect of intraday seasonality. We include 2 dummy
variables to control for the opening and closing of each of the two sessions. The first
dummy variable takes a value of 1 for the first half hour (9:30 AM-10:00 AM) and last
half an hour (2:30 PM- 3:00 PM) of trading, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable
takes a value of 1 for the last half hour of trading right before the recess (11:00 AM11:30 AM) and first half an hour of trading right after the recess (1:00 PM- 1:30 PM),
zero otherwise. We find a statistically significant coefficient for the 2 dummy variables,
suggesting intraday seasonality is important for the explaining volatility. But our results
for the predictive power of LOB slope in explaining volatility are qualitatively similar to
the ones presented earlier in terms of direction and level of significance.
7. Conclusion
We investigate the information content of the various liquidity measures for
predicting the future return volatility for the stocks listed on the SHSE. We also
investigate whether buy orders are more informative than sell orders, and whether these
relations change during the extreme market conditions. Finally, we examine the
predictive power of the LOB over the longer time horizon.
To study different dimensions of the LOB and the liquidity, we use cost-to-trade
measure as the proxy of the tightness and depth of the book and LOB slope, which
measures volume elasticity or change quantity supplied in the LOB per unit change in
limit order price.
We find that the LOB slope is the dominant liquidity measure that significantly
and consistently predicts future price volatility for the stocks listed on SHSE. The results
are robust to alternate model specifications and across different size based portfolios. The

38

gentler the slope, the higher is the future price volatility. A liquid stock can accommodate
increased liquidity demands and large market orders without significantly affecting the
prices, resulting in price smoothing and lower volatility. But, during the extreme market
movements the informativeness of LOB slope for future price volatility declines. We also
find that CTT is also informative in explaining future price volatility for a majority of the
sample stocks.
Next, we document that the buy orders are more informative than the sell orders
for a majority of the firms listed on SHSE. Since buy orders create new long positions,
they are more likely to be based on private information whereas sell orders can be based
on reasons other than information (for e.g. liquidity based reasons). Further, we show that
during the extreme market-wide up (down) movement days, the informativeness of bid(ask-) side of the LOB is significantly higher than the informativeness of ask- (bid-) side
of the LOB. These results document the trend chasing or sentiments induced herding
behavior of traders on SHSE. The dominance of individual investors and limited
arbitrage opportunities might be driving this behavior on SHSE.
Finally, we show that LOB has significant information content about the future
return volatility over the short time period but its predictive power declines significantly
over the longer time horizons. These results are helpful in understanding the market
efficiency and the trader’s order submission strategy on the fully electronic, purely order
driven and fastest growing market of SHSE.
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Chapter 3
Reduced Latency, Market Quality, and Systemic Risks of High
Frequency Trading
Introduction
High Frequency Trading (HFT) has increased dramatically in recent years, and
following a number of market mishaps, has also caught the attention of regulators.1
However, the empirical evidence on the behavior and impact of low latency trading has
so far been limited and inconclusive. Some find HFT has enhanced market quality by
reducing quoted spreads and increased risk-sharing, consumption smoothing, and price
efficiency (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2008; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009;
Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld, 2011). However, HFT has also increased volatility
(Boehmer, Fong, and Wu, 2013), effective spreads, adverse section costs (Hendershott
and Moulton, 2011), the severity of losses from episodic illiquidity as observed during
the Flash Crash of May 2010 (Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O'Hara, 2011), and the
frequency of glitches such as the Knight Capital Group software breakdown in August
2012 and the problems with the beginning of trading for the Facebook and BATS IPOs.
The introduction of the Arrowhead high speed trading platform by the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE) in January of 2010 reduced latency from 6 seconds to 2
milliseconds, which is a 99.97% drop. Since that time, co-located HFT market share of
1

Germany is set to advance a bill requiring traders to register with Germany's Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority and collect fees from those who use high-speed trading platforms.
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444813104578018292059338944.html). On August 1,
2012, France introduced a high-frequency trading tax. More recently, in the US, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has announced plans to build a Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) to monitor HFT
(http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-134.htm).
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trading in TSE equities has soared from about 0% to as much as 36% by April 2011 and
dark pool activity has started in its nascent stages.2 Moreover, there is still room for
growth as is evident from the fact that HFT’s market share on the NYSE is as much as
73% (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011; Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O'Hara,
2011).3
We use the TSE’s introduction of Arrowhead as a natural experiment to ascertain
how the reduced latency of Arrowhead has affected market quality, systematic trading
risk, and trading strategies.4 In addition, we analyze the evolution of key market quality
parameters for a pure LOB market. The heart of modern trading is the electronic limit
order book (LOB), which displays aggregate liquidity supply and is now the primary way
of trading equities worldwide.5 There is a rich theoretical literature on the relation
between traditional liquidity measures based on quotes at the top of a LOB and various
dimensions of market quality such as speed of trading (Biais, Hillion, and Spatt, 1995;
Hendershott and Moulton, 2011), and return volatility (Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen,
2007). The measures of systematic trading risks, such as quotes-to-trade ratio (Menkveld,
2012), autocorrelation (Chaboud, Hjalmarsson, Vega, and Chiquoine, 2009; Parlour,
1998; Barclay and Warner, 1993) and cross correlation in order flow (Ben-David,
2

Tokyo stock Exchange Annual Report, 2011

3

Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2012) conjecture that firm concentration in HFT is increasing

over time.
4

TSE role in the world markets is highlighted by the master agreement it has signed with NYSE
Euronext to allow both of their customers to access each exchange's markets through a linked network.
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/news/48/111207_a.html and
http://www.advancedtrading.com/exchanges/229300020
5

For example, Jain (2005) documents that 85 of the 100 leading exchanges in the world employed
electronic trading in the year 2000.
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Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000), and trading
outcomes in terms of fleeting order executions (Rosu, 2009) and the predictability of
trade price location (Parlour, 1998; Kaniel and Liu, 2005), have also been discussed in
the existing literature.
However, most of the studies cited above do not consider liquidity supplied by
traders simultaneously at multiple price levels away from the best bid and ask in highfrequency markets, the importance of which is highlighted empirically by Aitken,
Almeida, Harris, and McInish (2007), and theoretically by Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan
(2005), and Rosu (2009) who model this behavior. To address this deficiency, in addition
to the traditional liquidity measures, we also examine several newer measures that
quantify the state of the LOB beyond the best quotes: LOB slope (Biais, Hillion and
Spatt, 1995 and Naes and Skjeltorp, 2006) and cost of immediacy (COI) (Irvine, Benston,
and Kandel, 2000; Kang and Yeo, 2008; and Boehmer, Saar, and Yu, 2005 pp. 808),
which are particularly important in fast-paced markets where orders frequently walk up
or down the book.6 The change in the LOB Slope measures the resiliency of the full LOB
from a liquidity supply perspective while COI measures the tightness and depth of the
LOB. By incorporating the elasticity of liquidity supply and the cost of immediately
executing large orders, respectively, these two comprehensive LOB liquidity measures
represent the vital statistics of the modern low latency trading platforms.

6

LOB slope measure is defined as the weighted average of the change in quantity supplied in the
LOB per unit change in the price while The COI measure captures the fact that liquidity demanders incur
progressively higher cumulative costs as the available depth at the top of the LOB in fast markets becomes
insufficient to fully execute the order. For COI transaction cost measure, weighted average LOB
information for executions at multiple price points resulting from walking up or down the book is used
instead of stopping merely at the top of the LOB bid-ask spreads. COI formulae are provided in the next
section.
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We find that Arrowhead improved market quality and the price discovery by
increasing trading volume, LOB liquidity, and the number of trades and by reducing
intraday return volatility. We extend the literature in newer directions by showing that
Arrowhead amplified systematic trading risks by increasing order flow autocorrelations
and cross correlations, and the quotes-to-trade ratio. Furthermore, Arrowhead increased
the exposure to these systemic risks even more during tail risk events, indicating that low
latency markets could benefit from safety features such as kill switches, circuit breakers,
and rigorous software testing. We further document that Arrowhead has significantly
changed the trading outcomes by increasing the price placement predictability and the
frequency of fleeting order executions. The effects of Arrowhead are more pronounced
for the large-cap stocks. Finally we show that COI serves a channel through which
Arrowhead affect market quality, systematic risk, and trading strategies.
I. Low latency trading and LOB Liquidity Measures
A. Arrowhead low latency trading platform
On January 4, 2010, the TSE launched a new, high-tech trading platform called
“Arrowhead,” that cost about $142 million. A number of studies focusing on multimarket
trading, expected returns, minimum trading unit, price limits and liquidity for Japanese
stocks were published before the introduction of Arrowhead when the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) had a provision for warning quotes and delayed trading (Hamao,
Masulis and Ng, 1990; Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok, 1991; Lehmann and Modest,
1994; Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995; Bremer, Hiraki, and Sweeney, 1997).7
7

On August 24, 1998 TSE removed warning quote system, Ahn, Hamao and Ho (2002) analyze
liquidity dynamics after this change and decompose the components of bid-ask spreads only at the top of
the LOB.
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With the new low latency Arrowhead trading platform, the TSE has eliminated
the matching cycle delay, executes orders immediately, and instantaneously updates the
LOB, rendering computerized trading strategies more dominant (Uno and Shibata, 2011).
Now the TSE can process trades in two milliseconds (time elapsed between order
placement and order execution), which is at least 1,500 times faster than their previous
trading platform; the new speed is roughly the same as that of the NYSE and LSE
according to the TSE factbook.8 The new platform was introduced to attract investors
who depend on sophisticated software to make split-second trades. The new trading
platform also helps the TSE stay ahead of the growing number of rival proprietary trading
systems (PTSs), such as Kabu.com and SBI Japannext.9 One of the goals of our paper is
to understand the market quality, trading strategies, and systemic risk induced by the
Arrowhead trading platform.
B. LOB liquidity measures
Kyle (1985, p. 1316) notes that ‘‘liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, in
part because it encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets, these
include tightness, depth, and resiliency.’’ We capture these notions with two
comprehensive LOB liquidity measures that characterize the entire supply schedule in
low latency environment: LOB Slope and COI.

8

TSE Fact book 2011 retrieved from
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/factbook/index.html
9

TSE, with more than 95% of domestic equity market share, is the largest stock exchange in Asia
(TSE Annual Report, 2011). The recent approval of its merger with Osaka Stock Exchange, may make the
merged exchange a monopoly for trading equities in Japan (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0607/tse-s-osaka-merger-gets-90-odds-as-first-deal-since-10.html).
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B1. LOB Slope: A resiliency measure of LOB liquidity
LOB Slope (SLOPE) captures the elasticity of liquidity supply in a LOB, and,
hence, changes in SLOPE measure the resiliency of the full LOB. The measure originally
proposed by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) and formally defined by Naes and Skjeltorp
(2006), captures the change in quantity supplied in the LOB per unit change in the price:

{

∑

};

{

∑

} (1)

where NB and NA are the total number of bid and ask prices (tick levels), respectively, τ
denotes number of price steps, with τ = 0 representing the best bid-ask mid-point, pτ is
the price of τth price step,

is the natural logarithm of accumulated total share volume at

the price level τ. SLOPE is calculated as the average of BIDSLOPE and ASKSLOPE.
Steeper SLOPE indicates more liquid markets because large quantities can be traded with
very little price impact.
B2. Cost of Immediacy (COI): A measure of LOB’s depth and tightness
Apart from the resiliency of liquidity supply, the other main dimensions of LOB
liquidity are the LOB’s tightness and depth. COI reflects these concepts and captures the
round trip cost of trading 1% of daily volume by walking up or down the LOB, as
necessary (Irvine, Benston, and Kandel, 2000).
We estimate the instantaneous COI separately on the buy and the sell sides of the
LOB for each stock. Let T be the total number of shares to be bought or sold. We denote
the kth best bid (ask) price as

(

) and the kth best bid (ask) size as
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(
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We define two indicator variables,
bought at each price point k and

and

.

refers to number of shares to be

is defined analogously.

∑
∑

(

∑

)

∑

(2)

{

where K is the total number of price steps in a LOB,
Then, we compute ASKCOI and BIDCOI for stock i as follows:

∑

(

∑

)

(

)

(3)

Note that following Kang and Yeo (2008), the COI measures shown above are
scaled by the stock’s mid-quote to enable cross-sectional and panel data comparisons.
COI is calculated as the sum of ASKCOI and BIDCOI. Lower COI represents a more
liquid market.10 To illustrate the interpretation of COI, Figure 1 presents a snapshot of the
LOB for two hypothetical firms. If we compare the best quotes (top of the LOB) for the
two stocks, we conclude that both stocks are equally liquid. To understand the LOB
10

Trades matched and executed within each minute are not part of the LOB, but are reflected in
our measures by a decrease in cumulative depth of the LOB. Thus, both liquidity suppliers and demanders
from the recent past determine COI at any given instant. COI is the remuneration required by the current
suppliers from the next liquidity demander. In order to account for the effect of liquidity demanding market
orders in the recent past, we also include average trade size (ATS) and number of trades (NTRD) per
minute of trading as control variables in subsequent analysis. Order cancellations and revisions are
immediately reflected in LOB and, hence, our measures account for the cancelled and revised limit orders.
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dynamics, consider a market order to sell 1,000 shares. For stock L, the market order will
have to walk up all 5 steps to completely fill the order while for stock H, the market sell
order only needs to walk up to the second step. Based on equation (3), stock L has a
higher COI of 47.32 basis points compared to 13.17 basis points for stock H, so stock L is
less liquid than stock H.

Snapshot of the LOB
Stock L
Bid Side
Depth
Price
200
20
100
18
100
15
200
12
900
10

Stock H
Ask Side
Depth
Price
200
21
400
23
900
25
900
26
1,000
27

Bid Side
Depth
Price
200
20
1,300
19
1,100
18
1,200
17
1,300
16

Ask Side
Depth
Price
200
21
700
22
800
23
700
24
900
25

Figure 1. Hypothetical limit order book (LOB) for 2 stocks
In the graphs, 1 and -1 represent the best ask and best bid, respectively, which are
presented in the first row of the table. For each firm we show the depth and price for the
first five steps on each side of the LOB. The graphs illustrate the volume elasticity for the
two stocks. The vertical axis shows the cumulative order volume that can be executed as
investors walk up or down the LOB. The negative (positive) numbers on the horizontal
axis represent the price steps on the bid-side (ask-side) of the LOB. The slope of the
curve is one of our comprehensive measures of LOB liquidity. The steeper the slope, the
higher is the liquidity.
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For simplicity, the hypotheses for various market quality parameters in the
remainder of this section are stated with respect to COI. We note that the predictions for
the relation of the variables with respect to SLOPE have the opposite signs because COI
has an inverse relation with liquidity supply whereas SLOPE has a direct relation with
liquidity supply.
II. Hypothesis Development
Low latency trading has been the subject of intense public debate and
controversy. Some commentators suggest that HFT is a socially beneficial financial
innovation as it increases trading volume and liquidity, lowers trading costs and helps
price discovery. In contrast, others claim it may increase volatility and systemic risk.
Some regulators have expressed concerns. For example, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
said in a speech on September 22, 2010, "...high frequency trading firms have a
tremendous capacity to affect the stability and integrity of the equity markets. Currently,
however, high frequency trading firms are subject to very little in the way of obligations
either to protect that stability by promoting reasonable price continuity in tough times, or
to refrain from exacerbating price volatility." We contribute to the existing debate by
analyzing the effect of reduction in latency of trading that marked the launch of HFT in
the Japanese markets, on TSE’s market quality, systemic risk, and trading outcomes.
A. Impact of Arrowhead and LOB supply schedule on Market Quality
A1. Liquidity
Theoretical models on the liquidity provisions of a LOB offer ambiguous
predictions regarding the impact of increased speed of trading. Foucault, R ̈ ell, and
San ̇ as’s (2003) theoretical model shows that faster markets can raise adverse selection
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costs because informed liquidity demanders can more closely monitor the market for any
temporary mispricing or stale quotes. Focusing only on the top of the book bid-ask
spreads, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) show that this higher adverse selection cost
increases the compensation required by liquidity suppliers, which, in turn, increases the
cost of immediacy for liquidity demanders. However, Foucault, Kadan and Kandel
(2005), Baruch (2005), and Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005) suggest that the higher speed
of trading can increase the competition among liquidity suppliers at various price points
that, in turn, should reduce the cost of immediacy for liquidity demanders. Much of the
previous literature on HFT analyzes the top of the LOB liquidity. Introduction of
Arrowhead provides a natural experiment to test the predictions of the theoretical models
on the effect of low latency trading on full LOB liquidity. Using Stoll’s (2000) friction
model and control variables as applicable in the LOB context, we test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Arrowhead reduces COI and increases SLOPE.
A2. Volatility
The existing literature analyzing the effect of speed of trading on volatility offers
competing views. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2013), Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun

(2012), Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), and Hendershott and Moulton (2011)
find that HFT increases cost of immediacy and, thereby, leads to a significant increase in
volatility whereas Brogaard (2010) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) argue that HFT enables
aggressively competitive electronic liquidity provision at a much lower cost than that of
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traditional market makers, and, therefore, dampens short-term volatility. 11 To resolve this
debate, we test the competitive and adverse selection aspects simultaneously by using the
COI measure.12

Lower COI leads to lower future return volatility as shown in Figure 1. Stock H
has lower COI as compared to Stock L. Hence, Stock H can accommodate increased
liquidity demand and large market order executions without significantly affecting the
prices, resulting in price smoothing and lower volatility. In contrast higher COI and more
gaps in LOB results in higher volatility even with small market order executions.
Understanding lower COI as the main conduit for volatility reduction is important to
resolve the debate about the volatility increasing versus volatility dampening effects of
HFT.13 Hence, a natural extension of hypothesis 1 is:
Hypothesis 2. Arrowhead reduces COI and dampens stock return volatility.
B. Impact of Arrowhead and LOB supply schedule on Systemic Risk
B1. Correlation in order flow

11

Hasbrouck (1999), Rahman, Lee and Ang (2002), Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) and Naes and
Skjeltorp (2006) find a positive relation between transaction cost at the top of the book and short-term
volatility in the US, Hong Kong and Norway markets, respectively. Also, most of the above studies have
drawn their conclusions by studying hybrid markets where the specialist or designated market maker are
obligated to lower short-term volatility by acting as a counterparty. However, no one has tested this relation
for the TSE, which is a pure LOB, with no market makers with affirmative obligations to dampen the shortterm volatility. As a result, during extremely rare episodes, HFTs can simply step away from the market,
leaving the markets extremely volatile as was observed during the “flash crash” of May, 2010 (Cartea and
Penalva, 2011; Jarrow and Protter, 2011).
12

While the top of the LOB spreads may reflect competition at the equilibrium prices, they do not
fully capture the gaps that occur at the various price points in LOB due to severe adverse selction.
Additionally, the top of the book measures ignore the competition at the subsequent price steps.
13

Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) theoretical model suggests that the LOB is a conduit for
volatility information because of the option-like features of limit orders. Placing a limit buy (sell) order can
be viewed as writing a free out-of-money put (call) option (Copeland and Galai, 1983). As the value of
options depends on volatility, traders should incorporate volatility information in their limit order
submissions.
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Biais and Woolley (2011) suggest that high frequency trades are highly correlated
as they rely on similar strategies and hence, might contribute to destabilizing markets. 14
Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) and Chaboud, Hjalmarsson, Vega, and
Chiquoine (2009) analyze algorithmic trading in the foreign exchange markets and
suggest that the algorithmic strategies used in the market are not as diverse as those used
by non-algorithmic traders. The authors further assert that HFT has the potential to
rapidly propagate liquidity shocks across securities leading to a system-wide crash.
Hence, autocorrelation and cross correlation in order flow can serve as important
measures of systemic risk. We are among the first to test the effect of HFT on systemic
risk in a pure LOB market. Additionally, we show that COI serves as a channel through
which HFT affects systemic risk.15 We test the following hypotheses which include the
mechanisms of risk propagation:
Hypothesis 3. Arrowhead lowers COI or improves liquidity leading to higher
autocorrelation in order flow.

14

The August 2007 mini crash offers a good illustration of how correlated strategies can generate
systemic risk: At that time, many algorithms were using similar strategies. Thus, they were simultaneously
hit by a shock, and reacted similarly, which generated a downward spiral in the market.
15

Literature thus far, provides contradictory predictions on the effect of LOB liquidity provision
on systematic risk. Autocorrelation: Parlour (1998) predicts that an order increasing the LOB's depth is
more likely to follow an order decreasing depth on that side of the market creating negative serial
correlation in order flow. In contrast, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) suggest that traders might herd or
might split large orders or trades over time to conceal information (see Kyle (1985); Barclay and Warner
(1993)). Such herding or stealth trading leads to positive autocorrelation in highly liquid markets. Cross
Correlation: Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that if investors’ private signals about a stock do not contain
a market-wide component, stocks’ cross correlations with the overall market will be lower with rapid
trading as sentiments drive investors’ propensity to speculate and when markets are liquid this propensity to
speculate in individual stocks is very high. On the other hand, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)
and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) document the existence of commonality or positive cross correlation in
liquidity of informationally-related securities.
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Hypothesis 4. Arrowhead increases cross correlation by facilitating program trading of
baskets of securities.
B2. Quote stuffing
Another risk created by HFT is the significant increase in superficial order flow
(Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2012). The speed with which the quotes are posted
and cancelled has been criticized by market participants as it creates a false sense of deep
liquidity supply for a stock (Golub, Keane, and Poon, 2012; Gai, Yao, and Ye, 2012).
Biais and Woolley (2011) define quote stuffing as a trading strategy which involves
submitting an unwieldy number of orders to the market to generate congestion. Such
stuffing activity is classified as a type of market manipulation.16 However, the number of
quotes can increase for price efficiency reasons such as speedier incorporation of
fundamental information into prices through aggressive quote revisions and trading
around the news events. In this case, low latency trading not only increases the number of
quotes placed by liquidity suppliers but it also increases the number of trades. Hence, to
truly understand the dynamics of liquidity suppliers and demanders in a pure LOB
market, we calculate the quotes-to-trade ratio. We expect an increase in the quotes-totrade ratio during the post Arrowhead period. Using the available liquidity supply
schedule of the entire LOB, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Low latency facilitates algorithmic market making which should generate
a higher quotes-to-trade ratio.

16

Dodd-Frank Act, Section 747 specifically prohibits “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel
the bid and offer before execution.”
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C. Impact of Arrowhead and LOB supply schedule on trading strategies
C1. Price placements
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), Ellul, Holdings, Jain and Jennings (2007), and
Chakravarty, Jain, Upson, and Wood (2012) indicate that aggressive liquidity demanders
react to the dynamics of informed liquidity supply and hammer the shallower side of the
book to sweep the available liquidity ahead of other market participants.
These strategies imply that higher liquidity on the ask side or lower ASKCOI
(meaning a high density of sell orders in the LOB) attracts further selling, much of which
could be in form of aggressive market sell orders.17 Such orders increase the proportion
of sell trades that are executed at bid prices. In Figure 1, Stock L has lower ASKCOI than
BIDCOI while Stock H has higher ASKCOI than BIDCOI, which suggests that Stock L
will have higher proportions of trades executed at the bid price due to follow-on
strategies than Stock H.18 Such follow-on order strategies arise more frequently in highfrequency markets from order splitting, herding or imitating behavior, commonality in
analysis of news and information, and by quicker and efficient incorporation of new
information (Martinez and Rosu, 2013; Bicchetti and Maystre, 2012; Haldane, 2011;
Baruch, 2005; Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2005; and Boehmer, Saar, and Yu, 2005).
Hypothesis 6. Lower ASKCOI or higher BIDCOI leads to a larger proportion of trades
executed at the bid price with low latency trading platforms like Arrowhead.

17

The use of a market sell order in this example increase the probability of order execution. When
there are already a large number of limit sell orders in the LOB, a new limit sell order would have to stand
behind the queue with a lower execution probability.
18

Similar argument can be extended to the bid-side of the LOB.
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An immediate implication of Hypothesis 6 is that repeated executions and
liquidity depletion on a given side of LOB changes the shape of the LOB and gives rise
to imbalances. Prices must then change to restore a balanced LOB equilibrium. 19 We test
the theoretical predictions by Rosu (2009) that higher liquidity or lower ASKCOI
(BIDCOI) motivates sellers (buyers) to submit more aggressive orders on that side of the
market, resulting in a decrease (increase) in trade prices. In Figure 1, Stock L has higher
BIDCOI and lower ASKCOI, which suggests that Stock L will attract more aggressive
sell orders resulting in a price decline while Stock H has higher ASKCOI and lower
BIDCOI, which will attract more aggressive buy orders, resulting in a price increase.
Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7. Lower ASKCOI lowers future trade prices in low latency trading
platforms. Lower BIDCOI leads to higher future trade prices.
Our newer comprehensive LOB liquidity measures allow us to capture the entire
liquidity supply schedule on each side of the market (bid and ask). Also, TSE’s order
level dataset enables us to accurately classify trade initiator’s direction as buy versus sell
without having to rely on any inference mechanisms. This feature is essential to correctly
test the existence of follow-on strategies that are hard to detect in conventional datasets
like TAQ.

19

Several studies have shown that bid and ask prices and LOB imbalances at the top of the book
contain relevant information about future trade locations and price changes (Huang and Stoll, 1994; Engle
and Patton, 2004; Kalay and Wohl, 2002; Harris and Panchapagesan, 2005; Frino, Jarnecic, and McInish,
2005). However, the top of the LOB is just the tip of the iceberg (Aitken, Almeida, Harris and McInish,
2007) in HFT environments. Cao, Hansch, and Wang, (2009) consider the quotes beyond the best bid-ask
quotes, but their analysis is based on the asymmetry between the total quantity supplied irrespective of the
price steps and their scope is limited to price prediction unlike our comprehensive analysis of the evolution
of the entire LOB including several measures of price discovery. We also consider a richer characterization
of the LOB by looking at the interaction between the quantity and the price of the liquidity supplied.
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C2. Fleeting order executions
In general, impatient traders submit market orders, while patient traders submit
limit orders except when the markets are highly liquid. When the LOB is not liquid, new
limit orders are mostly placed inside the bid-ask spread. Rosu (2009) proposes that when
the LOB is highly liquid, traders play a “game of attrition.” During these times some
impatient trader either places a market order, or submits a quick (fleeting) limit order,
which some trader from the other side of the book immediately accepts resulting in a
fleeting order execution. Simply stated, the bottom seller places a limit order at a price
lower than the prevailing best ask price, and the top buyer immediately accepts the offer
by placing a market order. Faster markets should facilitate these fleeting trades. We
present the first test of Rosu’s theory of attrition by analyzing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. Arrowhead lowers COI or improves liquidity, leading to an increase in the
frequency of fleeting order executions.
III. Data sources and sample formation
Our data includes the price and the number of shares for every trade and for the
five best bid and ask quotes for all the TOPIX index constituent companies listed on the
first section of the TSE.20 Our sample period includes the pre-financial-crisis month of
June 2008, the post-financial-crisis month of January 2009, and the post-Arrowhead
month of January 2011.21 We obtain these data from the Nikkei Digital Media Inc.’s

20

The TSE, with a total market capitalization of about $3 trillion, is the second largest stock
exchange in the world, the largest being the NYSE Euronext (TSE annual report, 2009). TSE has 2 main
sections and a Mothers section. The First Section comprises the largest and the most liquid companies
which are part of the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX).
21

We test our results for two additional pre-crisis months- September 2007 and January 2008- and
the results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here. We analyze one month of data due to

59

Nikkei Economic Electronic Database Systems (NEEDS) database.
TSE, with more than 95% of domestic equity market share, is the largest stock
exchange in Asia.22 TSE is a pure order driven market with no market makers. TSE
trading takes place in two different trading sessions. The morning session begins at 9:00
a.m. and ends at 11:00 a.m., while the afternoon session begins at 12:30 p.m. and ends at
3 p.m. Both limit and market orders are permitted. The TSE has tiered minimum tick
sizes and minimum trading units that depend on the stock’s price. To smooth the price
movements, TSE also sets price limits that vary with stock prices.23 TSE also has
provisions for special quotes which are automated non-tradable indicative quotes placed
by the exchange to reduce price volatility.24 Additionally, there are no hidden orders on
the TSE, trades can only occur at the bid or ask, which allows for cleaner
predictions.25We incorporate these special features of the TSE in our main analysis as
well as conduct several robustness tests to ensure that our results can be generalized

computational limitations. Each month of data is about 125 GB; simple sorting and estimation of crosscorrelation takes over 2 weeks.
22

Van Kervel (2012) suggests that HFTs submits duplicate limit orders on several trading venues,
which might cause a strong overestimation of liquidity aggregated across trading venues. But unlike the US
markets, Japanese stock market is not fragmented, which helps us make cleaner predictions. Any given
stock can only be traded on one exchange. So, we don’t believe our results are driven by inflated liquidity
estimations. TSE is close to monopolistic stock exchange in the theoretical model of Pagnotta and
Philippon (2012).
23

See http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/index.html for the institutional details of TSE and its

history
24

In our sample period, special quotes occur less than 1% of the time. See Hamao and Hasbrouck
(1995) for details about the warning quotes and special quotes.
25

Dark pools operated in Japan by Bank of America Corp., BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup Inc.,
Credit Suisse Group AG (CS), Daiwa, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Instinet Group Inc., Liquidnet Holdings
Inc., Morgan Stanley, Nomura Holdings Inc., and UBS AG, account for less than 2% of trading volume
(http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-07/barclays-planning-tokyo-dark-pool-daiwa-sees-expansionin-asia).
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beyond the TSE.
We remove trades outside of regular trading hours and trades with zero prices or
zero volume, quotes with bid greater than ask, and limit orders with zero limit price. We
separately analyze the TSE first-section stocks in the three market capitalization and
liquidity based TOPIX sub-indices comprising the largest TOPIX 100 Index stock, 389
TOPIX Mid 400 Index medium capitalization stocks, and the remaining 1,068 small
capitalization stocks belonging to the first-section of TSE are in the TOPIX Small Index.
Along with the introduction of Arrowhead, the TSE also reduced tick sizes for
certain stocks. Since the focus of our study is analyzing the impact of changes in the
speed of trading, we eliminate firms for which the tick size changes. For the post-crisis
and post-Arrowhead analyses, we select 150 stocks, the top 50 each from the TOPIX 100,
the TOPIX MID 400, and the TOPIX Small indices. Keeping in mind the different
minimum trading units and tick sizes for stocks with different price levels, we estimate
time-series regressions separately for each security and then the parameter estimates are
averaged across the cross-section of sample securities. We follow Naes and Skejltorp
(2006) to compute the proportion of stocks for which the coefficients are significant and
also follow Ellul, Holden, Jain, Jennings (2007) to use a test of proportions to access the
statistical significance of the averaged coefficients.
IV. Results
A. Descriptive statistics from the benchmark period before crisis and Arrowhead
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample of 1,557 stocks for June 2008,
the benchmark period before the recent financial crisis. We present the results for the
whole sample and also for large-, mid- and small-cap stocks separately. MKTCAP, the
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average market capitalization is JPY 223 billion for the entire sample, 33 billion for the
small-cap firms and 2,179 billion for the large-cap firms. MONTHLY VOLUME for largecap firms is 143 million shares per stock, which is about 3 times the MONTHLY
VOLUME for the medium-cap firms and almost 16 times the MONTHLY VOLUME for
the small-cap firms. The minute-by-minute stock RETURN, as measured by the log
change in the quote midpoints, is -0.0005%. We find that the proportion of trades
executed at the bid price, BIDPROP, is about 50%, with the other 50% of the trades
executed at the ask price, implying almost an overall symmetric distribution between buy
and sell trades. Minute-by-minute VOLATILITY, defined as the absolute value of return
residual from the equation shown in the header for Table 1, for the overall sample is
0.13% per minute. Small firms are more volatile than large or medium sized firms.
Table 1 also shows that mean trade-by-trade autocorrelation is 0.07 and decreases with
size. The mean of cross correlation is 0.02.26 The mean ASKCOIi,t and BIDCOIi,t are
34.47 and 34.03 basis points, respectively. The mean COI, which is the sum of
ASKCOIi,t and BIDCOIi,t, of 68.50 basis points indicates that it costs market-order traders
(impatient traders) 69 basis points more in round-trip costs to buy and sell 1% of the
stock’s average daily trading volume than the cost of trading the same amount at the
quote midpoint. The COI increases as the firm size declines. The mean ASKSLOPEi,t and
BIDSLOPEi,t are 12.37 and 12.39, respectively. The mean SLOPE i,t, which is the
average of ASKSLOPEi,t and BIDSLOPEi,t, of 12.38 indicates that 12.38% more volume
is supplied for every change in the price step of the LOB. The mean SLOPE of 25.57 for
26

Cross correlation is calculated with reference to an Exchange Traded Fund that closely tracks
the TOPIX index: TOPIX exchange traded fund (Local code: 1306) is managed by Nomura Asset
Management.
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large-cap stocks is more than two times the mean SLOPE of 8.89 for the small-cap
stocks.
Continuing the examination of Table 1, the proportionate spread, SPREAD, is
0.56% for the overall sample and ranges from 0.19% for large stocks to 0.69% for small
stocks. Note that a trader executing a large order equal to 1% of daily volume in a large
cap stock has to actually pay 0.41% COI, which is more than twice the 0.19% spread at
the top of the book, highlighting the importance of analyzing the quotes beyond the top of
the LOB. The average depth at the best quotes, DEPTH, is 22,320 stocks. Number of
trades per minute, NTRDS, is 2.91, with large-cap stocks trading 5.09 times each minute
while mid- and small-cap stocks trading 3.08 and 2.26 times each minute, respectively.
The maximum and 95th percentile for large-cap stocks and the maximum and 99th
percentile for mid-cap stocks are 18 trades per minute, as the older trading platform took
more than 3 seconds to process orders from submission to execution according to the
TSE. This distribution indicates that the desire of traders for an even higher trade
frequency for large- and mid-cap stocks could be truncated by the limits of the older
system. ATS is 2,583 shares per trade.27 ATS is higher for large firms than for medium or
small firms. Since there are no hidden orders on the TSE, we can precisely observe the
number of times the quotes are updated during each minute, and, hence, accurately
measure the QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO. Measured at minute by minute frequency, the
average

27

The mean ATS seemed to be larger for TSE as compared to the US markets. A further analysis
reveal that this is due to the presence of minimum trading units on TSE, which results in a round lot of
1,000 shares for a majority trades on TSE. We find that median ATS is 1,000 while the 95th percentile, 99th
percentile and the maximum for ATS are 9000, 26667, and 5821000, respectively.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the benchmark period
We present summary statistics from 1 June 2008 to 30 June 2008 for all Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE) first section firms. In Panel A we report the average market capitalization (MKTCAP) and
monthly volume (MONTHLY VOLUME). RETURN is the return on security i as measured by the
log change in the bid-ask quote midpoint. BIDPROP is the proportion of orders executed at the bid
price. We measure minute-by-minute return volatility (VOLATILITY) by estimating the following
∑
∑
regression for each security i:
where Dk
is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k and the 12 lagged returns estimate the short-term
conditional expected returns. Volatility is defined as the absolute value of the residual
VOLATILITY= | | following Schwertz (1989).
AUTO CORR is the return autocorrelation. CROSS CORR measures how the order flow on stock i
co-vary with the order flow on the market as proxied by the order flow on the TOPIX exchange
traded fund. In Panel B we report data for liquidity measures. LOB Slope for the five best asks
(ASKSLOPE) and five best bids (BIDSLOPE) is calculated using Equations 2 and 3, respectively.
SLOPE is (BIDSLOPE + ASKSLOPE)/2. COI (=ASKCOI+ BIDCOI) measures the cost that
liquidity demanders have to bear above the intrinsic value due to a sudden surge in the demand for
1% of the daily average trading volume. SPREAD is the proportionate spread over each minute of
trading. DEPTH is the average depth at the best bid and best ask. NTRDS is the number of trades
for each minute and ATS is the average trade size for each minute. We also compute the ratio of
number of quotes-to-trades during each minute (QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO). The large,
medium, and small classifications are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks Index, the
TOPIX Mid400 Index, and the TOPIX Small Index, respectively.
All firms
Large
Medium
Small
(n = 1,557)
(n = 100)
(n = 389)
(n = 1,068)
Panel A: Firm and market characteristic averages
MKTCAP (billion JPY)
223.37
2,179
294.96
33.18
MONTHLY VOLUME
25.26
143.22
46.73
7.91
(million shares)
RETURN
-0.0005%
0.0000%
-0.0000%
-0.0007%
BIDPROP
50.02%
50.01%
49.98%
50.05%
VOLATILITY
0.13%
0.04%
0.10%
0.19%
AUTO CORR
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.06
CROSS CORR
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
Panel B: Liquidity measures
COI (basis pts)
ASKCOI (basis pts)
BIDCOI (basis pts)
SLOPE
ASKSLOPE
BIDSLOPE
SPREAD
DEPTH
NTRDS
ATS
QUOTES-TOTRADE RATIO

68.50
34.47
34.03
12.38
12.37
12.39
0.56%
22.32
2.91
2,583
4.78

40.99
20.61
20.38
25.57
25.52
25.61
0.19%
37.79
5.09
5,281
5.99
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45.51
22.78
22.72
19.38
19.33
19.43
0.27%
27.73
3.08
3,089
5.76

84.35
42.47
41.88
8.89
8.92
8.85
0.69%
19.16
2.26
1,557
4.28

quotes to trade ratio for all stocks in the sample is 4.78 suggesting that the number of
quote revisions are about 5 times the number of executed trades.28
B. Liquidity effects of the Arrowhead low latency trading platform
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the post-crisis and the postArrowhead periods. 29 Consistent with Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), we find
that Arrowhead increased MONTHLY VOLUME by 6% from 93 million shares per stock
per month to 99 million shares for the entire sample. The increase is much higher
compared to the benchmark volume of 25 million shares in Table 1, which suggest that
crisis also induced an increase in trading volume. MONTHLY VOLUME for large-cap
firms increased dramatically; after Arrowhead it is almost 13% higher relative to the
period preceding Arrowhead in Table 2 and also much higher relative to the pre-crisis
benchmark period in Table 1. However, MONTHLY VOLUME for mid- and small-cap
firms declined after Arrowhead relative to the benchmark volume before Arrowhead in
Table 2 or Table 1. These results suggest that Arrowhead relaxed the speed limit that was
binding mainly for the large-cap stocks.
Table 2 also reports that VOLATILITY declined significantly to 0.06% for all
firms relative to the pre-crisis and pre-Arrowhead benchmarks of 0.14% and 0.13%,
respectively. Volatility declined from 0.13% to 0.02% for the large-cap stocks. Hence, as
shown by Baruch (2005) and Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005), higher speed of trading and

28

We find that the frequency of quote updates is much higher for large-cap firms (28.10 times per
minute) than small-cap (9.04 times per minute) which suggest that 3 second latency of the older trading
platform was a binding constraint for large cap stocks. Thus, Arrowhead should have a meaningful impact
on the trading in large cap stocks.
29

Uno and Shibata (2011) provide an excellent description of Arrowhead and its impact on the
trading frequency and top of the book spreads. We analyze the effect of Arrowhead on evolution of LOB.
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Table 2
Liquidity changes around Arrowhead reduction in latency
We present summary statistics for a stratified sample of 150 firms listed on the first section of
TSE formed by selecting the firms with the highest market capitalization in the large, medium,
and small firm groups. Before and after columns represent the pre and post launch periods of
the new Arrowhead low latency trading platform. The treatment period for our natural TSE
system overhaul experiment comprises of data for January 2011 and the control period
comprises data for January 2009. FLEET ORDER is defined as an order that improves best bid
(ask) and is followed by a trade at the bid (ask) within 1 second of improvement. Remaining
variable definitions and classifications are the same as described in Table 1.
All firms
Large
Medium
Small
(n = 150)
(n = 50)
(n = 50)
(n = 50)
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Panel A: Firm and market characteristics
MONTHLY
VOLUME
(million shares)
BIDPROP (%)
VOLATILITY
(%)
AUTO CORR
CROSS CORR
FLEET ORDERS

93.74

109.88 237.77

287.60

36.13

37.86

5.02

4.18

49.26

50.01

49.50

50.02

49.01

49.98

49.29

50.01

0.14

0.06

0.13

0.02

0.14

0.06

0.16

0.08

0.02
-0.03
1.91

0.11
0.04
3.61

0.04
0.03
2.10

0.18
0.10
4.52

0.02
-0.02
1.69

0.14
0.04
2.73

-0.01
-0.05
1.44

0.02
-0.02
1.95

Panel B: Liquidity measures
COI (basis pts)
59.52
ASKCOI(basis pts) 29.87
BIDCOI(basis pts)
29.66
SLOPE
20.39
ASKSLOPE
20.34
BIDSLOPE
20.44
SPREAD
0.23%
DEPTH (‘000)
44.90
NTRDS
7.34
ATS
3,800
QUOTES-TO4.89
TRADE RATIO
TRADESPEED
0.08

28.38
14.41
13.97
20.68
20.73
20.61
0.16%
257.71
11.15
3,132
5.69

57.24
28.79
28.45
23.35
23.30
23.40
0.21%
84.72
10.75
7,047
6.41

26.29
13.21
13.08
25.81
25.73
25.90
0.14%
545.93
18.14
6,665
7.17

57.39
28.95
28.44
20.98
20.92
21.05
0.20%
30.72
6.10
2,262
5.94

27.85
13.96
13.88
21.47
21.40
21.54
0.15%
67.98
7.11
2,025
6.37

0.12

0.11

0.19

0.06

0.08
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66.03 33.26
32.82 17.81
33.21 15.46
14.95 12.17
14.91 12.15
14.99 12.18
0.31% 0.23%
2.35 39.47
3.71
3.42
822
744
4.32
4.47
0.04

0.06

greater transparency result in higher competition among liquidity suppliers at various
price points that, in turn, results in price smoothing or a decline in volatility. The mean of
AUTO CORR and CROSS CORR in order flow increased for a majority of the firms
during the post-Arrowhead period. However, the effect of Arrowhead is more
pronounced for the large- and mid-cap stocks. We also find that the frequency of fleeting
order execution, defined as an order that improves best bid (ask) and is followed by a
trade at the bid (ask) within 1 second of improvement, has significantly increased during
the post-Arrowhead period.
Table 2 further reports that COI declined by more than 50% for all the sample
firms during the post-Arrowhead period, which supports Rosu’s (2009) and Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel’s (2005) predictions that faster arrival rates reduce the expected
waiting time for orders in the queue so that limit orders require lower compensation for
waiting. Lower COI reflects this reduction in costs of supplying liquidity. We also find
that the SLOPE has increased significantly in 2009-2011 for the large- and mid-cap firms
compared its level in 2008. These results indicate an overall increase in liquidity supplied
by the LOB post Arrowhead.30
Number of trades increased by more than 50% from 7.34 trades per minute to
11.15 trades per minute, post Arrowhead. We also find that average trade size declined,
which is why the total volume did not rise as dramatically during the post-Arrowhead
period. These results suggest a significant increase in sophisticated order slicing on the

30

To test the possibility of changes in market quality over time, we test the changes in liquidity,
volatility, autocorrelation and cross correlation in order flow, and quotes-to-trade during the same period
for the stocks listed on Osaka stock exchange, but the difference for the two periods (2009, 2011) was not
significant.
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TSE due to increase in HFT, supporting the findings in Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2011, Figure 4). We also find that the QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO increased
by 17% from 4.89 pre-Arrowhead to 5.69 post-Arrowhead while the TRADESPEED
(inverse of the average time between trades per minute of trading) increased by 50% from
0.08 pre-Arrowhead to 0.12 post-Arrowhead.31
C. Impact of Arrowhead on market quality
C1. LOB liquidity
Figure 2, Panels A and B, plots intraday averages for COI and SLOPE in five
minute buckets throughout each trading day. We observe the standard U-shape pattern for
intraday COI and SLOPE (see, McInish and Wood, 1992). We also find that Arrowhead
significantly improved the LOB liquidity by reducing the COI and increasing the SLOPE.
We formally test this relation by estimating the following regression model based on
Stoll (2000) specifications:

COIi,t or SLOPEi,t = αi + β1iARROWHEADit + β2i LOG PRICEit + β3i LOG NTRDSi,t + β4i
VOLATILITYi,t +β5iLOG VOLUMEi,t + β6i MKTRETi,t +β9i HIGHSPEEDi,t +β10i
LOWSPEEDi,t +µi,t

where ARROWHEAD is the dummy variable that equals 1 for the post Arrowhead
period (January 2011) and 0 otherwise (January 2009), LOG PRICEi,t is the natural log of
the end of minute trading price, LOG NTRDSi,t is the natural log of number of trades per

31

Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find that autoquote increased the number of messages
by 6%. Menkveld (2012) finds that cancellation-to-trade ratio for an European market (CHI-X) is 5.
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Panel A: Minute-by-Minute COI

Panel B: Minute-by-Minute Volatility

Panel C: Minute-by-Minute Autocorrelation
trade ratio

Panel D: Minute-by-Minute Quotes-to-

Panel E: Fleeting order executions per minute

Panel F: Minute-by-Minute NTRDS

Figure 2. Impact of Arrowhead on key market quality parameters.
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minute of trading, VOLATILITYi,t is the absolute value of the return, conditional on its
own 12 lags and day-of-week dummies, LOG VOLUMEi,t is the natural log of the average
trading volume each minute, MKTRETi,t is the return on the market as measured by return
on the TSE exchange traded fund. We create two dummy variable to capture the effect of
speed of trading on liquidity (Hendershott and Moulton, 2011): HIGHSPEEDi,t is a
dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the speed of quote updates is greater than its 75th
percentile value and LOWSPEEDi,t is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the speed
of quote updates is less than its 25th percentile value. α and β are parameters to be
estimated and µi,t is a random error term. The subscripts i and t indicate firm i and minute
t, respectively. The regressions are estimated for each security and then the parameter
estimates are averaged across securities.
Table 3 summarizes the results from the estimation of stock-by-stock regressions
using high frequency, minute-by-minute data. ARROWHEAD’s negative coefficient of 3.55 in Panel A indicates that Arrowhead has significantly reduced the COI for a majority
of the sample stocks. Column (2) summarizes the distribution of statistical significance in
the stock by stock estimations. The coefficient of ARROWHEAD is significant for 98%
of the sample stocks and 95% of the coefficients are negative. We also find that,
consistent with the prior literature (Stoll, 2000), COI is positively related to NTRDS and
VOLATILITY while negatively related to VOLUME and PRICE. Table 3, Panel B, shows
that SLOPE has significantly increased post Arrowhead. Overall, our results support the
theoretical predictions of Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) and Boehmer, Saar and Yu
(2005) and are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Higher speed of trading due to introduction
of Arrowhead increases competition among traders resulting in tightening of the LOB.
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This reduces COI and increases SLOPE. The coefficients are opposite in sign because
COI is an inverse measure of liquidity whereas SLOPE is a direct measure of liquidity.
C2. Volatility
Figure 2, Panel A, shows that VOLATILITY has declined post Arrowhead. We
also observe the well-established U-shape patterns (McInish and Wood, 1992) in
VOLATILITY during both pre- and post-Arrowhead periods. Figure 3, Panel B, shows a
positive relation between COI and future volatility. We test the relative informativeness
of COI, SLOPE, and other traditional liquidity measures in explaining future return
volatility formally by estimating the regression equation presented in Table 4 following
Schwertz (1989). Several control variables that could result in a greater return volatility
are included to capture potential information accumulation or differences in opinion
(Harris and Raviv, 1993), relative pessimism in market sentiment (wider spreads, lower
depth, higher volatility or volume, and negative market return) , depth (Hasbrouck, 1999)
and dispersion of limit orders in the book (Kang and Yeo, 2008) day of the week (French,
1980; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990), the average trade size (Jones, Kaul and Lipson,
1994). The regressions are estimated for each security and then the parameter estimates
are averaged across securities.
Table 4, Panel A, summarizes the results from the estimation of stock-by-stock
regressions using high frequency, minute-by-minute data. COI’s positive coefficients of
6.55 in the standalone model (1) and 2.48 in the full regression model (4) indicate that
higher COI is followed by higher future volatility. Column (5) summarizes the
distribution of statistical significance in the stock by stock estimations. The coefficient of
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Table 3
Arrowhead improves limit order book liquidity
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
COIi,t or SLOPEi,t = αi + β1iARROWHEADit + β2i LOG PRICEit + β3i LOG NTRDSi,t + β4i VOLATILITYi,t
+β5iLOG VOLUMEi,t + β6i MKTRETi,t +β9i HIGHSPEEDi,t +β10i LOWSPEEDi,t +µi,t

where ARROWHEAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the post Arrowhead low latency
trading platform (January 2011) and 0 otherwise (January 2009). The remaining variables are as
defined earlier. Columns with heading %t (sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that are
significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported average
estimates in parentheses). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates
averaged across all individual security regression equations. The large, medium, and small
classifications are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks Index, the TOPIX Mid 400
Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX Small-Sized Stocks Index, respectively.
Panel A. Impact of Arrowhead on COI
Variables
ARROWHEAD
LOGVOL
LOGNTRDS
HIGH SPEED
LOW SPEED
VOLATILITY
LOGPRICE
MKTRET
ADJ R2

(1)
All Firms
-3.55*
-2.04*
1.84*
-0.21
1.17
4.30*
-2.44*
-0.14
0.148

(2)
%t (%sign)
98 (95)
84 (74)
80 (71)
75 (53)
42 (74)
100 (99)
95 (89)
46 (60)

Panel B. Impact of Arrowhead on LOB SLOPE
(1)
(2)
Variables
All Firms
%t (%sign)
ARROWHEAD
2.31*
93 (97)
LOGVOL
2.14*
76 (86)
LOGNTRDS
-0.41
40 (68)
HIGH SPEED
-0.01
55 (52)
LOW SPEED
-0.19
18 (64)
VOLATILITY
-2.93*
100 (99)
LOGPRICE
2.31*
89 (93)
MKTRET
0.08
13 (51)
2
ADJ R
0.139

(3)
Large-cap
-4.53*
-5.07*
3.83*
-1.06*
2.07*
4.64*
-2.86*
-0.21
0.114

(4)
Mid-cap
-2.89*
-1.54*
2.06*
-0.12
1.17
4.23*
-2.29*
-0.18
0.121

(5)
Small-cap
-1.92*
-1.96*
0.91*
0.78*
-0.33
3.89*
-2.35*
-0.01
0.174

(3)
Large-cap
3.39*
4.04*
-0.58
0.27
-0.44*
-5.38*
3.07*
0.12
0.167

(4)
Mid-cap
2.22*
1.82*
-0.44
0.18
-0.32
-3.92*
2.34*
0.06
0.126

(5)
Small-cap
1.84*
0.44
-0.16
-0.47
0.22
-2.32*
1.71*
0.07
0.112

* significant at the .05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis that significantly more than
60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean. The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following
equation:
, where P is the hypothesized value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the
sample proportion, and σ is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution which is given by:
sample size.
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[

], where n is the

Panel A: COI and future return volatility
autocorrelation

Panel B: COI and future

Panel C: COI and future cross correlation
ratio

Panel D: COI and future quotes-to-trade

Panel E: COI and future trade placements
trades

Panel F: COI and future number of

Figure 3. Graphical representations of benchmark relationship between COI and market
quality measures.
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COI is significant for 78% of the sample stocks and 84% of the coefficients are positive.
These results are consistent across the different size portfolios (Table 4, Panel B).
Steeper SLOPE also leads to lower future volatility. SLOPE is informative for future
return volatility for about 60% (47%) of the sample stocks. SLOPE significantly predicts
future return volatility for a majority of large- and mid-cap firms. This result is consistent
with Naes and Skjeltorp’s (2006) findings for Norwegian stocks. Table 4, Panel A,
column 6, reports the results from an alternative analysis using the GARCH(1,1)
specification (summarized in the footnote 47) for return volatility and they are consistent
with the results derived using the two stage OLS regressions.32 Overall, our results
support Hypothesis 2 and the theoretical predictions of Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen
(2007) that lower COI leads to lower future return volatility. Table 4, Panel C,
summarizes the results for the effect of Arrowhead on return volatility and the
relationship between COI, SLOPE and return volatility. Consistent with the pre-crisis
period results summarized in Table 4, Panel A, and with Hypothesis 2, we find a
statistically significant and positive (negative) coefficient of 5.94 (-2.06) for COI
(SLOPE) . We also find a statistically significant and negative coefficient of -0.47 for the
dummy variable ARROWHEAD in the full sample, which shows that Arrowhead has
significantly reduced return volatility. We note that the coefficients regarding the

32

We have also used the following GARCH(1,1) specification, selected based on lowest AIC and
SIC criterions, for return volatility:
∑

∑

+β1i DISDTi,t+β2iSLOPEit+β3iCOIi,t+ β4,mMt+1+β5i NTRDSi,t+β6i ATSi,t+ β7iSPREADi,t+ β8iDEPTHi,t
+ β9i HIGH SPEEDi,t +β10i LOW SPEEDi,t +β11iMKTRETi,t
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reduction in volatility due to Arrowhead are significant only for large- and mid-cap
stocks.

Table 4
Intraday volatility
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
|εi,t+1| = αi +β1i COIi,t+β2iSLOPEit+β3iDISDTi,t+ β4,mMONDAYt+1+β5i NTRDSi,t+β6i ATSi,t+β7iSPREADi,t
+β8iDEPTHi,t+β9i HIGHSPEEDi,t +β10i LOWSPEEDi,t +β11iMKTRETi,t +∑
+µi,t+1
where |εi,t+1| is the future return volatility measured as defined in Table 1, COIi,t is the cost that liquidity demanders
have to bear to trade 1% of the daily average trading volume, SLOPEi,t is the average of the slope for the five best bids
and five best asks, DISDTi,t is the dispersion of limit orders, The remaining variables are as defined earlier. α, β,
and δ are parameters to be estimated, and µi,t+1 is a random error term. The subscripts i and t indicate firm i and minute
t. δi,j captures the persistence in volatility. We present the results based on calendar time forecasting by predicting the
return volatility for the full sample and for three size based portfolios based on the previous minute’s lagged LOB
information for our benchmark period of June 2008 in Panels A and B. Panel C summarizes the results for the impact
of Arrowhead for the post financial crisis period using the following model:
|εi,t+1| = αi +β1i COIi,t+β2iSLOPEit+β3iDISDTi,t+ β4,mMt+1+β5i NTRDSi,t+β6i ATSi,t +β7iSPREADi,t +β8i DEPTHi,t +β9i
TRADING SPEEDi,t +β10i ARROWHEADi,t +β11i MKTRETi,t +β12i ARROWHEADi,t*COIi,t +β13i
ARROWHEADi,t*SLOPEit +β14i ARROWHEADi,t*DISDTi,t + ∑
+µi,t+1
where ARROWHEAD is the dummy variable that equals 1 for the post Arrowhead period (January 2011) and 0
otherwise (January 2009). The remaining variables are as defined earlier. Columns with heading “%t (sign)” report the
percentage of t-statistics that are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the
reported average estimates in parentheses). Column (6) in Panel A reports the results from stock by stock
GARCH(1,1) analysis. The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all
individual security regression equations. The large, medium, and small classifications are based on the TOPIX 100
Large-Sized Stocks Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX Small-Sized Stocks
Index, respectively.
Panel A. Predicting future return volatility for the benchmark period
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables

Β1

Β2

Β3

All Firms

%t (%sign)

GARCH(1,1)

2.48*

78 (84)

2.54*

-0.36*

60 (62)

-0.41*

1.01

47 (79)

0.97

MONDAY

0.04

28 (52)

0.04

NTRDS

1.74

31 (81)

1.79

ATS

2.12*

57 (84)

2.22*

SPREAD

0.85

50 (54)

0.65

-0.26
-0.18
0.65
0.52
0.051

30 (55)
27 (72)
10 (98)
35 (62)

-0.30
-0.21
0.74
0.59
0.055

COI

6.55*

SLOPE

-3.25*

DISDT

DEPTH
HIGH SPEED
LOW SPEED
MKTRET
ADJ R2

5.33*

0.039

0.035

0.036
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Table 4 continued
Panel B. Predicting future return volatility across different firm sizes for the benchmark period
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Large-cap

%t (%sign)

Mid-cap

%t (%sign)

Small-cap

%t (%sign)

2.97*

81 (100)

3.52*

76 (98)

2.08*

77 (78)

SLOPE

-0.40*

73 (74)

-0.26*

64 (66)

0.05

46 (49)

DISDT

-0.26

Variables
COI

24 (54)

0.77

35 (68)

1.20*

55 (83)

MONDAY
NTRDS
ATS

0.05
3.16
4.33*

5 (40)
36 (100)
64 (100)

0.06
2.33
3.79*

6 (57)
28 (98)
56 (99)

0.03
1.41
1.36*

38 (52)
32 (74)
51 (76)

SPREAD

0.98

21 (72)

0.87

30 (51)

0.84

60 (54)

-0.58
-0.06
0.61
0.65
0.024

19 (53)
4 (50)
5 (100)
18 (72)

-0.57
-0.16
0.53
0.47
0.039

20 (54)
6 (55)
6 (100)
25 (68)

-0.12
-0.20
0.73
0.53
0.057

35 (58)
37 (83)
11 (97)
41 (60)

DEPTH
HIGH SPEED
LOW SPEED
MKTRET
ADJ R2

Panel C. Predicting future return volatility post crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)
Variables

All Firms

COI
SLOPE
ARROW
ARROW*COI
ARROW*SLOPE
2

ADJ R

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Mid-cap

Small%t
cap
(%sign)
6.92* 88 (100)
-0.71
39 (52)

5.94*
-2.06*

%t
(%sign)
89 (99)
64 (69)

Largecap
4.89*
-2.53*

%t
(%sign)
92 (96)
79 (81)

6.04*
-1.98*

%t
(%sign)
87 (100)
74 (71)

-0.47*

61 (89)

-0.36*

90 (89)

-0.70*

64 (72)

-0.36

31 (100)

0.25

8 (73)

0.14

0.43

14 (67)

0.18

9 (100)

-0.15

10 (57)

-0.18

-0.13

9 (75)

-0.03

6 (31)

0.162

0.162

2 (0)
14 (71)

0.159

0.165

* significant at the .05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis
that significantly more than 60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean.
The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P is the hypothesized
value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ
is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the
sample size.
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D. Impact of Arrowhead on systemic risk
D1. Autocorrelation and cross correlation
Figure 3, Panel B, shows a negative relation between COI and future
autocorrelation. Hence, higher liquidity facilitates order slicing trading strategies, leading
to a higher trade-by-trade autocorrelation.33 We formally analyze this relation by
estimating the regression model summarized in Table 5.
Based on the results summarized in Table 5, Panel A, column (1), we find that
COI has a statistically significant and negative coefficient of -0.44. Hence, the lower the
COI the higher is the AUTOCORR. These results are consistent for a majority of largeand mid-cap stocks. We also find that SLOPE significantly positively predicts
AUTOCORR for large-cap stocks. Thus, we find a positive relation between LOB
liquidity and AUTOCORR. Our results support Hypothesis 3 and are consistent with the
models of strategic trading that suggest that rational informed investors spread their
trading over time to conceal information (see Kyle, 1985, and Barclay and Warner,
1993). Such stealth trading leads to positive autocorrelation in highly liquid markets.
Table 5, Panel B, summarizes the results for the effect of Arrowhead on
AUTOCORR and on the relationship between COI, SLOPE and AUTOCORR. We find a
statistically significant and negative (positive) coefficient of -0.56 (0.31) for COI
(SLOPE), which is consistent with the pre-crisis period results summarized in Table 5,
Panel A, and with Hypothesis 3. We also find that Arrowhead significantly increases
AUTOCORR for a majority of large- and mid-cap stocks, as reflected by the positive and

33

We also analyze order-by-order autocorrelation and get qualitatively similar results as those for
trade-by-trade autocorrelation.
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statistically significant coefficient of 1.12 for the ARROWHEAD dummy. These results
indicate that lower latency of Arrowhead facilitates automated order splitting and herding
strategies resulting in higher autocorrelation in order flow.
Figure 3, Panel C, shows a positive relation between COI and future cross
correlation. The lower cross correlation in a more liquid market suggests that stockspecific idiosyncratic information dominates the systemic components and informed
investors private signals are incorporated in prices at a more intense rate in liquid markets
consistent with supports Kyle’s (1985) and Barclay and Warner’s (1993). In contrast
when COI for trading individual equities is higher, then systemic components dominate
and create higher cross-correlation.
In Table 6, Panel A, we formally test this finding using the regression framework,
where we find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for COI. A further
analysis based on the three size-based portfolios reveals that the predictive power of COI
is consistent across different firm sizes. Our findings suggest that liquid markets increase
information production resulting in higher trading in individual stocks. We also find that
SLOPE significantly negatively predicts CROSSCORR for a majority of large-cap firms.
Table 6, Panel B, summarizes the results for the effect of Arrowhead on
CROSSCORR and the relationship between COI, SLOPE and CROSSCORR. Consistent
with the pre-crisis period results summarized in Table 6, Panel A, we find a positive
(negative) and statistically significant coefficient of 0.41 (-0.22) for COI (SLOPE) that
suggests lower liquidity leads to higher CROSSCORR. More importantly, as a test of
Hypothesis 4 we also find a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.91 for

78

Table 5
Trade-by-trade autocorrelation
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
AUTOCORRi,t+1 = αi + β1iCOIi,t + β2iSLOPEi,t + β3i NTRDSi,t + β4i ATSi,t + β5i SPREADi,t + β6i DEPTHi,t+β7i
HIGHSPEEDi,t +β8i LOWSPEEDi,t+β9iVOLATILITYi,t+β10iRETURNi,t + µi,t+1
where AUTOCORRi,t+1 is the trade-by-trade autocorrelation for stock i and minute t+1. The remaining
variables are as defined in Table 3. We present the results based on calendar time forecasting by predicting
the return autocorrelation for the full sample and for three size based portfolios based on the previous
minute’s lagged LOB information for our benchmark period of June 2008 in Panel A. Panel B summarizes
the results for the impact of Arrowhead for the post financial crisis period using the following model:
AUTOCORRi,t+1 = αi + β1iCOIi,t + β2iSLOPEi,t + β3i NTRDSi,t + β4i ATSi,t + β5i SPREADi,t + β6i DEPTHi,t
+β7i TRADING SPEEDi,t +β8i VOLATILITYi,t +β9i RETURNi,t +β10i ARROWHEADi,t +β11i MKTRETi,t +β12i
ARROWHEADi,t*COIi,t +β13i ARROWHEADi,t*SLOPEit +µi,t+1
The variables are as defined previously. Columns with heading “%t (sign)” report the percentage of tstatistics that are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported
average estimates in parentheses). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates
averaged across all individual security regressions. The large, medium, and small classifications are based on
the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX
Small-Sized Stocks Index, respectively.
Panel A. Predicting future autocorrelation for the benchmark period
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
COI
SLOPE
NTRDS
ATS
SPREAD
DEPTH
VOLATILITY
RETURN
HIGH SPEED
LOW SPEED
ADJ R2

All Firms

%t (%sign)

-0.38*
0.25
0.97*
-0.29
-0.07
0.16
-0.99*
0.13
0.84
-0.31
0.034

68(77)
40(71)
78(93)
43(75)
39(89)
37(82)
82(95)
10(57)
37(61)
7(82)

Large-cap
-0.88*
0.42*
1.23*
-0.77*
-0.61*
1.04*
-1.66*
0.12
0.50
-0.24
0.033

Mid-cap

Small-cap

-0.48*
0.31
0.98*
-0.22
-0.06
0.32
-1.53*
0.18
0.72
-0.44
0.042

-0.15
0.21
0.87
-0.28
-0.01
0.01
-0.75
0.11
0.94*
-0.27
0.032

Panel B. Predicting future autocorrelation post crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All
%t
Large%t
Mid-cap
%t
Firms (%sign)
cap
(%sign)
(%sign)
COI
-0.56*
72(84)
-0.84*
88(90)
-0.52* 92(80)
SLOPE
0.31*
52(62)
0.82*
76(82)
0.07
48(54)
ARROW
1.12*
74(84)
1.55*
84(92)
1.10* 88(96)
ARROW*COI
-0.07
22(78)
-0.12
28(82)
-0.06
32(88)
ARROW*SLOPE
0.11
28(75)
0.15
34(76)
0.11
32(78)
ADJ R2
0.049
0.043
0.050

(7)
Smallcap
-0.26
0.04
0.79
-0.01
0.06
0.055

(8)
%t
(%sign)
36(74)
32(48)
48(64)
6 (64)
16(70)

* significant at the 0.05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis
that significantly more than 60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean.
The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P is the hypothesized
value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ
is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the
sample size.
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Table 6
Intraday cross correlation
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
CROSSCORRi,t+1 = αi + β1iCOIi,t+ β2iSLOPEi,t + β3i NTRDSi,t + β4i ATSi,t + β5i SPREADi,t + β6i DEPTHi,t +β7i
HIGHSPEEDi,t +β8i LOWSPEEDi,t + β9iVOLATILITYi,t + β10iRETURNi,t + µi,t+1
where CROSSCORRi,t+1 measures how the order flow on stock i co-varies with the order flow on the market as
proxied by the order flow on the TSE exchange traded fund for minute t. The remaining variables are as defined in
Table 3. We present the results based on calendar time forecasting by predicting the return cross correlation for the
full sample and for three size based portfolios based on the previous minute’s lagged LOB information for our
benchmark period of June 2008 in Panel A. Panel B summarizes the results for the impact of Arrowhead for the
post-financial-crisis period using the following model:
AUTOCORRi,t+1 = αi + β1iCOIi,t + β2iSLOPEi,t + β3i NTRDSi,t + β4i ATSi,t + β5i SPREADi,t + β6i DEPTHi,t
+β7i TRADING SPEEDi,t +β8i VOLATILITYi,t +β9i RETURNi,t +β10i ARROWHEADi,t +β11i MKTRETi,t +β12i
ARROWHEADi,t*COIi,t +β13i ARROWHEADi,t*SLOPEit +µi,t+1
The variables are as defined previously. Columns with heading “%t (sign)” report the percentage of t-statistics that
are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported average estimates in
parentheses). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all individual
security regressions. The large, medium, and small classifications are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks
Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX Small-Sized Stocks Index, respectively.
Panel A. Predicting future return cross correlation for the benchmark period
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables

All Firms

COI
SLOPE
NTRDS
ATS
SPREAD
DEPTH
VOLATILITY
RETURN
HIGH SPEED
LOW SPEED
ADJ R2

0.72*
-0.28*
-0.14
-0.21
0.13
-0.08
0.50
0.01
0.06
-0.07
0.087

%t (%sign)
69(78)
51(69)
25(59)
51(55)
49(69)
34(50)
62(55)
1(54)
26(93)
5(53)

(4)

(5)

Large-cap

Mid-cap

Small-cap

1.04*
-0.46*
-0.52
-0.56*
0.46
-0.63
2.15*
0.08
0.07
-0.14
0.072

0.71*
-0.18
-0.09
-0.17
0.25
-0.05
0.98*
0.05
0.05
-0.08
0.088

Panel B. Predicting future return cross correlation post crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
All Firms
%t
Large%t
Mid-cap
%t
(%sign)
cap
(%sign)
(%sign)
COI
0.41* 72 (65)
0.68* 84 (72)
0.38* 78 (64)
SLOPE
-0.22* 50 (62)
-0.43* 76 (65)
-0.23 47 (57)
ARROW
0.91* 64 (79)
1.17* 84 (77)
0.95* 76 (85)
ARROW*COI
0.38
18 (71)
0.53
22 (75)
0.31 17(68)
ARROW*SLOPE
-0.14
28 (66)
-0.30
42 (76)
-0.18 22 (61)
ADJ R2
0.078
0.082
0.073

(7)
Smallcap
0.06
-0.04
0.02
0.30
-0.01
0.079

0.52*
-0.15
-0.01
-0.13
0.03*
-0.05
0.19
-0.01
0.06
-0.01
0.102

(8)
%t
(%sign)
54 (48)
10 (46)
32 (70)
13 (69)
15 (60)

* significant at the 0.05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis
that significantly more than 60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean.
The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P is the hypothesized
value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ
is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the
sample size.
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ARROWHEAD. Hence, Arrowhead increased cross correlation in order flow due to
increase in program trading. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction of
Biais and Woolley (2011), who suggest that high frequency trades are highly correlated
and hence, might contribute to destabilizing markets. Our findings also support Chaboud,
Hjalmarsson, Vega, and Chiquoine (2009) who suggest that HFT has the potential to
rapidly propagate liquidity shocks across securities leading to a system-wide crash.
D2. Quotes-to-trade ratio
Figure 2, Panel D, shows that the quotes-to-trade ratio significantly increased
during the post-Arrowhead period. We also observe the existence of well-established Ushape patterns (McInish and Wood, 1992) during both pre- and post-Arrowhead periods.
Figure 3, Panel D, shows a negative relation between COI and the future QUOTES-TOTRADE RATIO. We formally test the relation by analyzing the following regression
model described in Table 7.
Table 7, Panel A, shows that COI (SLOPE) significantly negatively (positively)
predicts the future QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO. These results are consistent across
different size-based portfolios. Hence, the higher the COI the lower is the QUOTES-TOTRADE RATIO. Higher liquidity supply in the LOB increases the frequency of quote
revisions or cancellations, increasing the QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO. These results are
consistent with our Hypothesis 5.
Table 7, Panel B summarizes the results for the effect of Arrowhead on the
QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO, and the relation between QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO
and COI (or SLOPE). We find a statistically significant and negative (positive)
coefficient of -1.31 (2.03) for COI (SLOPE), which is consistent with the pre-crisis
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Table 7
Message traffic: Quotes-to-trade ratio
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIOi,t+1 = αi + β1i COIi,t+ β2i SLOPEi,t+ β3i MONDAYt+1+ β4i NTRDSi,t + β5i ATSi,t
+ β6i SPREADi,t + β7i DEPTHi,t+β8iVOLATILITYi,t+β9i MKTRETi,t +µi,t+1
where QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIOi,t+1 is the future number of quotes to number of trades ratio. The
remaining variables are as defined in Table 3. We present the results based on calendar time forecasting by
predicting the quotes-to-trade ratio, for the full sample and for three size based portfolios, based on the
previous minute’s lagged LOB information for our benchmark period of June 2008 in Panel A. Panels B
summarizes the results for impact of Arrowhead for the post financial crisis period using the following
model:
QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIOi,t+1 = αi + β1i COIi,t+ β2i SLOPEi,t+ β3i MONDAYt+1+β4i NTRDSi,t+β5i ATSi,t+β6i
SPREADi,t+β7i DEPTHi,t+ β8iVOLATILITYi,t +β9iMKTRETi,t +β10iARROWHEADi,t
+β11iARROWHEADi,t*COIi,t +β12iARROWHEADi,t*SLOPEit +µi,t+1
The variables are as defined previously. Columns with heading “%t (sign)” report the percentage of tstatistics that are significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported
average estimates in parentheses). The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates
averaged across all individual security regression equations. The large, medium, and small classifications
are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index,
and the TOPIX Small-Sized Stocks Index, respectively.
Panel A: Predicting the future quotes-to-trade ratio for the benchmark period
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables

All Firms

%t (%sign)

Large-cap

(4)
Mid-cap

COI
-0.84*
62 (63)
-2.69*
-1.71*
SLOPE
1.15*
75 (89)
1.23*
1.52*
MONDAY
0.19
23 (64)
0.51
0.56
SPREAD
-0.49
49 (78)
-0.14
-0.47
DEPTH
0.34
47 (79)
1.03*
0.61*
VOLATILITY
0.14
16 (51)
0.83
0.13
ATS
-0.47
35 (61)
-0.91*
-0.40
NTRDS
-0.77
46 (62)
-2.01*
-0.72*
MKTRET
0.04
4 (52)
0.02
0.03
ADJ R2
0.091
0.114
0.082
Panel B: Predicting the future quotes-to-trade ratio post crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variables
COI
SLOPE
ARROW
ARROW*COI
ARROW*SLOPE

(5)
Small-cap
-0.25
0.65*
0.06
-0.59*
0.18
0.08
-0.03
-0.22
0.05
0.090
(7)

(8)

All
%t
Firms (%sign)
-1.31* 64 (72)
2.03* 79 (92)

Large%t
cap
(%sign)
-2.91* 71 (87)
2.38* 86 (97)

Mid-cap
-2.23*
2.85*

%t
(%sign)
69 (81)
88 (99)

2.59* 88 (97)

3.51* 98 (100)

3.06*

91 (99)

1.09*

78 (92)

-2.77*

92 (100)

-0.68*

73 (79)

3.11*

95 (100)

1.82*

68 (85)

-1.54* 81 (88)
2.33* 83 (96)

-3.04* 96 (99)
3.42* 99 (100)

2

Small%t
cap
(%sign)
-0.67
46 (60)
1.57* 65 (74)

ADJ R
0.193
0.216
0.168
0.188
* significant at the 0.05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis
that significantly more than 60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean.
The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P is the hypothesized
value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ
is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the
sample size.
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period results summarized in Panel A. We also find a positive and statistically significant
coefficient of 2.59 for the ARROWHEAD dummy, suggesting that Arrowhead has
significantly increased the QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO for a majority of sample stocks.
Thus, traders revise or cancel their orders with a higher intensity in low latency
environments. Finally, we find that Arrowhead significantly increased the
informativeness of COI (SLOPE) for the future QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO for a
majority of the sample firms as reflected by the significantly negative (positive)
coefficient for ARROW*COI (ARROW*SLOPE). Thus, the relation between liquidity and
the intensity of quote revisions and cancellations strengthens as exchanges reduce their
matching engine’s latency. Hence, the results summarized in Table 8, Panels A and B,
support our Hypothesis 5 that Arrowhead increased QUOTES-TO-TRADE RATIO.
D3. Tail Risk
Biais, Foucault, Moinas (2012) suggest that HFTs can process information on
stock values faster than other traders. Thus, they increase the intensity of adverse
selection particularly during systemic risk event, such as the May 6th 2010 Flash Crash.
To test the changes in tail risks introduced by Arrowhead, we identify the trading minutes
when the market return is extremely negative (5th percentile) and analyze the effect of
low latency on various parameters of market quality and systemic risk. Table 8 and
Figure 5 summarize the results from this analysis. In Panel A, we define tail risk events
as the minutes during which the return on market index is in bottom 5th percentile (5%
extreme negative market return minutes). But the tail itself can be different before and
after Arrowhead. In Panel B, we control for this by matching the tail risk events by the
actual extreme negative return values. In Panel B tail risk events, during either period, are
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Table 8
Tail Risk: Pre- and Post-Arrowhead
We analyze the behavior of the key market quality and systemic risk parameters during the
extreme negative market movements. The variables are as defined previously. Columns (1) and
(2) report the means for the key variables during the pre- and post-Arrowhead period,
respectively. Column (3) reports the difference in means (post-Arrowhead - pre-Arrowhead). For
Panel A we create a subsample of trading minutes for which the market returns are in 5th
percentile (5% extreme negative returns), while for Panel B, we create a subsample of trading
minutes for which the market returns are between -0.42% (minimum for post-Arrowhead) and 0.11% (5th percentile for post-Arrowhead).
Panel A. Effect of Arrowhead on tail risk, as defined by trading minutes when the market return
is in the bottom 5th percentile
VARIABLES

COI (Basis points)
SLOPE
VOLATILITY
AUTOCORR
CROSS CORR
NQUOTES
NTRDS
QUOTES-TO-TRADE

(1)
Pre-Arrowhead

(2)
Post-Arrowhead

67.11
14.48
0.22%
-0.01
0.04
10.55
5.42
2.00

(3)
Difference

32.50
17.11
0.08%
0.16
0.10
70.41
8.60
8.18

-34.61**
2.63**
-0.14%**
0.17**
0.06**
59.86**
3.18**
6.18**

Panel B. Effect of Arrowhead on tail risk, as defined by trading minutes when the market return is
between -0.42% (minimum for post-Arrowhead) and -0.11% (5th percentile for post-Arrowhead)
VARIABLES

COI (Basis points)
SLOPE
VOLATILITY
AUTOCORR
CROSS CORR
NQUOTES
NTRDS
QUOTES-TO-TRADE

(1)
Pre-Arrowhead

(2)
Post-Arrowhead

63.42
14.99
0.13%
-0.02
0.04
10.44
5.20
2.06

(3)
Difference

32.50
17.11
0.08%
0.16
0.10
70.41
8.60
8.18

-30.92**
2.12**
-0.05%**
0.18**
0.06**
59.97**
3.40**
6.12**

** significant at the 0.01 level of significance using the two sample t-test:

,
√(

where SD is standard deviation, N is the number of observations, and subscripts, pre and post
refer to pre-Arrowhead and post-Arrowhead, respectively.

84

)

Panel A. Effect of Arrowhead on the relationship between future quotes-to-trade ratio and
COI

Panel B. Effect of Arrowhead on relationship between future number of fleeting order
executions and COI

Panel C. Effect of Arrowhead on the relationship between future number of traders and
COI
Figure 4. Pre- and post-Arrowhead: Graphical representations of effect of Arrowhead on
relationship between COI and key market quality parameters
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Panel A: Minute-by-Minute COI

Panel B: Minute-by-Minute LOB Slope

Panel C: Minute-by-Minute Volatility

Panel D: Minute-by-Minute Quotes-to-trade ratio

Panel E: Minute-by-Minute Autocorrelation

Panel F: Minute-by-Minute Cross Correlation

Figure 5. Tail risk (minutes for which market return is in the lowest 5th percentile) preand post-Arrowhead.
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defined as minutes for which the market return lies between -0.42% (minimum for postArrowhead) and -0.11% (5th percentile for post-Arrowhead). In both Panels, we find that
Arrowhead has significantly improved the market quality even during the extreme market
conditions as reflected by higher LOB slope and lower COI and volatility during the postArrowhead period. However, systemic risk has also increased during the post-Arrowhead
as reflected by higher trade-by-trade autocorrelation, cross correlation in order flow, and
quotes-to-trade ratio. Our results document that HFT act like market makers as they
continue to provide liquidity and dampen volatility even during the extreme market
conditions. But HFT has also the potential to quickly propagate wild liquidity shocks
across the markets. Our results also document that HFT’s shock propagation ability
increases during the extreme market conditions which could potentially lead to a highly
destabilizing market situation, such as Flash Crash.
E. Impact of Arrowhead on trading strategies and outcomes
E1. Trade price location
Figure 3, Panel E, shows a negative relationship between LOB liquidity
imbalance (ASKCOI minus BIDCOI) and the future proportion of sell trades executed at
bid prices. We formally test this result by estimating the regression model outlined in the
header of Table 9. The regressions are estimated for each security and then the parameter
estimates are averaged across securities.
Table 9, Panels A and C summarize the results using the cost-based COI measures
for the benchmark period and pre- and post-Arrowhead periods, respectively. Table 9,
Panels B and D presents similar results for the elasticity-based SLOPE measures. In
Table 9, Panel A, we find a statistically significant and negative (positive) relationship
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between ASKCOI (BIDCOI) and the future proportion of sell trades executed at bid
prices. As the ASKCOI decreases, reflecting higher liquidity on the ask side of LOB, the
proportion of additional sell orders executed at the bid prices increases significantly in
the standalone COI regression model in column (1) as well as the full model including all
control variables in column (2). The standardized coefficient of -2.89 is the average
across all stock-by-stock regressions, with 96% of the coefficients being significant and
85% of those having a negative sign as shown in column (3). Conversely, lower liquidity
on the bid side or higher BIDCOI increases the proportion of sell trades. However, the
predictive power of COI is short lived for one minute and is not significant for longer
time intervals. Results shown in Table 9, Panel A, column (4) for the 2nd minute are
insignificant and the numbers for the following 30 minutes (not reported) are also
insignificant. The results are consistent across different size based portfolios (Table 9,
Panel A, columns (5) through (7)).
The inverse relation between ASKCOI and the proportion of trades executed at the
bid is evidence supporting Hypothesis 6. Our results reject Parlour’s (1998) liquidity
replenishment predictions in the shorter time period. Instead, the results are consistent
with the findings in Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) and Ellul, Holdings, Jain and Jennings
(2007) that deep LOB or lower COI on ask- (bid-) side of LOB is followed by sell (buy)
market orders, increasing (decreasing) the proportion of trades executed at the bid prices.
Results for future trade price movements are summarized in Table 9, Panel A,
columns (8) though (11). We find that the lower ASKCOI (BIDCOI) leads to a decrease
(increase) in future trade prices at the end of the next 1 and 2 trading minutes. These
results are consistent across different size based portfolios (Table 9, Panel A, columns
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(12) through (14)). Hence, higher (lower) ASKCOI discourages sell (buy) market orders
as traders become more aggressive to get their orders executed, resulting in a price
increase (decline). The positive relation between ASKCOI and future trade price supports
Hypothesis 7 and is consistent with the finding in Cao, Hanch, and Wang (2009).
Results for SLOPE, reported in Table 9, Panel C, are qualitatively similar for
large- and medium-cap stocks. The SLOPE does not significantly predict the future trade
location and price movements for the small-cap firms. For all three categories of stocks,
COI does a better job than SLOPE, of explaining the future trade price location.
Table 9, Panels B and D, summarize the results of the stock-by-stock regression
analysis at the 1-minute frequency for the effect of Arrowhead on trade price location.
The additional variables added to the models described by equations (6a) and (6b) are the
ARROWHEAD dummy and the interaction terms between the ask- and bid-side liquidity
measures and the Arrowhead dummy. Table 9, Panel B, reports that the coefficient for
ASKCOI (BIDCOI) continue to have statistically significant and negative (positive)
values of -4.32 (5.53) consistent with Hypotheses 6. More importantly, we find a
statistically significant and negative (positive) coefficient of -4.26 (3.59) for
ARROW*ASKCOI (ARROW*BIDCOI) that suggests that Arrowhead has significantly
improved the informativeness of COI for the future trade price location for a majority of
sample stocks. A further analysis using the 3 size-based portfolios shows that the effect
of Arrowhead on the relation between COI and future trade price location is more
pronounced for the large- and mid-cap firms.
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Table 9
Trade price location
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
%BIDi,t+1 or PRIi,t+1 = αi +β1iASKCOIit-j +β2i BIDCOIit-j +β3i MONDAYt+1+β4i SPREADi,t-j + β5i DEPTHi,t-j+β6i VOLATILITYi,t-j+β7i VOLUMEi,t-j+
β8i MKTRETi,t-j +µi,t+1
where %BIDi,t+1 or PRIi,t+1 is the percentage of trades executed at the bid during the next minute of trading (columns 1 through 4) and change in
trade prices for columns (8) through (11), in turn. For Panels A and B, we use cost based liquidity measures: ASKCOIi,t is the cost that liquidity
demanders bear to buy 1% of the daily average trading volume and BIDCOIi,t cost that liquidity demanders bear to sell 1% of the daily average
trading volume. For Panels C and D, we define ask and bid liquidity using elasticity based measures that are calculated in terms of ASKSLOPE
and BIDSLOPE using Equations 2 and 3, in turn, for each firm, for every change in the LOB. MONDAYt+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for
Mondays and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are as defined earlier. We present the results based on calendar time forecasting by predicting
the trade price location changes based on the previous minute’s and 2 minutes lagged LOB information for our benchmark period of June 2008
in Panels A and C. Panels B and D summarizes the results for impact of Arrowhead for the post financial crisis period using the following
model:
%BIDi,t+1 or PRIi,t+1 = αi + β1i BIDCOIit + β2i ASKCOIit + β3i MONDAYt+1+ β4i SPREADi,t + β5i DEPTHi,t + β6i VOLATILITYi,t +β7i VOLUMEi,t +
β8i MKTRETi,t +β9i ARROWHEADi,t +β10i ARROWHEADi,t*BIDCOIit +β11i ARROWHEADi,t*ASKCOIit + µi,t+1
where ARROWHEAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the post Arrowhead low latency trading platform (January 2011) and 0 otherwise
(January 2009). The remaining variables are as defined earlier. Columns with heading %t (sign) report the percentage of t-statistics that are
significant (the percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported average estimates in parentheses). The remaining
columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all individual security regression equations. The large, medium, and small
classifications are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX SmallSized Stocks Index, respectively.
Panel A. Predicting the trade price location (PRIi,t+1) with COI measures for the benchmark period
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)
Large
Mid
Dep. Var.
% trades executed at bid during the following minutes
Variable
bidi,t+1min bidi,t+1min %t(%sign) bidi,t+2min
bidi,t+1min
ASKCOI
-2.86*
-2.89*
96(85) -0.36
-3.06*
-3.04*
BIDCOI
2.07*
2.18*
97(91)
0.89
2.67*
2.33*
MONDAY
-0.60*
53(70) -0.52*
-0.06
-0.67*
SPREAD
-0.29
22(53) -0.06
-0.64
-0.24
DEPTH
0.28
27(60)
0.23
0.13
0.06
VOLATILITY
0.64
4(67)
0.09
0.82
0.90
VOLUME
-0.05
7(53)
-0.14
-0.02
-0.01
MKTRET
-1.60*
57(100) -0.96
-2.34*
-2.86*
ADJ R2
0.006
0.028
0.010
0.029
0.028

(7)
Small

(8)

PRIi,t+1min
-2.76* 3.29*
1.41* -2.23 *
-0.62*
-0.15
0.38
-0.39
-0.06
-1.11*
0.027 0.015

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)
Large Mid
Small
Change in trade price in the following minutes
PRIi,t+1min %t(%sign) PRIi,t+2min
PRIi,t+1min
4.04*
81(97)
2.60*
3.54* 4.45* 3.91*
-3.88 *
79(86)
-2.17*
-4.28* -5.25* -3.38*
0.33
6(82)
0.48
0.47
0.46
0.27
-0.34
57(56)
-0.03
-0.29
-0.17 -0.25
0.19
13(55)
0.11
0.02
0.17
0.27
0.51
38(62)
0.32
0.17
0.50
0.54
0.14
39(53)
0.17
0.10
0.17
0.14
3.30*
65(96)
3.01*
9.15* 7.02* 1.30*
0.045
0.039
0.054 0.046 0.038

Table 9-continued
Panel B. Predicting the trade price location (PRIi,t+1) with COI measures post financial crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)

(2)

(3)

Variables

All
Firms

%t
(%sign)

% of following trades executed at bid
Large%t
Mid-cap %t
Small%t
cap
(%sign)
(%sign)
cap (%sign)

ASKCOI
BIDCOI
ARROW

-4.52*
5.53*
1.23

87(98)
91(99)
52(60)

-7.54*
9.87*
1.25

98(98)
100(100)
54(58)

ARROW*
ASKCOI
ARROW*
BIDCOI
ADJ R2

-4.26*

78(90)

-7.50*

94(90)

-3.56* 85(98)

-1.12

52(79)

1.54

32(80)

3.59*

74(86)

7.87*

84(95)

2.59* 83(90)

1.94

56(68)

-2.65

37(76)

0.041

0.021

0.044

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

-4.85* 94(100) -1.52* 73(93)
5.08* 96(100) 2.23* 76(94)
1.46 52(56)
0.98 50(69)

0.053

(10)

All
%t
Firms (%sign)
4.57* 89(99)
-4.19* 87(99)
0.12 12(78)

0.041

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

Change in following trade price
Large%t
Mid%t
Small- %t
cap (%sign)
cap (%sign) cap (%sign)
4.79* 93(100) 4.93* 82(100) 4.00* 89(96)
-4.26* 92(100) -4.35* 80(95) -3.98* 88(100)
0.31 20(40)
0.22 11(80) -0.16 4(100)
2.23* 60(100)
-3.05* 66(79)
0.056

0.93

31(70)

-3.02

39(71)

0.045

0.80 10(60)
-1.45 8(78)
0.019

Panel C. Predicting the trade price location (PRIi,t+1) with LOB Slope measures for the benchmark period
(1)

(2)

ASKSLOPE
1.63*
BIDSLOPE
-1.72*
MONDAY
SPREAD
DEPTH
VOLATILITY
VOLUME
MKTRET
ADJ R2
0.004

1.52*
-1.49*
-0.79*
-0.09
0.44
0.11
-0.10
-1.60*
0.014

Dep. Var.
Variable

(3)

(5)
(6)
Large
Mid
% trades executed at bid during the following minutes
bidi,t+1min bidi,t+1min %t(%sign) bidi,t+2min
bidi,t+1min
62(90)
60(89)
51(71)
20(55)
25(69)
5(61)
6(63)
56(100)

(4)

0.95
-0.96
-0.62*
-0.07
0.34
0.08
-0.16
-1.06
0.012
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3.49*
-3.07*
-0.13
-1.31
0.69
0.27
-0.13
-2.30*
0.016

2.36*
-2.56*
-0.85*
-0.29
0.39
0.19
-0.04
-2.86*
0.015

(7)
Small

(8)

(12)
(13)
(14)
Large
Mid
Small
Change in trade price in the following minutes
PRIi,t+1min PRIi,t+1min %t(%sign) PRIi,t+2min
PRIi,t+1min

0.06 -1.97*
-0.05 2.05*
-0.82*
0.35
0.41
-0.25
-0.12
-1.10*
0.012 0.003

(9)

(10)

-2.02*
1.99*
0.27
-0.08
0.13
0.53
0.12
3.21*
0.029

53(100)
53(99)
4(79)
57(56)
12(60)
38(61)
37(51)
65(96)

(11)

-1.12
1.10
0.44
-0.02
0.18
0.29
0.19
3.00*
0.032

-2.62* -2.58*
2.65* 2.81*
0.38
0.38
-0.09 -0.03
0.04
0.13
0.13
0.47
0.36 -0.34
9.09* 7.01*
0.042 0.031

-1.77
1.67
0.22
-0.11
0.18
0.58
0.09
1.31*
0.027

Table 9-continued
Panel D. Predicting the trade price location (PRIi,t+1) with LOB Slope measures post crisis and post Arrowhead
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
% of following trades executed at bid
%t
Large%t
Mid-cap %t
Small- %t
(%sign)
cap
(%sign)
(%sign)
cap (%sign)

Variables

All
Firms

ASKSLOPE

3.90* 92(99)

6.11*

99(100)

3.33* 98(100) -1.86* 79(97)

BIDSLOPE

-4.01* 91(99)

-6.31*

98(100)

-3.98* 98(100) -1.83* 76(94)

0.96

58(59)

0.86

54(51)

0.04

32(56)

3.81*

96(71)

1.76* 81(72)

0.62

58(69)

-4.05*

90(71)

-1.47* 83(70)

ARROW

0.61

48(55)

ARROW*
2.25* 79(71)
ASKSLOPE
ARROW*
-2.12* 78(69)
BIDSLOP
E
ADJ R2
0.027

0.039

0.024

-0.68* 62(65)

0.017

(9)

(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
Change in following trade price
All
%t
Large- %t
Mid%t
Small- %t
Firms (%sign)
cap (%sign)
cap (%sign) cap (%sign)
-2.99 49(97)

-4.55* 62(96)

-2.70

38(94)

-1.72 22(100)
1.76 24(100)

2.91

41(87)

4.56* 60(80)

2.40

40(89)

0.42

36(60)

0.57* 66(61)

0.82

35(71)

-1.74 29(93)

-3.10* 62(92)

-1.83

1.73* 62(75)

0.53

0.027

0.010

0.88

0.016

37(76)

-0.18 6(100)

27(100) -0.29 8(75)
34(76)

0.35 24(67)

0.012

* significant at the .05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis that significantly more than 60% of the
individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean. The test statistic is a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P
is the hypothesized value of population proportion in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ is the standard deviation
of the sampling distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the sample size.
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Table 9, Panel B, also reports the results for informativeness of COI for future
trade price movements (columns 9 through 16). We find a statistically significant positive
(negative) coefficient of 4.57 (-4.19) for ASKCOI (BIDCOI) consistent with pre-crisis
period findings reported in Table 9, Panel A, supporting Hypothesis 7. We also find a
statistically significant and positive (negative) coefficient of 2.23 (-3.05) for
ARROW*ASKCOI (ARROW*BIDCOI) for large-cap firms. This result highlights the fact
that higher speed of trading increases competition among liquidity providers in normal
times. Thus, after the introduction of Arrowhead, we have faster price increases
(decreases) in lower (higher) ASKCOI environments.
Table 9, Panel D, reports results for a similar analysis using SLOPE Liquidity
measures, which are qualitatively similar to the results for COI presented earlier.
However, we find that informativeness of the LOB Slope measures significant improved
during the post-crisis and the post-Arrowhead periods as shown by a statistically
significant coefficient for ASKSLOPE (BIDSLOPE) for 92% (91%) of the sample stocks.
During the benchmark period the coefficient for ASKSLOPE (BIDSLOPE) is statistically
significant for 62% (60%) of the sample stocks (Table 9, Panel C).
E2. Fleeting order executions
Next, we test the “fleeting order” hypothesis proposed by Rosu (2009) by
analyzing regression equation presented in Table 9, where FLEETING is defined as the
number of times per minute an improvement in best bid (or ask) is followed by a trade at
the bid (or ask) within 1 second of the top of the book quote improvements.49 Table 10
summarizes the results from this analysis. We find a negative (positive) and statistically

49

Our dataset has time stamps closest to a second.

significant coefficient of -1.19 (1.85) for COI (SLOPE). This suggests that during highly
liquid markets, when a trader improves the best bid (ask), the top trader on the ask (bid)
side of the market quickly accepts the updated order by placing a market order to buy
(sell). When market is very liquid, non-execution risk of a patient limit order is higher.

Table 10
Fleeting Order Executions
For each firm in our sample, we estimate the following regression model:
FLEETINGi,t+1 = αi + β1iCOIi,t + β2iSLOPEi,t + β3i NTRDSi,t + β4i ATSi,t + β5i SPREADi,t + β6i DEPTHi,t
+β7i TRADING SPEEDi,t +β8i VOLATILITYi,t +β9i RETURNi,t +β10i ARROWHEADi,t +β11i MKTRETi,t +β12i
ARROWHEADi,t*COIi,t +β13i ARROWHEADi,t*SLOPEit +µi,t+1
FLEETING is defined as the number of times per minute an improvement in best bid (or ask) is followed by
a trade at the bid (or ask) within 1 second of quote improvements. The remaining variables are as defined
previously. Columns with heading “%t (sign)” report the percentage of t-statistics that are significant (the
percentage of parameter estimates that have the same sign as the reported average estimates in parentheses).
The remaining columns present the standardized parameter estimates averaged across all individual security
regressions. The large, medium, and small classifications are based on the TOPIX 100 Large-Sized Stocks
Index, the TOPIX Mid 400 Medium-Sized Stocks Index, and the TOPIX Small-Sized Stocks Index,
respectively.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Variables

All Firms

%t (%sign)

Large-cap

Mid-cap

Small-cap

COI
SLOPE
ARROWHEAD
ARROW*COI
ARROW*SLOPE
NTRDS
ATS
SPREAD
DEPTH
VOLATILITY
RETURN
ADJ R2

-1.19*
1.85*
1.74*
-0.62*
0.89*
0.92*
-0.22
-1.55*
1.07*
0.28
1.51*
0.181

-1.49*
1.82*
2.12*
-0.75*
0.93*
1.04*
-0.79*
-1.54*
1.15*
-0.33
2.17*
0.231

-1.04*
2.17*
1.91*
-0.76*
1.04*
0.91*
-0.18
-1.88*
0.88*
0.45
1.25*
0.189

68(79)
93(85)
89(91)
53(69)
79(80)
71(77)
54(53)
74(89)
80(77)
21(62)
69(84)

-0.58
1.67*
1.17*
-0.41
0.70*
0.86*
0.23
-1.25*
1.21*
0.78
1.07*
0.158

* significant at the 0.05 level of significance using the test of proportions, which tests the null hypothesis that
significantly more than 60% of the individual coefficient estimates have the same sign as the mean. The test statistic is
a z-score (z) defined by the following equation:
, where P is the hypothesized value of population proportion
in the null hypothesis (0.60 in our setting), p is the sample proportion, and σ is the standard deviation of the sampling
distribution which is given by:
[
], where n is the sample size.
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Hence, higher liquidity makes traders impatient resulting in higher frequency of fleeting
order executions. Further, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for
ARROWHEAD, suggesting that Arrowhead has increased such attrition behavior of LOB.
Consistent with Hypothesis 8, we also find that Arrowhead has significantly improved
the informativeness of COI (SLOPE) for predicting fleeting order executions as reflected
by negative (positive) and statistically significant coefficient for ARROW*COI
(ARROW*SLOPE) and Figure 4, Panel A.
F. Comparative analysis of comprehensive and traditional liquidity measures
COI and SLOPE may be redundant if they are highly correlated with traditional
liquidity measures or with one another. We find the following correlations: COI and
SPREAD, 0.15; COI and DEPTH, -0.24; SLOPE and SPREAD, -0.36; and SLOPE and
DEPTH, 0.04. All of these correlations are much lower than even 50% suggesting that
COI and SLOPE contain significantly different information than either of the traditional
liquidity measures.50 We also find that correlation between SLOPE and COI is -0.39.
Based on the results summarized in Tables 3 through 8, we find that SPREAD and
DEPTH do not have any significant predictive power for the majority of key variables
while COI and SLOPE consistently and significantly predict the key market quality,
systemic risk, and trading outcomes. DEPTH is a significant predictor of the future
number of trades (Table 8). Hence, higher top of the book DEPTH leads to a faster speed
50

The average Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all the variables are less than 5, hence, we do
not have any multicollinearity issues when including all the relevant liquidity measures together in one
regression model. For each independent variable, VIF is calculated as: VIFi = 1/(1- ) (see Greene (2000)
for more details).
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of trading, which supports the attrition theory of Rosu (2009). But overall, the COI
measure dominates the traditional liquidity variables in explaining the evolution of the
state of the LOB.
IV. Robustness tests
We perform additional robustness tests to confirm the results presented above.
Due to computational burdens of working with high frequency data, we limit the
robustness analysis to Tables 3, 4, and 5 when the coefficients are nearly identical in
robustness tests.
First we, account for the effect of intraday seasonality. We include 2 dummy
variables to control for the opening and closing of each of the two sessions. The first
dummy variable takes a value of 1 for the first half hour (9:00 AM-9:30 AM) and last
half an hour (2:30 PM- 3:00 PM) of trading, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable
takes a value of 1 for the last half hour (10:30 AM-11:00 AM) of trading right before the
recess and first half an hour (12:30 PM- 1:00 PM) of trading right after the recess, zero
otherwise. We find a statistically significant coefficient for the 2 dummy variables,
suggesting intraday seasonality is important for the key market quality variables, such as
liquidity and volatility. But our results for the effect of Arrowhead and for relationship
between COI and market quality parameters are qualitatively similar to the ones
presented earlier in terms of direction and level of significance.
The TSE has a provision of special quotes, which are automated non-tradable
indicative quotes placed by the exchange to advertise potential jumps in price and to
encourage investors to place balancing orders on the other side. Our data identifies these
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types of special quotes. We delete these special quotes and re-analyze our results. We
find that less than 1% of the quotes in our sample are “special quotes.” Our results are
robust to this alternate data specification as the direction and statistical coefficients are
identical to those reported in the paper for all the tables. For example, the coefficient in
Table 4, Panel A, for ASKCOI variable changes minimally from -2.86 with special quotes
to -2.91 without them.
The TSE has a variable minimum trading unit (MTU) and tick sizes which varies
with stock prices. Differences in the MTU and tick sizes across stocks can potentially
impact some of our predictions (Amihud, Mendelson and Uno, 1999). To investigate, we
analyze the stocks with MTU of 1,000 because a majority of stocks on the TSE have a
MTU of 1,000. The sample size drops from 1,557 stocks to 917 stocks by imposing this
filter. Our results from this reduced sample are consistent with the ones presented earlier
for Tables 3 and 4, which already control for differing tick sizes. This is not surprising
because our approach of averaging stock-by-stock regression coefficients controls for
various differences across firms including varying MTU and tick sizes.
V. Conclusion
Using the introduction of the Arrowhead high speed trading platform by the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) as a natural experiment, we analyze the impact of a
significant reduction in latency of trade matching engine on various aspects of markets
quality and risks. Arrowhead reduced TSE latency from 6 seconds to 2 milliseconds,
which is a 99.97% drop. Our tests examine market quality (limit order book (LOB) slope,
cost of immediacy, and intra-day volatility), systemic risk (trade autocorrelation, order
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flow cross correlation, quotes-to-trade ratio, and tail risk), and trading outcomes
(evolution of trade price location and the frequency of fleeting order executions). In
addition, to understand the evolution of LOB, we examine the informativeness of two
LOB liquidity measures—the cost of immediacy for trading 1% of average daily volume
(COI) (Irvine, Benston, and Kandel, 2000), and a measure of the elasticity of depth over
the price steps, LOB slope (Biais, Hillion and Spatt, 1995).
We find that the introduction of the Arrowhead trading platform improved LOB
liquidity as reflected by reduced COI and increased LOB slope, for a majority of the
large- and mid-cap stocks. The average number of trades for each minute of trading also
increased by more than 50% while the average trade size declined substantially,
generating an increase of only 17% in total trading volume.
Analyzing all the stocks included in the TOPIX index, we find that the COI is the
dominant liquidity measure that significantly and consistently predicts market quality,
systemic risk, and trading outcomes. We show that lower COI, reflecting highly liquid
market, can easily accommodate large buy or sell volumes without significantly affecting
the prices, resulting in a low return volatility. We also show that return volatility
decreased following the introduction of Arrowhead, especially during tail risk events
when the market is experiencing significant declines.
Next, we document that liquidity facilitates order splitting to conceal information,
leading to higher autocorrelation. Additionally, liquid markets increase stock specific
information production and motivate trading in individual stocks, resulting in lower cross
correlation. We further show that traders more frequently revise their quotes in a liquid
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market resulting in a higher quotes-to-trade ratio. Arrowhead significantly increased the
systemic risk by increasing both autocorrelation and cross correlation in the order flow as
well as the quotes-to-trade ratio. Furthermore, Arrowhead increased the exposure to
these systemic risks even more during tail risk events. These contrasting effects of
Arrowhead are analogous to the increased speed and fatality risk associated with
automobiles relative to pedestrian traffic. Thus, a policy implication of our findings is
that low latency markets need safety features such as kill switches, circuit breakers,
rigorous software testing, some of which may require regulatory interventions.
Finally, we show that higher ask or bid side liquidity motivates traders on that
side to submit more aggressive orders, resulting in predictable price changes. Arrowhead
significantly changed the trading outcomes by improving the informativeness of COI in
explaining the future trade price location and by increasing the frequency of fleeting
order executions for a majority of large-cap stocks. These newer measures of aggregated
liquidity in LOB represent essential tools for any trader in high speed markets.
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Chapter 4
Dividend Clienteles: A Global Investigation
I. Introduction
Miller and Modigliani (1961) established that, in a frictionless world, when the
investment policy of a firm is held constant, the dividend payout policy is irrelevant for
shareholder wealth. Higher dividend payouts lead to lower earnings retained and hence,
lower capital gains, and vice versa, leaving the total wealth of the shareholders
unchanged. In empirical studies using accounting and market data, dividend payout
policy has been related to firm-specific variables, such as net income, cash flows, and
firm size.1 However, the observed dividend payouts are more likely to be the results of
premeditated financial decisions which consider factors beyond firm-specific accounting
and financial variables.
We compare the cross-sectional variation in the dividend payout policies of
companies across 32 countries. The measurements of dividend payout policy include
dividend yield, dividend payer, and dividend initiation.2 Beyond the impact of firmspecific accounting and financial variables, this study investigates how the country level
variations, such as shareholder demand due to demographic variations and consumption
needs, agency problems manifested in the extent of minority shareholder protection and
business disclosures, and market quality in terms of transparency and liquidity; affect the
dividend payout policies.

1

See Allen and Michaely (2003)

2

The three measurements are defined in Appendix A.

As a departure from the conventional supply-based theory of corporate payout
policy, Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner (2011) propose a demand-based theory and use
local senior as a proxy for shareholder demand. They find that corporations respond to
the preferences of their shareholders when setting the payout policy. Our study extends
Becker et al. demand-based theory to an international setting and investigates whether
shareholder demand measured at a country level helps explain individual firms’ dividend
payouts across countries. In addition, we analyze several other proxy variables such as
proportion of government expenditure on health, proportion of foreign investment in
domestic stock markets, and domestic investor overconfidence, to capture the different
dimensions of shareholder demand for dividends.3
Another popular explanation is that dividend payouts address agency problems
between corporate insiders and outside shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). The
explanation stresses that unless profits are paid out to shareholders, they may be diverted
by the insiders for personal use or committed to unprofitable projects that provide private
benefits to the insiders. Additionally, due to the divergence of interests between insiders
and outsiders, the former often process and trade on information about firm’s shares
values, making profits at the expense of the outside shareholders. Dividends may then act
as a signaling mechanism as it is a costly to replicate vehicle for conveying private
information to capital market (Easterbrook, 1984; La Porta et al., 2000; Dennis and
Osobov, 2008; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; 2011; Kuo, 2012). However, most of the

3

All the variables used in this study are defined in Appendix A.
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studies testing the agency explanation for dividend payouts use La Porta et al. (1998)
Anti-Director Right Index (ADRI). We extend this literature by testing the agency
hypothesis using a more reliable ADRI index, revised by Spamann (2010), and the extent
of business disclosure index, provided by the World Bank.
Asymmetric information and ease of trading in capital markets provide alternate
explanations for dividend policy. Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) document that the
firms with less liquid common stocks are more likely to pay cash dividends. The
asymmetric information explanation for dividends would predict that the firms
headquartered in a country with opaque capital markets will have to rely on generous
dividend payouts to establish their reputation. We test these predictions by analyzing the
effect of stock market liquidity and stock price informativeness on dividend payout
policy.
We find that firms respond to the tendency of older investors to hold dividendpaying stocks in combination with individual investors’ increased financial demands due
to a low government funding in health expenses. Firms also try to attract foreign
investors by resorting to a generous payout policy. We also find that less confident
investors, as measured by index of individualism (IDV) developed by Hofstede (2001),
prefer dividends over capital gains.
Next we document that firms operating in countries with poor protection of
minority shareholders and low level of business disclosure pay higher dividends. Hence,
dividends serve as a substitute for effective legal protection, which enables firms in
unprotected legal environments to establish reputations for good treatment of investors
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through dividend payouts. Hence, when shareholders face the potential exploitation due
to weak shareholder protection, the preference for dividend payments become stronger.
Further we show that firms headquartered in a country with poor market quality,
which has worse price informativeness due to reduced transparency, and low stock
market liquidity; pay higher dividends. The empirical evidence is consistent with the
argument that shareholders demand a higher dividend payout when the market quality is
poor and the uncertainty surrounding the future realization of capital gain increases.
Finally, we show that firms headquartered in countries with low tax rates on
dividends pay higher dividends relative to the companies headquartered in countries with
high taxes on dividends. The empirical results show that there exists a “tax preference”
clientele among investors across countries. Investors in lower tax countries have a
preference for equities with generous payout policy. In contrast, investors in higher tax
countries prefer firms to retain cash flow for investment and realize equity return through
the appreciation of stock prices.
II. Hypotheses Development
In this study we test whether the shareholder demand for dividends, the agency
costs, and the stock market quality in a given country affects a firm’s payout policy. In
this section we motivate each of these factors and develop the testable hypotheses.
II.1. Shareholder demand for dividends
Becker, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2011) find that, for the sample of US firms,
shareholder demand for dividends influences a firm’s payout policy. The authors capture
the shareholder demand for dividends by the fraction of 65 years old or older residents in

108

the county where a firm is headquartered.4,5 We extend this literature to an international
setting and use proportion of population who are 65 years old or older in a given country
(Seniors) as a proxy for the demand for dividends in that country and test the following
hypothesis:
H1. Firms headquartered in countries with larger proportion of Senior population
should have a generous dividend payout policy.
In addition, to capture different aspects of shareholder demand at the country
level, we include several other proxy variables such as proportion of government
expenditure on health, proportion of foreign investment in domestic stock markets, and
domestic investor overconfidence.
According the World Health Organization, health related expenditures are a major
expense for seniors. Countries across the globe have varying health care services funded
by the government which can drive the consumption needs of the Seniors. We test the
following hypothesis:
H2. Firms headquartered in countries with lower proportion of government
expenditure on health should have a generous dividend payout policy.

4

The selection of the proxy for dividend demand is based on two streams of literature: first,
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) argue that seniors have a preference for dividend-paying stocks, and second,
Huberman (2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) show that
individual investors tend to hold stocks of local firms.
5

Using data on the stock holdings of individual investors, Pettit (1977) and Lewellen, Stanley,
Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) find that the correlation between dividend yield and age is significantly
positive.
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Empirical evidence on impact of foreign investment in the domestic stock markets
on dividend payout policy is mixed. Jeon, Lee and Moffett (2011) and Kang, Lee and
Park (2010) find that most foreign investors on Korean markets are institutional investors
who maintain large positions and serve as effective monitors of these firms, which results
in higher dividend payouts. While, Dhalquist and Robertsson (2001) find that foreign
investors prefer firms paying low dividends for Swedish firms as dividends are taxed at a
higher rate than capital gains. We participate in this debate by testing the following
hypothesis:
H3. Firms headquartered in countries with higher proportions of equity ownership
by foreign investors should have a generous dividend payout policy.
Impact of investors behavioral biases generated due to cultural difference on
dividend payout policy has not been explored in the literature. Chui, Titman and Wei
(2010) find that Hofstede’s (2001) individualism index measuring investor
overconfidence is positively associated with trading volume.6 Van den Steen (2004)
argues that when individuals are overoptimistic about their abilities, they tend to
overestimate the precision of their predictions. Hence we argue that the overconfident
investors would be indifferent between capital gains and dividends while the less
confident investors would have a preference for dividend payments. Specifically, we test
the following hypothesis:

6

Anderson, Fedenia, Hirschey, and Skiba (2011) present an excellent summary of 5 cultural
dimensions provided by Hofstede.
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H4. Firms headquartered in countries with lower score on individualism index
should have a generous dividend payout policy.
II.2. Agency Cost
Miller and Modigliani derive their dividend irrelevance proposition by ignoring
the agency cost between the owners and outside shareholders. Many researchers have
challenged this assumption and argued the relevance of dividend payout policy in
addressing the agency problems.
Two competing agency hypotheses—outcome model versus substitute model—
are outlined in La Porta et al. (2000) to describe the relationship between the shareholder
rights and dividend payouts. The outcome model hypothesizes that better shareholder
rights lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can exercise their legal
powers to force firms to disgorge the excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute model
argues that poor shareholder rights lead to higher payouts because firms have stronger
incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. La Porta et al. find support for
the outcome model using the Anti-Director Right Index (ADRI) proposed by La Porta et
al. (1998) as a measurement of shareholder protection.
Spamann (2010) re-examines the procedure adopted by La Porta et al. (1998) in
developing the ADRI and finds that the original ADRI does not follow rigorous legal
definitions. To avoid the ambiguity in creating ADRI for individual countries, Spamann
gets help from local attorney in the respective countries and compiles a new ADRI. The
reexamination of ADRI data compilation procedure leads to more than two thirds
corrections for the sample countries and the correlation between corrected and original
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ADRI values is only 0.53. This study reexamines the relationship between agency
problems using the corrected ADRI and the Business Disclosure index provided by the
World Bank, and the dividend payout policy by testing the following hypothesis:
H5. Firms headquartered in countries with better minority shareholder protection
should have a generous dividend payout policy.
II.3. Stock Market Quality
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is based on the
key assumption that trading is frictionless. Hence, investors can instantly buy or sell any
stock without incurring any trading costs and price impact. If an investor prefers
dividends, he can create homemade dividends by selling a portion of his holdings in the
firm. However, in real world, an investor has to incur a cost for trading stocks. Using the
data from US markets, Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) argue that the stocks that
pay cash dividends, satisfies investors’ liquidity needs without any trading in the stock.
As a result, investors with current or anticipated future liquidity needs can avoid trading
frictions by investing in dividend paying stocks. Hence, there should be a negative
relationship between liquidity and dividend payout policy. In this study we use two
different measures of liquidity. We measure transaction costs by estimating the
proportion of zero daily firm returns (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka, 1999; Bekaert,
Harvey and Lundblad, 2007). To capture different dimension of liquidity we use turnover
ratio as measured by the total value of shares traded divided by the average market
capitalization (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). Using a comprehensive sample of firms from
32 countries we test the following hypothesis:
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H6. Firms headquartered in countries with poor liquidity should have a generous
dividend policy.
Another key parameter of stock market quality is the level of market
transparency. Miller and Modigliani in their dividend irrelevance proposition assume
complete market transparency. In this perfect capital market investors have homogeneous
expectations of a firm’s current and future investment opportunities and cash flows.
Hence, there exists a consensus about the firm’s value which makes them indifferent
between dividends and capital gains. However, the real world markets are opaque (Jin
and Myers, 2006) and there exist firm specific uncertainties. In this case investors would
show stronger preference for dividends than future capital gains when the asymmetric
information becomes more severe and the market becomes more opaque (Bhattacharya,
1979; Lee, 2011). We formulate these theoretical predictions by testing the following
hypothesis:
H7. Firms headquartered in countries with opaque stock markets should have a
generous dividend payout policy.
We use stock price informativeness (Jin and Myers, 2006) as a measure of level
of stock market transparency in a given country. Based on Roll’s (1988) Presidential
address on

, Jin and Myers (2006) show that, for a sample of firms from 40 countries,

stock price informativeness, as measured by one minus coefficient of determination from
country specific market models around the world, is significantly positively related to the
stock market transparency.
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III. Data Description and Methodology
The global investigation becomes feasible when the expanded global databases
become readily available and new measurements are documented in finance literature
addressing the issues of shareholder demand, agency problems, and market quality.7 The
first sub-section describes the data sources and the measurement of the country level
explanatory variables as well as the firm level control variables. The second and the third
sub sections explain the measures of the stock price informativeness and the market
liquidity, respectively. Summary statistics are reported in the fourth sub-section.
Appendix A describes all the variables used in the analyses.
III.1. Data Description
We compile data from several sources. Stock price, dividend yield and firm-level
accounting information such as, net income, cash, market-to-book ratio, debt, market
value, and total assets come from Datastream. We download data for all the firms in all
the 48 countries for which Spamann (2010) provides the Anti-Director Rights Index
(ADRI) for the years 1997 and 2005. From this original universe, we eliminate firms with
dividend yield of greater than 20% and select top 100 firms for each country based on
market capitalization.8,9 We also control for the monthly returns averaged over the

7

World Bank Database, DataStream, International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey (CPIS), Investor overconfidence index, OECD tax database, and Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions.
8

Dividend yield had extreme outliers and we removed those data from our final analysis.
Dividend yield of 20% represents the 99.5th percentile. Our results are robust to alternate cutoffs for the
variable (we tested our results for cutoffs ranging from 10%-30%)
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preceding 3 year period and return volatility for each firm, which is the variance of
monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years.
To capture different aspects of shareholder demand at the country level, we
include proxy variables such as proportion of population 65 years old or older in a given
country (Seniors), percentage of government expenditure on health (Government Health
Expense), proportion of foreign equity investment in the domestic stock markets (FPI),
and an index of individualism (IDV) developed by Hofstede (2001), which measures
investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2010).
Demographic data on seniors at the country level come from the World Bank. We
also obtain the data on the government expenditure on health, stock trading turnover ratio
and the extent of business disclosure for each of the sample countries from the World
Bank database. Foreign equity investment in the domestic stock markets is provided by
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) data library. Data on investor overconfidence as measured by the
investors’ individualism scores are obtained from Hofstede’s website.10
We use Antidirector Rights Index (ADRI) (Spamann, 2010) and extent of
business disclosure to capture the agency problem between the minority shareholders and
owner managers. The ADRI comes from Spamann (2010), and reflects such aspects of

9

We select top 100 firms to create a balanced sample among countries. Our results hold for the
full sample of firms from DataStream.
10

http://geerthofstede.nl/index.aspx
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minority rights as the ease of voting for directors, the possibility of electing directors
through a cumulative voting mechanism, the existence of grievance mechanism for
oppressed minority shareholders, such as a class action lawsuit, the percentage of votes
needed to call a special shareholder meeting, and the existence of preemptive rights.
Since this index is available only for years 1997 and 2005, we restrict our analysis to
these years with most of our analyses focusing on the data from the more recent year,
2005. Extent of business disclosure index measures the financial and operational
transparency of businesses in a given country. This index is based on a survey conducted
by the World Bank and the scores vary between zero and ten.
We use country-level data on taxes in some of the analysis. Data on tax rates are
obtained from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Tax Database, which provides effective tax rates on distribution of domestic source of
income to a resident individual shareholder in each country. We use the Net Dividend
Tax, which is the top marginal statutory personal income tax rate imposed on dividend
income after taking account imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances in each
country. 11
We merge the data from the various data sources and the unmatched firms were
deleted from the final analyses. We delete the countries with less than 35 firms from our
final analysis that reduces our sample to 2,975 firms from 32 countries.
11

Under a classical system (like in the U.S.), profits are first taxed at the corporate level, and then
after corporate tax profits are taxed again at the shareholder level when that income is distributed to them
as a dividend. Under an imputation system (whether in full or just partial), part or all of the corporate
income tax paid by a company on its profits is credited against the personal income tax liability of the
shareholders
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III.2. Stock Price Informativeness
We calculate our measure of stock price informativeness using a two-factor
international model as in Morck, Yeung, and Wu (2000) to include both the local and
U.S. market index returns. This model is also used by Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) and
has the following specifications:

(1)

where

is the firm j return for month t,

is the domestic market index return,

is

the USA market index return during month t with,12

(

)

(

Our measure of informativeness is 1 −

)

.

(2)

of equations (1). Given the bounded

nature of R2, we conduct our tests using the following logistic transformation of 1 −
outlined in Fernandes and Ferreira (2009):

(3)

12

In a separate analysis we used world market index return from Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) database to calculate the informativeness measure. We obtained qualitatively similar
results to the one presented using USA market index return.
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Thus,

measures firm-specific stock return variation relative to market-wide

variation, or lack of synchronicity with the market. To conduct our country-level study,
we list

across firms for each country. The median

in the list represents the price

informativeness for a country. A higher median value derived from all firms in a country
means more informativeness for that country.
III.3. Measures of Liquidity
One of the problems with an international study is that the data from certain
countries are of relatively poor quality, and detailed transaction data (for example, bidask spreads or market impact estimates) are not widely available (Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad, 2007). To take care of this problem we rely on the incidence of observed zero
daily returns in these markets. Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that if the value of an
information signal is insufficient to outweigh the costs associated with transacting, then
market participants will elect not to trade, resulting in an observed zero return. The
advantage of this measure is that it requires only a time series of daily equity returns.
Given the paucity of time-series data on preferred measures such as bid-ask spreads or
bona-fide order flow used in Kyle (1985), this measure is an attractive empirical
alternative as documented by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007).
Our second measure of liquidity is the turnover ratio reported for every country
by the World Bank. This ratio is the total value of shares traded divided by the average
market capitalization.
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III.4. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the 32 countries included in the analysis with the descriptive
statistics on the key variables across countries. We find that Finland had the highest
average dividend yield (2.89%), Japan had the largest proportion of firms paying
dividends (66%) while France had the largest proportion of firms initiating dividends
(9%) during the sample period. Japan had the highest proportion of senior population
(19.92%) during 2005. The USA had the worst shareholder protection (ADRI) and the
most liquid stock market while Spain had the most opaque stock market during the
sample period.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the key explanatory variables
included in the study. We observe that a typical firm included in the sample pays about
1.40% dividends per year. About 42% of the sample firms paid dividends during the
period under investigation while 4% of the sample firms initiated dividends in 2005. An
average sample country has about 12% of population classified as seniors, with the mean
government expenditure on health of about 13%. Foreign equity investment comprises of
about 29% of domestic market capitalization of a typical sample country’s stock market
and the individualism score for typical investor is 55.24 on a scale of 1 through 100. The
average minority shareholder protection as measured by ADRI index is 4.02 on a scale of
1 through 6 and the average level of business disclosure is 6.23 on a scale of 1 through
10. Average informativeness and illiquidity scores are 2.98 and 39.68% respectively
while the turnover ratio is about 2.84 times the market capitalization.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics across Countries
This table presents summary statistics for the key variables analyzed in the study across countries. The sample
consists of the pooled cross sections for 2005. N is the number of firms included in the final sample from a given
country, Dividend Yield is the dollar amount of dividends paid out in year divided by end-of-year equity market
value, Dividend Payer is an indicator variable equal to 0 for nonpayers and 1 for dividend payers, Dividend
Initiation is an indicator variable equal to 1 for nonpayers at the end of year t-1 who start to pay a dividend in
year t, and zero otherwise, Seniors is the proportion of population who are 65 years old or older in a given
country in which a firm is headquartered, ADRI is the Antidirector Rights Index that measures shareholder
protection, Informativeness is the median logistic transformed relative firm-specific over market-wide stock
return variation estimated using an international two-factor model for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms
for each country, and Illiquidity is proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country averaged over
the month.

Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
UK
USA
Venezuela

N
68
99
92
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
45
100
100
100
99
100
100
100
89
100
52
100
100
100
98
100
99
99
35

Dividend Dividend Dividend
Yield (%)
Payer
Initiation
1.92
0.36
0.04
1.90
0.41
0.03
1.45
0.58
0.05
1.98
0.64
0.04
1.48
0.31
0.02
1.63
0.44
0.04
1.88
0.33
0.02
1.72
0.56
0.03
2.89
0.60
0.04
1.91
0.53
0.09
1.65
0.52
0.01
1.62
0.50
0.04
1.04
0.33
0.03
1.33
0.39
0.02
1.55
0.35
0.05
1.88
0.52
0.06
1.92
0.66
0.04
0.73
0.27
0.01
1.37
0.31
0.02
2.13
0.55
0.02
2.83
0.57
0.06
1.68
0.49
0.04
0.55
0.24
0.02
1.48
0.48
0.05
1.22
0.57
0.04
1.92
0.47
0.07
0.96
0.44
0.04
1.08
0.34
0.07
1.38
0.28
0.05
1.89
0.48
0.03
1.92
0.49
0.02
1.35
0.52
0.04
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Seniors
(%)
10.34
12.94
16.21
17.26
6.17
13.11
8.10
15.13
15.95
16.46
18.86
17.99
4.59
10.99
10.10
19.65
19.92
4.36
5.77
14.15
14.51
3.81
3.85
17.06
16.76
17.15
15.98
7.10
5.66
16.10
12.38
4.98

ADRI Informativeness Illiquidity
(%)
3.00
3.45
50.91
4.00
2.82
53.44
4.00
3.18
49.70
2.00
2.76
43.76
5.00
3.17
70.65
4.00
2.91
55.48
5.00
3.19
69.29
4.00
3.27
43.66
4.00
3.29
34.26
5.00
2.96
38.74
4.00
2.97
38.02
3.00
3.22
29.67
4.00
2.86
42.29
4.00
2.54
38.80
4.00
3.18
51.26
4.00
2.95
28.71
5.00
2.42
26.32
4.00
3.27
40.28
3.00
3.15
58.49
4.00
2.95
28.45
4.00
2.77
38.97
5.00
2.70
45.50
5.00
3.22
78.33
4.00
3.10
44.83
6.00
1.28
37.70
4.00
2.68
33.61
3.00
3.22
34.62
4.00
2.73
61.56
4.00
3.48
31.45
5.00
2.47
51.79
2.00
4.17
13.41
2.00
3.21
87.96

Table 2

Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for payout policy variables and the key country level
variables. The sample consists of the pooled cross sections for the year 2005. Dividend Yield is
the dollar amount of dividends paid out in year divided by end-of-year equity market value.
Dividend Payer is an indicator variable equal to 0 for nonpayers and 1 for dividend payers.
Dividend Initiation is an indicator variable equal to 1 for nonpayers at the end of year t-1 who
start to pay a dividend in year t, and zero otherwise. Seniors is the proportion of population who
are 65 years old or older in a given country in which a firm is headquartered, Government
Health Expense is the proportion of health expenditure funded by government, FPI is the total
investment in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by the stock market
capitalization, IDV is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001), which measures
investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias, Informativeness is the median logistic
transformed relative firm-specific over market-wide stock return variation estimated using an
international two-factor model for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for each country,
ADRI is the Antidirector Rights Index that measures shareholder protection, Business Disclosure
measures the financial and operational transparency of businesses in a given country, Illiquidity
is the proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country averaged over the month,
and Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded divided by the average market
capitalization.
Variables

Mean

Payout Policy Variables
Dividend Yield
1.40
(%)
Dividend Payer
42.00
(%)
Dividend Initiation
4.00
(%)
Dividend Demand Variables
Seniors (%)
12.41
Government Health
13.02
Expense (%)
FPI (% of market
28.81
capitalization)
IDV
55.24
Agency
ADRI
4.02
Business
6.23
Disclosure
Market Quality
Informativeness
2.98
Illiquidity (%)
39.68
Turnover ratio
2.84

25th Percentile

Median

75th Percentile

Standard
Deviation

0.00

0.00

2.03

2.49

0.00

0.00

100.00

0.49

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.20

7.10

14.15

16.77

5.23

11.56

14.11

16.24

4.28

19.10

22.35

31.53

27.42

35.00

57.00

74.00

22.76

4.00

4.00

5.00

0.90

5.00

7.00

8.00

2.61

2.77
22.73
2.41

2.97
34.78
2.88

3.22
50.00
3.35

0.46
23.48
0.69
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Table 3 presents the Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients among the
key variables included in the study. We find that the Seniors is positively related
Dividend Yield. Hence, a firm headquartered in a country with larger proportion of senior
population pays higher dividend. We also find that Dividend Yield increases with low
Government Health Expense, high FPI, and low IDV. These results support our demand
based explanation for dividends summarized in Hypotheses 1 through 4. Table 3 also
reports that Dividend Yield is higher for firms headquartered in a country with a lower
score for ADRI and Business Disclosure. These results reject the outcome model for
dividends and our Hypothesis 5. Hence, our results support the substitute model for
dividends. Finally we find that Dividend Yield is higher for firms headquartered in a
country with lower Informativeness, higher Illiquidity, and lower Turnover Ratio. Hence,
the Dividend Yield declines as the stock market quality of a given country improves.
These results support our market quality Hypotheses 6 and 7. Overall, the bivariate
results shows that investors demand higher dividends from a firm headquartered in a
country with strong shareholder demand, poor minority shareholder rights or poor market
quality.
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
This table reports the product moment correlation coefficients for the key variables included in the study.
The sample consists of the pooled cross sections for 2005. Dividend Yield is the dollar amount of
dividends paid out in year divided by end-of-year equity market value, Seniors is the proportion of
population who are 65 years old or older in a given country in which a firm is headquartered, Government
Health Expense is the proportion of health expenditure funded by government, FPI is the total investment
in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by the stock market capitalization, IDV
is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001), which measures investor overconfidence and
self-attribution bias, Informativeness is the median logistic transformed relative firm-specific over marketwide stock return variation estimated using an international two-factor model for U.S. dollar excess
returns across all firms for each country, ADRI is the Antidirector Rights Index that measures shareholder
protection, Business Disclosure measures the financial and operational transparency of businesses in a
given country, Illiquidity is the proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country averaged
over the month, and Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded divided by the average market
capitalization.

(1) Dividend Yield
(2) Seniors
(3) Government Health
Expense
(4) FPI
(5) IDV
(6) Informativeness
(7) ADRI
(8) Business
Disclosure

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.00
0.07
-0.11

1.00
0.24

1.00

0.02
-0.17
-0.01
-0.01

0.23
0.43
-0.27
-0.06

0.29
0.35
-0.15
-0.03

-0.04

-0.18

0.08
-0.03

-0.15
0.09

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.00
0.31
0.15
0.03

1.00
-0.05 1.00
0.18 0.36

1.00

-0.02

0.08

0.10 0.09

0.16

-0.31
0.04

-0.22 -0.37 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 1.00
0.04 0.10 0.28 0.29 0.02 -0.37

(10)

1.00

Table 3-continued
(9) Illiquidity
(10) Turnover ratio
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1.00

IV. Results
We analyze the factors that affect the payout policy. Dividend yield, dividend
payer and dividend initiation capture the payout policy of a firm. We analyze the three
broad factors that can influence the payout policy: investor demand for dividends, agency
costs and stock market conditions. Finally we analyze the impact of taxation on payout
policy.
IV.1. Relationship between the payout policy and investor demand, agency costs and
market conditions.
We analyze the impact of the following three broad factors on the dividend
payout policy: (1) the local dividend demand determined by country specific
demographics such as, Seniors, Government Health Expense, FPI and IDV, (2) agency
costs determined by ADRI index and business disclosure index, and (3) stock market
quality determined by price informativeness and liquidity. We consider three measures of
dividend payout policy: the dividend yield variable (Dividend Yield), an indicator
variable for paying dividends (Dividend Payer), and an indicator variable for paying
dividends conditional on having not paid dividends in the previous fiscal year (Dividend
Initiation). To analyze this relationship we use the following regression model:

DIVIDEND POLICYi,t = α1 +α2DEMANDit-1 +α3AGENCYit-1+ α4MARKET QUALITYit-1+
α5CONTROL VARIABLESit-1 + µi,t
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(4)

Our payout policy dependent variables, defined in the previous section, are
measured one year after the independent variables. Demand factors include: Seniors,
which is the proportion of population who are 65 years old or older in a given country in
which a firm is headquartered; Government Health Expense, which is the proportion of
health expenditure funded by government, as reported by the world bank; FPI, which is
the total investment in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by
the stock market capitalization; IDV, which is an index of individualism developed by
Hofstede (2001) as a measurement of investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias.
Agency factors are ADRI, which is the Antidirector Rights Index that measures
shareholder protection; and Business Disclosure, that measures the financial and
operational transparency of businesses in a given country. Market Quality factors include
Informativeness, which is the median logistic transformed relative firm-specific over
market-wide stock return variation estimated using an international two-factor model for
U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for each country; Illiquidity, which is the
proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country averaged over the
month; and Turnover ratio, which is the total value of shares traded divided by the
average market capitalization.
In addition to these factors, the regressions also include firm-specific controls
scaled by the market value of the equity: Net Income, Cash, market-to-book ratio and
Debt. Volatility refers to the variance of monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years.
Return refers to monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years. Asset Growth is the
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logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior year and Lagged Dividend Yield is
the dividend yield during the previous year.
The results from these analyses are presented in the Tables 4 and 5. The Variance
Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all the variables are less than 5 hence, we do not have any
multicollinearity issues when including all the relevant explanatory variables together in
one regression model.13 The estimated coefficients pertaining to the firm-specific
accounting and financial variables, (control variables) line up with the prior expectations
and the literature. Return, net income, cash, and firm size (market value and total assets),
all increase the dividend yield and the probability of paying dividends, while return
volatility, market-to-book ratio, debt, and asset growth reduces the dividend yield and the
likelihood of paying dividends.14 Positive and statistically significant coefficient for
lagged dividend yield shows the stickiness in the payout policy.
IV.1.a. Demand based explanation
Table 4, Column (1) summarizes the results from a restricted model including
only the DEMAND factors and the control variables. All four of the DEMAND factors
significantly predict dividend yield. Seniors and foreign equity investment (FPI) are
significantly positively related to the dividend yield, while government expenditure on
health and individualism (IDV) are significantly negatively related to the payout policy.
Column (4) summarizes the results from the pooled regression analysis. A positive and
13

For each independent variable, VIF is calculated as:
more details)
14

(see Greene (2000) for

Our results support Lee, Gupta, Chen, and Lee’s (2011) findings that dividend yield is negative
related to firm’s growth.
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statistically significant coefficient of 0.19 for Seniors suggests that Dividend Yield
increases by 0.19 standard deviations for every one standard deviation increase in
Seniors. Hence, firms headquartered in a country with larger Senior population pays
higher dividend than a firm headquartered in a country with lower Senior population.
This result is consistent with the findings in Becker et al. (2011) and supports our
Hypothesis 1.
A negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.12 for government health
expense suggest that with the decline in government health expenditure, personal out-ofpocket health related expenses increases and the firms respond to this increased demand
for dividends by investors by paying generous dividends. Hence, we find support for our
Hypothesis 2.
We also find a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.04 for FPI.
Hence, dividend yield also increases with the increase in the foreign equity investment.
This result is consistent with the findings in Jeon, Lee and Moffett (2011) and Kang, Lee
and Park (2010) and supports our Hypothesis 3. Finally we find that the dividend yield
declines with the increase investor individualism (IDV). Overconfident investors show
the willingness to assume the uncertainty associated with capital gains and hence reduce
the demand for dividends. This result is consistent with our Hypothesis 4.
Results for our other payout policy variables, dividend payer and dividend
initiation, are summarized in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5. Column (1) in Table 5 is
copied from column (4) in Table 4 and used as a benchmark for comparison purpose.
Column (2) summarizes the results for the impact of demand factors on firm’s probability
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of dividend payments. In general, the results in column (2) are qualitatively similar to the
ones presented for dividend yield in column (1). All the four demand factors are
significant predictor of probability of a firm paying dividend. We find that increase in
both, the Senior population and foreign investors, increases the probability of dividend
payments while increase in government health expense and IDV decreases the probability
of dividend payments.
Results for our last payout policy variable, dividend initiation, are summarized in
column (3) of Table 5. The variability in the dividend initiation variable is smaller
because few nondividend payers in the year 2005 began to pay dividends in the year 2006
(only 4% of the sample firms fall in this category). Three of the DEMAND factors,
Seniors, FPI, and IDV, significantly predict the dividend initiations.
These results provide evidence of an effect of investor demand on dividend
policy. The estimated coefficients suggest an economically important relation between
corporate payout behavior and local dividend demand, particularly for dividend yield and
dividend payer.
Although our findings are consistent with individual investor demand driving
corporate payout policy decisions, this clearly is not the only plausible interpretation of
our results. We consider potential alternative explanations in the following sub-sections.
IV.1.b. Explanation based on agency problems
Easterbrook (1984) argue that dividends help in reducing the agency problems
between the insiders and outside shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) use the ADRI from
La Porta et al. (1998) as a proxy for this agency cost. The ADRI for the year 2005 is
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corrected and updated by Spamann (2010). We analyze the agency explanation for
dividends for more recent period and using the corrected ADRI and business disclosure
index provided by the World Bank.

Table 4
Dividend Yield
This table presents OLS regression results for firm dividend payout behavior, estimated
over the sample of pooled observations from the 2005 cross sections. Dependent variable
is measured 1 year after the firm- and the country-level controls. Dividend Yield is the
dollar amount of dividends paid out in year divided by end-of-year equity market value.
Our key independent variables are Seniors is the proportion of population who are 65
years old or older in a given country in which a firm is headquartered, Government Health
Expense is the proportion of health expenditure funded by government, FPI is the total
investment in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by the stock
market capitalization, IDV is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001),
which measures investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias, ADRI is the Antidirector
Rights Index that measures shareholder protection, Business Disclosure measures the
financial and operational transparency of businesses in a given country, Informativeness is
the median logistic transformed relative firm-specific over market-wide stock return
variation estimated using an international two-factor model for U.S. dollar excess returns
across all firms for each country, Illiquidity is the proportion of zero daily returns across
all firms for each country averaged over the month, and Turnover ratio is the total value of
shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. Besides the key variables, the
regressions include firm-specific controls: Net Income, Cash, market-to-book ratio and
Debt. Volatility refers to the variance of monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years.
Return refers to monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years. Asset Growth is the
logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior year and Lagged Dividend Yield is the
dividend yield during the previous year. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for
heteroskedasticity.
, , denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1)
Dividend Demand Variables
0.06***
Seniors
(0.02)
Government
Health Expense

-0.07***
(0.03)

(2)

(3)

-

-

-

-
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(4)
0.19***
(0.03)
-0.12***
(0.03)

Table 4-continued
FPI
IDV

0.02*
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.02)

-

-

-

-

0.04***
(0.01)
-0.07***
(0.03)

Agency
ADRI
Business
Disclosure
Market Quality

-

-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.03**
(0.01)

Informativeness

-

-

Illiquidity

-

-

Turnover

-

-

-

-0.08***
(0.03)
-0.07***
(0.02)

-0.04***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.02)
-0.06***
(0.02)

-0.06***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.01)
-0.08***
(0.02)

0.04**
(0.02)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.13***
(0.03)
0.10***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.43***
(0.13)
0.29

0.05***
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.15***
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.42***
(0.13)
0.30

Control Variables
Return
Return Volatility
Net Income
Cash
Market-to-book
Debt
Log of Market
Value
Log of Assets
Asset Growth
Lag Dividend
Yield
Adjusted R2

0.04***
(0.02)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.13***
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.43***
(0.13)
0.29

0.04***
(0.02)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.12***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.43***
(0.13)
0.28
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Table 5
Dividend Payout Policy
This table presents OLS regression results for firm dividend payout behavior, estimated over
the sample of pooled observations from the 2005 cross sections. Dependent variable is
measured 1 year after the firm- and the country-level controls. Dividend Payer is an indicator
variable equal to 0 for nonpayers and 1 for dividend payers. Dividend Initiation is an indicator
variable equal to 1 for nonpayers at the end of year t-1 who start to pay a dividend in year t, and
zero otherwise. Our key independent variables are Seniors is the proportion of population who
are 65 years old or older in a given country in which a firm is headquartered, Government
Health Expense is the proportion of health expenditure funded by government, FPI is the total
investment in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by the stock
market capitalization, IDV is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001), which
measures investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias, ADRI is the Antidirector Rights
Index that measures shareholder protection, Business Disclosure measures the financial and
operational transparency of businesses in a given country, Informativeness is the median
logistic transformed relative firm-specific over market-wide stock return variation estimated
using an international two-factor model for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for each
country, Illiquidity is the proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country
averaged over the month, and Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded divided by the
average market capitalization. Besides the key variables, the regressions include firm-specific
controls: Net Income, Cash, market-to-book ratio and Debt. Volatility refers to the variance of
monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years. Return refers to monthly stock returns over
the preceding 3 years. Asset Growth is the logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior
year and Lagged Dividend Yield is the dividend yield during the previous year. Standard errors
(shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity.
, , denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dividend Yield
Dividend Payer
Dividend Initiation
Dividend Demand Variables
0.19***
0.34***
0.07**
Seniors
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.01)
Government Health
-0.12***
-0.14***
-0.01
Expense
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.04***
0.05***
0.04*
FPI
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
-0.07***
-0.06**
-0.06*
IDV
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.04)
Agency
-0.08***
-0.07***
-0.03*
ADRI
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.01)
-0.07***
-0.03**
-0.04*
Business Disclosure
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
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Table 5-continued
Market Quality
Informativeness
Illiquidity
Turnover ratio

-0.06***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.01)
-0.08***
(0.02)

-0.02**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)

-0.04*
(0.02)
0.03*
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.03)

0.05***
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.15***
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.42***
(0.13)
0.30

0.11***
(0.02)
-0.06*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
0.03*
(0.02)
-0.02***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.28***
(0.03)
0.15***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.25***
(0.07)
0.36

0.05**
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.00)
0.01*
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
0.04
(0.03)
0.06**
(0.03)
-0.06**
(0.02)
0.14***
(0.04)
0.03

Control Variables
Return
Return Volatility
Net Income
Cash
Market-to-book
Debt
Log of Market Value
Log of Assets
Asset Growth
Lag Dividend Yield
Adjusted R2

Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 summarize the impact of agency cost on the
dividend yield. We find a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.08 for
ADRI and -0.07 for Business Disclosure in column (4). These results suggest that firms
operating in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders and low business
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disclosure pay higher dividends. We find qualitatively similar results for other two
payout policy variables, dividend payer and dividend initiation, as summarized in Table
5, columns (2) and (3). These results contradict the findings of La Porta et al. (2000) and
are inconsistent with our Hypothesis 5. Hence, our results reject the outcome model but
support the substitute model for dividends. We provide two explanations for this
contradiction. First, we consider a different time period than La Port et al. (2000). The
way the market operates has changed drastically between the two time periods [see Jain,
(2005) for more details]. Second, Spamann (2010) revised the La Porta et al (1998) ADRI
index and finds that the LLSV ADRI compiled by La Porta et al. does not follow rigorous
legal definition. To avoid the ambiguity in compiling ADRI, Spamann gets help from
local attorney in individual countries and compiles a new set of corrected ADRI. The
revised measurement of agency costs provides a new perspective on the relation between
the dividend payout policy and the agency problems.
In untabulated results, we analyzed the impact of ADRI on dividend yields for the
year 1997 (same period as in La Porta et al. (2000)).We find support for La Porta et al.
results for this sample period and using the LLSV ADRI index from La Porta et al.
(1998). When we used the corrected index from Spamann for 1997, we find that the sign
of the coefficient on ADRI is consistent with the outcome model but not significant.
IV.1.c. Explanation based on market quality
Miller and Modigliani’s homemade dividend argument relies on the key
assumptions of complete transparency and frictionless trading. We test these predictions
for markets with varying degree of transparency and illiquidity. Table 4, column (3)
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summarizes the results for the restricted model including only the market quality factors:
the price informativeness and the market liquidity, and the control variables. We find a
negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.04 for informativeness which
suggests that higher the informativeness, lower is the dividend yield. Pooled regression
results from column (4) show similar results and support our Hypothesis 6.
We also find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for Illiquidity and
negative coefficient for Turnover in both, the restricted regression results (column (3))
and pooled regression results (column (4)). These results suggest that firms headquartered
in a country with better stock market liquidity pay lower dividends. Hence, the results
support our Hypothesis 7.
We find qualitatively similar results for the other two payout policy variables,
dividend payer and dividend initiation, summarized in Table 5, columns (2) and (3),
except for Turnover, which is not significant predictor for either the dividend payer or the
dividend initiation. Hence, the firms headquartered in a country with poor stock price
informativeness and lower liquidity, have a higher probability for dividend payments and
dividend initiations.
IV.2. Relative contribution of the individual factors
In order to measure the relative importance of each of the three factors:
shareholder demand, agency costs and market quality, in explaining the dividend yield,
we calculate the individual contribution of each of these factors to the R2 of the pooled
dividend yield regression summarized in Table 4, Column (4). Results from this analysis
are summarized in Table 6. We find that all the three factors have significant explanatory
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power for explaining the dividend yields of the sample firms. We find that demand
factors and market quality factors improve the explanatory power for dividend yields by
about 2% each, while the agency factors improve the explanatory power for dividend
yields by 2.5%, beyond what is explained by the firm specific controls.

Table 6
Change in R2 test
This table reports the individual contribution of each category of factors influencing the payout
policy in explaining the dividend yield which is the dollar amount of dividends paid out
divided by the end-of-year equity market value. Demand Factors include: Seniors, which is the
proportion of population who are 65 years old or older in a given country in which a firm is
headquartered, Government Health Expense, which is the proportion of health expenditure
funded by government, as reported by the World Bank, FPI, which is the total investment in
domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized by the stock market
capitalization, IDV, which is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001), that
measures investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Agency factors are ADRI, which is
the Antidirector Rights Index that measures shareholder protection, and Business Disclosure,
that measures the financial and operational transparency of businesses in a given country.
Market Factors include Informativeness, which is the median logistic transformed relative
firm-specific over market-wide stock return variation estimated using an international twofactor model for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for each country, Illiquidity, which
is the proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for each country averaged over the
month, and Turnover ratio, which is the total value of shares traded divided by the average
market capitalization. In addition to these factors, the regressions also include firm-specific
controls: Net Income, Cash, market-to-book ratio and Debt. Volatility refers to the variance of
monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years. Return refers to monthly stock returns over
the preceding 3 years. Asset Growth is the logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior
year and Lagged Dividend Yield is the dividend yield during the previous year. F (Change)
statistic is calculated as:
[ SSE(R) - SSE(F) ] / [ df(R) - df(F) ]
F(Change) = ------------------------------------------SSE(F) / df(F)
SSE(R) and df(R) is the sum of squared errors and degrees of freedom for the restricted model,
SSE(F) and df(F) is the sum of squared errors and degrees of freedom for the full model,
,
, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

135

Table 6- continued
VARIABLE
Demand Factors
Agency Factor
Market Factors

Change in R-square
0.019
0.025
0.021

F (change)
9.65***
8.94***
8.27***

P-value
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

IV.3. Taxes and dividend payout policy
As our final analysis, we analyze the impact of taxes on dividend payout policy.
The empirical evidence of impact of taxes on dividend payout policy is ambiguous. Many
researchers have argued that changes in the tax rate on dividends have a significant effect
on payout policy (Elton and Gruber, 1970; Pettit, 1977; Perez-Gonzalez, 2003; and
Graham and Kumar; 2006) while others have found that taxes have no effect on dividend
payout policy (Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum, 1978; Grinstein and Michaely,
2005; and Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan, 2009). Hence, the debate over the effect of
taxes on dividend payout policy continued unresolved. We participate in this debate and
use the net dividend tax to measure the level of taxes on dividends in each country. Since
we have dividend tax information only for the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, for this analysis we consider companies listed on 24
countries for which we can find the data on net tax rate on dividends. The Net Dividend
Tax is the top marginal statutory personal income tax rate imposed on dividend income
after taking account imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances in each country.
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 7. We find a negative and
statistically significant coefficient for Net Taxes for all the three dividend payout policy
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variables. This result suggests that the higher the tax rate on dividends, the lower is the
dividend yield. We also find that probability of dividend payments and dividend
initiations increases with decline in the dividend tax rates.

Table 7
Dividend Payout Policy and Taxes
This table presents OLS regression results for firm dividend payout behavior, estimated over the sample
of pooled observations from the 2005 cross sections. Dependent variable is measured 1 year after the
firm- and the country-level controls. Dividend Yield is the dollar amount of dividends paid out in year
divided by end-of-year equity market value. Dividend Payer is an indicator variable equal to 0 for
nonpayers and 1 for dividend payers. Dividend Initiation is an indicator variable equal to 1 for nonpayers
at the end of year t-1 who start to pay a dividend in year t, and zero otherwise. Our key independent
variables are Net tax is the top marginal statutory personal income tax rate imposed on dividend income
after taking account imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances in each country, Seniors is the
proportion of population who are 65 years old or older in a given country in which a firm is
headquartered, Government Health Expense is the proportion of health expenditure funded by
government, FPI is the total investment in domestic stock markets by foreign investors and is normalized
by the stock market capitalization, IDV is an index of individualism developed by Hofstede (2001), which
measures investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias, ADRI is the Antidirector Rights Index that
measures shareholder protection, Business Disclosure, that measures the financial and operational
transparency of businesses in a given country, Informativeness is the median logistic transformed relative
firm-specific over market-wide stock return variation estimated using an international two-factor model
for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for each country, Illiquidity is the proportion of zero daily
returns across all firms for each country averaged over the month, and Turnover ratio is the total value of
shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. Besides the key variables, the regressions
include firm-specific controls: Net Income, Cash, market-to-book ratio and Debt. Volatility refers to the
variance of monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years. Return refers to monthly stock returns over
the preceding 3 years. Asset Growth is the logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior year and
Lagged Dividend Yield is the dividend yield during the previous year. Standard errors (in parentheses)
allow for heteroskedasticity.
, , denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

(1)
Dividend Yield

(2)
Dividend Payer

(3)
Dividend Initiation

-0.11***
(0.04)

-0.02*
(0.01)

-0.04*
(0.03)

0.02**
(0.01)
-0.09***
(0.03)

0.16***
(0.03)
-0.14***
(0.03)

0.12***
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.03)

Taxes
Net Tax
Dividend Demand Variables
Seniors
Government Health
Expense

137

Table 7-continued
FPI
IDV

0.04**
(0.02)
-0.07**
(0.03)

0.05**
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.03)

0.08***
(0.03)
-0.05*
(0.03)

-0.04*
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)

-0.03*
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)

-0.03*
(0.02)
-0.04*
(0.03)

-0.10***
(0.03)
0.03*
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.03)

-0.02*
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.01)
-0.11***
(0.03)

-0.02*
(0.01)
0.13***
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.04)

0.06***
(0.02)
-0.01*
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.10***
(0.03)
0.14***
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.40*
(0.22)
0.31

0.13***
(0.02)
-0.02***
(0.00)
0.05***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.05*
(0.03)
0.25***
(0.04)
0.19***
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.23*
(0.12)
0.37

0.07**
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.04)
0.08*
(0.04)
-0.04*
(0.02)
0.20***
(0.04)
0.06

Agency
ADRI
Business Disclosure
Market Quality
Informativeness
Illiquidity
Turnover Ratio
Control Variables
Return
Return Volatility
Net Income
Cash
Market-to-book
Debt
Log of Market Value
Log of Assets
Asset Growth
Lag Dividend Yield
Adjusted R2
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V. Robustness Tests
V.1. Country fixed effects
A robust test with respect to heterogeneous error variance terms across countries
is in order. Stock prices within a country are subject to market disturbance and hence,
their regression disturbance terms for all firms in a country will be highly cross
correlated. Ordinary least squares estimators are unbiased but their variance-covariance
matrix is inefficient. In estimating an efficient covariance structure, White (1980)
heteroscedasticity consistent estimator is applied to control for both within country
correlation and heteroscedasticity across countries. The correlation among various
residual terms from a country is allowed to change across countries. The variancecovariance matrix for regression coefficients is estimated by
∑

̂ ̂

where X is the regression design matrix, Xi is the

explanatory variables for firms in the i-th country, ̂ is residual vector estimated from
ordinary least squares regression model applied to firms in the i-th country. This exercise
gives us results consistent with the ones presented earlier. We find support for our result
that all the three factors- investor demand, agency costs and market quality, explain the
dividend payout policy, although the statistical significance for IDV regression
coefficient weakens after the adjustment for within country correlation and
heteroscedasticity across countries.
V.2. Sample Selection
For the results presented thus far, we select top 100 stocks from each sample
country based on market capitalization. In untabulated results we also use total assets as
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selection criterion and we get qualitatively similar results as the ones reported. Our
results are also robust to inclusion of all the firms available in Datastream from the 32
sample countries.
It might be argued that selecting top 100 firms based on market capitalization may
bias the results due to the presence of large capital markets, such as US, UK, and Japan.
Hence, instead of selecting top 100 firms from each country, we randomly select 100
firms from each of the sample country. Our results are robust to this alternate sample
selection process.15
V.3. Model Specifications
The results presented thus far are derived using the ordinary least squares
regression method. To test the robustness of our results to alternate model specifications,
we estimate these regressions using Tobit framework for Dividend Yield and Probit and
Logit frameworks for Dividend Payer and Dividend Initiation models. The results are
reported in Table 8. We obtain qualitatively similar results as the ones reported in Table
5. All the three factors, investor demand for dividends, agency costs, and market quality,
significantly predict dividend payout policy and the coefficients have the same signs with
similar statistical significance as reported in Table 5.

15

Results are available on request.
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Table 8
Dividend Payout Policy re-examined using Tobit, Probit and Logit regression models
This table presents regression results for firm dividend payout behavior, estimated over the
sample of pooled observations from 2005 cross-sections. The regressions and all the variables
mirror those from Table 5. Instead of OLS, in this table a Tobit model is employed for the
regression results reported in the column (1), a Probit specification is employed for the results
reported in the columns (2) and (4), and a Logit specification is employed for the results reported
in the columns (3) and (5). Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity.
, , denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Dividend Yield
Dividend Payer
Dividend Initiation
Tobit
Probit
Logit
Probit
Logit
Dividend Demand Variables
0.48***
0.50***
0.39***
0.09**
0.10**
Seniors
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Government Health
-0.31***
-0.31***
-0.23***
-0.07
-0.07
Expense
(-0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(0.11)
0.10**
0.07**
0.05**
0.05**
0.04*
FPI
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.18***
-0.11**
-0.03*
-0.14**
-0.18**
IDV
(-0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.04)
Agency
-0.19***
-0.09**
-0.06***
-0.02*
-0.03*
ADRI
(-0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.17***
-0.04**
-0.02*
-0.09*
-0.13*
Business Disclosure
(-0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.04)
Market Quality
-0.14***
-0.07***
-0.06**
-0.04*
-0.04*
Informativeness
(-0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.33***
0.05**
0.05**
0.03*
0.03*
Illiquidity
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.21***
-0.06*
-0.10**
0.00
0.00
Turnover ratio
(-0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(2.02)
Control Variables
0.11***
0.38***
0.40***
0.17***
0.22***
Return
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.02)
-0.07*
-1.84***
-1.83***
-0.45**
-0.57*
Return Volatility
(-0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.08)
(0.11)
0.13*
0.10
0.11
-0.04
-0.05
Net Income
(0.04)
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.87)
(1.04)
0.14***
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.04
Cash
(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.14)
(0.37)
(0.43)
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Table 8-continued
Market-to-book
Debt
Log of Market Value
Log of Assets
Asset Growth
Lag Dividend Yield
Pseudo R2

-0.08**
(-0.02)
-0.05
(-0.11)
0.39***
(0.01)
0.19***
(0.03)
-0.04
(-0.04)
1.07***
(0.00)
0.30

-0.05
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.77)
0.35***
(0.01)
0.26***
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.03)
0.44***
(0.01)
0.53

-0.07
(0.11)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.29***
(0.01)
0.21***
(0.02)
-0.00
(1.34)
1.38***
(0.01)
0.60

0.01
(0.37)
-0.01
(1.08)
0.11
(0.08)
0.18*
(0.05)
-0.13***
(0.01)
0.15***
(0.01)
0.08

0.01
(0.52)
-0.02
(0.92)
0.13
(0.10)
0.22*
(0.06)
-0.14***
(0.01)
0.15***
(0.01)
0.08

VI. Conclusions
This paper uses a sample of firms from 32 countries around the world to analyze
the firm’s dividend payout policies. We take advantage of the diverse demographics,
market quality and different levels of legal protection of minority shareholders across
these countries to compare dividend policies of companies. Finally, we analyze the effect
of taxes on dividend payout policy.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) raise an important question of whether the firms set
their payout policies and investors sort accordingly, or whether companies set their
payout policies in response to the preferences of their current shareholders. In this paper,
we provide evidence consistent with the later argument. Specifically, we test for the
effect of dividend demand on payout policy. Firms seem to respond to the tendency of
older investors to hold dividend-paying stocks in combination with individual investors’
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increased financial demands due to a low government funding in health expenses. Firms
also try to attract foreign investors by resorting to a generous payout policy. We also find
that overconfident investors, as measured by index of individualism (IDV) developed by
Hofstede (2001), reduce their demand for dividends. Demographics thus provide an
empirical proxy for dividend demand, which we exploit in this paper to examine the
broader question of whether the demand factors of current owners influence corporate
actions.
Next, we analyze the agency costs based explanation for payout policy. Agency
costs are captured by the extent of minority shareholder protection as measured by AntiDirector Right Index (ADRI) and the level of business disclosure. We find that firms
operating in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders and low level of
business disclosure pay higher dividends. Unlike LaPorta et al. (2000) findings that
support the outcome agency model, our results support the substitute agency model for
dividends. Dividends serve as a substitute for effective legal protection, which enables
firms in unprotected legal environments to establish reputations for good treatment of
investors through the dividend policies. We find that the reason for this contradiction is
the difference in the study periods covered by the two studies. Also, Spamann (2010)
argues that the LLSV ADRI compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) does not follow rigorous
legal definition. The findings are consistent with the intuition that when shareholders face
the potential exploitation due to weak shareholder protection, the demand for dividend
payments becomes stronger.
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A country with good market quality has better price informativeness due to
improved transparency, and higher stock market liquidity. We test the effect of market
quality on payout policy and find that a firm headquartered in a country whose stock
market is transparent and liquid, pay lower dividends. Finally, we show that companies
headquartered in countries with low dividend tax rates pay higher dividends relative to
the companies headquartered in countries with high taxes on dividends.
Overall, our results support the presence of strong dividend clienteles. Firms
headquartered in countries with a lower proportion of senior citizens, generous universal
health care, higher investor overconfidence, lower proportion of foreign investors, lower
agency costs, a liquid and transparent market, and higher taxes have clients for firms with
lower dividend payouts.
Understanding dividend policy is important not only because of the amount of
money involved and the repeated nature of the decision, but also because payout policy is
closely related to, and interacts with most of the financial and investment decisions firms
make (Allen and Michaely, 2003). Synthesizing innovations in financial theories and
measurements, this global investigation of dividend clienteles substantiate the
explanatory power of variables derived from shareholder demand, agency problems,
market quality and taxes.
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Appendix A
Variable

Description

Source

Payout policy variables
Dividend Yield

Dollar amount of dividends paid out in year divided
by end-of-year equity market value.

DataStream

Dividend Payer

An indicator variable equal to 0 for nonpayers and 1
for dividend payers.

DataStream

Dividend
Initiation

An indicator variable equal to 1 for nonpayers at the
end of year t-1 who start paying dividend in year t
and zero otherwise.

DataStream

Dividend Demand Variables
Seniors

Proportion of population who are 65 years old or
older in a given country where the sample firm is
headquartered

World Bank

Government
Health Expense

Proportion of health expenditure funded by
government in a given country where the sample
firm is headquartered

World Bank

FPI

Total investment in domestic stock markets by
foreign investors divided by the stock market
capitalization of the country where the sample firm
is headquartered

World Bank

IDV

Index developed by Hofstede (2001) and measures
overconfidence and self-attribution bias of investors
from the country where the sample firm is
headquartered

Hofstede (2001)

Antidirector
Rights Index
(ADRI)

The index is constructed by Spamann (2010) and
measures the level of shareholder protection in a
given country. It was constructed as in LLSV (1998)
but a reexamination of the legal data leads to
corrections for thirty-three out of forty-six countries
analyzed.

Spamann (2010)

Business
Disclosure

Measure of the financial and operational
transparency of businesses in a given country. Based
on a survey conducted by the World Bank and the

World Bank

Agency
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scores vary between one and ten
Market Quality

Informativeness

The median logistic transformed relative firmspecific over market-wide stock return variation
estimated using an international two-factor model
for U.S. dollar excess returns across all firms for
each country over the previous 3 years

DataStream

Illiquidity

Proportion of zero daily returns across all firms for
each country averaged over the month over the
previous 3 years

DataStream

Turnover Ratio

Total value of shares traded divided by the average
stock market capitalization of the country

World Bank

Return

Monthly stock returns over the preceding 3 years

DataStream

Return Volatility

Variance of the monthly stock returns over the
preceding 3 years

DataStream

Net Income

Net income of the sample firm divided by its market
value of equity

DataStream

Cash

Net cash held by the sample firm divided by its
market value of equity

DataStream

Market-to-book

Market to book ratio of the sample firm’s equity

DataStream

Debt

Net debt of the sample firm divided by its market
value of equity

DataStream

Log of Market
Value

Logarithm of the market value of equity of the
sample firm

DataStream

Log of Assets

Logarithm of the total assets of the sample firm

DataStream

Asset Growth

Logarithm of the growth rate of assets over the prior
year

DataStream

Lag Dividend
Yield

Dividend yield during the previous year

DataStream

Net Tax

Top marginal statutory personal income tax rate
imposed on dividend income after taking account
imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances
in each country

OECD database

Control Variables
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